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INTRODUCTION
I have a proposition for you. It’s called Proposition 209. All you
have to do is stop discriminating in favor of women and racial minorities, and your perpetual problems of race and gender discrimination
will finally disappear. If this Proposition sounds too good to be
true . . . well, you know how the saying goes. In law, as in life, the seductiveness of a proposition owes as much to its disregard of established norms as to its underlying content. Eliminate the affront to social convention, and a proposition promises about as much excitement as a routine liaison with one’s spouse. But add the allure of
forbidden temptation, and a proposition acquires a naughty fascination that can make it seem irresistibly compelling. Propositions are
also socially precocious. They intimate a liberated enlightenment
that trumps the social inhibitions to which most of us remain unwittingly captive. To be sure, indignant disapproval is the appropriate
response to an indecent proposal in polite society. But beneath the
surface of such indignation, can there truly be anyone who is not secretly drawn to the thrill of a proposition?
True to form, California’s Proposition 209 is thrilling, seductive,
and replete with naughty fascination. The recently adopted ballot
initiative, which has amended the California Constitution to prohibit
race- and gender-based affirmative action by agencies of the state, is
thrilling in its defiance of current convention. Its populist rejection
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of the affirmative action concept is staggering in scope, and irreverent in demeanor. It seems to condemn all affirmative action programs—regardless of their remedial justification or prospective
promise—in a brazen rebuke of the social policymakers who spent
decades putting those programs in place. Moreover, Proposition 209
is seductive in its simplicity. It suggests that centuries of intractable
race and gender injustice can be neutralized through the unadorned
expedient of prospective neutrality. Although such a suggestion dismisses conventional wisdom on the complex nature of race and gender relations, Proposition 209 lays precocious claim to one of those
liberated enlightenments that the uninitiated have yet to recognize as
appropriate. Proposition 209 is also replete with the naughty fascination of forbidden temptation, because of the bewitching possibility that it might be merely a ruse. Formally denominated the “California Civil Rights Initiative,” Proposition 209 pledges to advance the
cause of race and gender equality. But like the separate-but-equal
and gender protective regimes that preceded it, Proposition 209 may
be just another discriminatory attempt to appropriate resources by
those accustomed to having them, at the expense of those accustomed to having them taken away.
As a nation whose formulation of social policy is constitutionally
constrained, we reflexively turn to the courts for constitutional resolution of our controversial social policy disputes. But it turns out that
the Constitution has surprisingly little to say about the validity of
Proposition 209. This fact is starkly demonstrated by the divergent
judicial receptions that Proposition 209 has received to date. Shortly
after the adoption of Proposition 209, a federal district court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation, finding a
“strong probability” that Proposition 209 would ultimately be held to
1
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. A few
months later a three-judge court of appeals panel reversed the district
court, stating that “[a]s a matter of ‘conventional’ equal protection

1. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, No. C 96-4024 TEH, 1996 WL 691962, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 1996) (issuing temporary restraining order). In its subsequent opinion
granting a preliminary injunction, the district court replaced its previous finding of a “strong
probability” of success with a finding that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a “probability of success” on their claim of unconstitutionality. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp.
1480, 1491, 1510, 1519, 1520 (N.D. Cal. 1996), rev’d, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
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analysis, there is simply no doubt that Proposition 209 is constitutional.”2 The discrepancy between these two adjudications is telling.
The divergent doctrinal arguments offered by the district court
and the court of appeals seem plausible within the confines of the
opinions that advance them, but like two ships passing in the night,
neither opinion engages the arguments made by the other. The district court determined that Proposition 209 was likely to be unconstitutional because it treated race and gender preferences differently than it treated other preferences, such as preferences for veterans, athletes or alumni children. Accordingly, the district court held
that Proposition 209 constituted a race and gender classification that
was prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.3
More specifically, the district court found that Proposition 209 restructured the political process in a way that made it more difficult
for proponents of race and gender preferences to secure the preferences that they desired (they had to amend the state constitution)
than it was for proponents of other types of preferences to secure the
preferences that they desired (they needed only to secure the adoption of ordinary legislation or administrative regulations).4 The court
of appeals, on the other hand, found that Proposition 209 could not
violate the Constitution under “conventional” equal protection
analysis because it required the same race and gender neutrality that
the Equal Protection Clause itself required.5 Moreover, as a matter
of “political structure” analysis, the court of appeals held that Proposition 209 did not impermissibly restructure the political process. The
court found that any political burdens suffered by women and minorities ultimately resulted from the neutrality commands of the
Equal Protection Clause, and not solely from the Proposition 209
prohibition on race and gender preferences.6
Despite each opinion’s facial plausibility, neither responds to the
baseline assumptions made by the other. The court of appeals opinion ignores the fact that Proposition 209 applies meaningfully only to
affirmative action that is permitted by the Constitution (unconstitutional affirmative action would be invalid even in the absence of
2. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 1997). The Supreme
Court ultimately denied certiorari, thereby allowing the court of appeals decision to stand. See
Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
3. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1504-06, 1508-10.
4. See id. at 1506-10.
5. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 701-02.
6. See id. at 702-09.
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Proposition 209). As a result, Proposition 209 is itself an impermissible race and gender classification. It is a race and gender classification because it treats race and gender preferences differently than it
treats other preferences. And it is impermissible under the heightened scrutiny that is applied to race and gender classifications, because its justification for this differential treatment is to neutralize affirmative action preferences that are themselves constitutionally
valid. These constitutionally valid affirmative action preferences are
therefore doctrinally indistinguishable from other non-prohibited
preferences, but Proposition 209 treats them in ways that are fatally
different. Moreover, Proposition 209 treats race and gender preferences differently than other preferences precisely because they benefit race and gender minorities rather than groups like veterans, athletes or alumni children: this makes Proposition 209 discriminatory in
the most traditional sense. The court of appeals response to the district court argument, therefore, is simply non-responsive.
But there is a similar problem with the district court argument.
The district court asserts that Proposition 209 is itself a racial preference that restructures the political process in a discriminatory manner, but as the court of appeals points out, Proposition 209 treats all
races and genders in precisely the same way. It is true that the topics
addressed by Proposition 209 are constitutionally suspect race and
gender groups, but Proposition 209 is utterly neutral in the way that it
treats those constitutionally suspect groups: it bans all preferences
regardless of whom they benefit or burden. As a result of this neutrality, Proposition 209 is not subject to heightened constitutional
scrutiny, because it is not a race or gender classification at all and it
cannot violate an Equal Protection Clause that does nothing more
than demand equal treatment within race and gender groups. Al7
though Loving v. Virginia arguably holds that a legislative classification can become a race or gender classification merely by using the
topics of race or gender as the basis for classification,8 this aspect of
Loving may simply be wrong. The district court response to the court
of appeals argument, therefore, is simply non-responsive.
Each opinion views Proposition 209 from a different perspective,
but neither perspective can realistically claim to be more constitutionally correct than the other. Each perspective merely reflects a
7. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
8. See id. at 8-9 (holding that a statutory scheme to prevent interracial marriages on the
basis of race violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses).
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different set of baseline assumptions and normative preferences concerning the desirability of affirmative action as a policy. The liberal
black district court judge likes affirmative action as a means of combating the lingering effects of race and gender discrimination, but the
conservative white court of appeals judges dislike affirmative action
because it interferes with their desire for prospective race and gender
neutrality. There is, however, nothing in the Constitution that is capable of resolving this social policy dispute without simply elevating
one policy preference above the other for reasons of subjective normative appeal. The meaning of the Equal Protection Clause is simply
indeterminate with respect to the constitutionality of Proposition 209.
This doctrinal indeterminacy is a signal that the judiciary does
not have any productive role to play in the resolution of the current
affirmative action debate. In a democracy, resolution of that debate
is properly left to the politically accountable branches of government
rather than to the politically unaccountable Supreme Court. In essence, the affirmative action debate constitutes a nonjusticiable political question in the classic sense in which that concept was first invoked by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.9 Moreover,
the Court’s record on race- and gender-based policymaking counsels
against its entry into the Proposition 209 debate. When the Supreme
Court has intervened in the political process of race- or gender-based
policy formulation, it has often ended up sacrificing minority interests for majoritarian gain, as it did in Dred Scott v. Sandford,10 Plessy
11
12
v. Ferguson and even Brown v. Board of Education. Ironically, the
9. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803) (observing that the exercise of executive discretion
regarding political issues can never be examined by the courts).
10. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 451-52 (1856) (invalidating the Missouri Compromise because the Constitution did not grant Congress the power to deny a citizen
(slaveholder) his property (slaves) by prohibiting slavery in certain U.S. Territories, and
thereby returning Dred Scott and his family to slave status).
11. 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896) (constitutionalizing the “separate but equal” doctrine and
arguably mandating that public accommodations be “equal” for all races, but still allowing
separate accommodations based solely upon race).
12. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) [hereinafter Brown I ]. Although Brown seemed to prohibit
governmental use of racial classifications in general, see id. at 494-95 (overruling the Plessy
“separate but equal” doctrine); cf. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 174 (1962) (“[A] judgment legitimating
[antimiscegenation] statutes would have been unthinkable, given the principle of the School
Segregation Cases . . . .”), and promised to desegregate public schools, see Brown v. Board. of
Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) [hereinafter Brown II ] (requiring desegregation of public
schools “with all deliberate speed”), it did neither. Northern schools are still badly segregated,
and racial classifications are common in governmental actions ranging from drug profiles to
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equality concept on which Brown rests has now been rendered most
useful as a tool to invalidate affirmative action programs.13
The Supreme Court declined to enter the doctrinal debate between the lower courts concerning the constitutionality of Proposition 209, electing to deny certiorari rather than address the merits of
the pending facial challenge to Proposition 209.14 However, the
Court will almost certainly be called on again to resolve the constitutionality of Proposition 209 when Proposition 209 is invoked to invalidate particular California affirmative action programs. The Supreme Court will be in a difficult position as it considers the proper
response to Proposition 209. On a clean slate the Court could simply
defer to the political process and decline to invalidate Proposition
209. But the Court is not writing on a clean slate. It has already intervened in the political policymaking process in cases like Adarand
15
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and the recent string of voting rights
16
cases to invalidate racial affirmative action programs. For reasons
that are developed in Part III of this Article, the Court cannot legitimately uphold political prohibitions on affirmative action after having selectively intervened to invalidate political endorsements of affirmative action. Accordingly, if the Supreme Court is to behave in a
manner that does not itself violate the Equal Protection Clause, it
must either overrule cases like Adarand and the voting rights cases in

adoption standards. See infra notes 395-412 and accompanying text (discussing failure of
Brown to realize promised objectives).
13. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1951 (1996) (plurality opinion) (invalidating
majority-minority voting districts adopted by state legislature); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894,
1899 (1996) (same); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 921 (1995) (same); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 238-39 (1995) (apparently invalidating congressionallyadopted minority construction preference under strict scrutiny); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 486 (1989) (invalidating minority construction set-aside adopted by city
council); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(invalidating layoff preference for minority teachers adopted by board of education as part of
consent decree); cf. Lawyer v. Department of Justice, 117 S. Ct. 2186, 2194-95 (1997)
(upholding, under rational-basis scrutiny, constitutionality of voter redistricting plan that used
race as factor, where race did not predominate over traditional districting principles and plan
was part of consent decree that omitted disputed majority-minority district); Abrams v. Johnson, 117 S. Ct. 1925, 1941 (1997) (upholding court-adopted districting plan that substituted one
majority-minority district for three majority-minority districts contained in plan adopted by
state legislature after Supreme Court invalidation and remand in Miller).
14. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 397 (1997).
15. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 238-39 (subjecting minority preference in award of construction contracts to strict scrutiny and likely invalidation).
16. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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order to let the political process resolve the affirmative action debate,
or invalidate Proposition 209 under the same standards that the
Court has recently used to invalidate affirmative action programs.
Judicial withdrawal from the affirmative action debate is the
preferable alternative, but such a withdrawal would entail the relinquishment of more social policymaking power than the Supreme
Court is likely to give up. Accordingly, it is most realistic to hope
that the Court will invalidate Proposition 209 so that proponents and
opponents of affirmative action can compete on more equal terms in
whatever sphere the Court leaves open for political policymaking. If
the Court chooses this option, it should rely on a form of doctrinal
analysis that is viscerally more satisfying than the political structure
analysis emphasized by the lower courts. Because Proposition 209
redistributes societal resources on the basis of race and gender just as
other affirmative action programs do, the Court should subject
Proposition 209 to heightened scrutiny just as it subjects other affirmative action programs to heightened scrutiny. If the Court is not
willing to treat Proposition 209 as analogous to other affirmative action measures, the Court should still subject Proposition 209 to
heightened scrutiny under a Washington v. Davis17 intentional discrimination analysis.18 An intentional discrimination analysis also reveals that Proposition 209 is a race and gender classification that
should trigger heightened judicial scrutiny. Moreover, the Supreme
Court’s stated aversion to discriminatory animus, recently reaffirmed
in Romer v. Evans,19 indicates that Proposition 209 cannot survive
heightened, or even minimal, constitutional scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause.20 The Supreme Court, therefore, possesses the
doctrinal means to invalidate Proposition 209 in a convincing manner. What remains to be seen is whether the Court possesses the
commitment to race and gender equality that is necessary to generate
this result.
Part I of this Article discusses what is at stake in the debate surrounding Proposition 209. Part I.A discusses the apparent purpose of
Proposition 209. Part I.B discusses subtle ambiguities in the meaning
17. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
18. See id. at 238-48 (requiring proof of a discriminatory purpose to trigger heightened
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause).
19. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
20. See id. at 1627 (commenting that because Colorado’s anti-gay ballot measure appears
to be rooted in anti-gay animus, the measure “lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state
interests”).
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of Proposition 209. Part I.C discusses how these ambiguities emanate
from contestable beliefs about the abstract concepts of neutrality and
merit, and suggests that the continued viability of these concepts is
what is really at stake in the contemporary affirmative action debate.
Part II analyzes the legal arguments that the lower courts made
for and against the constitutionality of Proposition 209, in an effort to
demonstrate that the governing equal protection standards are doctrinally indeterminate. Part II.A analyzes the court of appeals opinion upholding the constitutionality of Proposition 209, and highlights
the doctrinal difficulties inherent in the court of appeals view that
Proposition 209 is race- and gender-neutral. Part II.B analyzes the
district court opinion enjoining implementation of Proposition 209 on
equal protection grounds, and highlights the doctrinal difficulties inherent in the district court view that Proposition 209 is a discriminatory race and gender classification.
Part III argues that the Supreme Court should either withdraw
from the social policy debate about affirmative action, or maintain
consistency by invalidating Proposition 209 as it has recently chosen
to invalidate other affirmative action programs. Part III.A suggests
that doctrinal indeterminacy precludes the Supreme Court from
playing any productive role in the resolution of the on-going political
debate about affirmative action, but presumes that the Court will be
unwilling to treat the policy desirability of affirmative action as a
nonjusticiable political question. Part III.B then argues that the
Court should subject Proposition 209 to heightened scrutiny as either
an affirmative action program for white males, or an act of intentional discrimination under Washington v. Davis, and should then invalidate Proposition 209 under the discriminatory animus analysis of
Romer. This Article concludes that whatever action the Supreme
Court chooses to take, it would be unrealistic to expect the Court to
act as if it were not itself an integral part of our political culture.
I. STAKES OF THE DEBATE
Proposition 209 was adopted by the voters of California as a
ballot initiative in the November 5, 1996 general election, by a margin of 54 to 46 percent of the nearly 9 million votes cast.21 Formally

21. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 696, 697 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
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entitled the “California Civil Rights Initiative,”22 Proposition 209
amends the California Constitution so that it generally prohibits raceand gender-based affirmative action by California state agencies.23
Proposition 209 has attracted national attention because of the impact that its ultimate constitutional fate may have on similar proposals to eliminate affirmative action presently being considered by
Congress and other states.24
On November 6, 1996—the day after Proposition 209 was adopted—a coalition representing the interests of women and racial minorities who opposed Proposition 209 filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, mounting a facial challenge to Proposition 209 on equal protection and federal pre22. See id. at 696.
23. See id. (quoting California Ballot Pamphlet prepared by non-partisan California Legislative Analyst’s Office to describe Proposition 209 to California voters); Coalition for Econ.
Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp 1480, 1493 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (same), rev’d, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
24. See, e.g., William Claiborne, Affirmative Action Ban Is Upheld; California Proposition
Constitutionally Valid, U.S. Appeals Panel Says, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1997, at A1 (commenting
on effect that Proposition 209 might have on anti-affirmative action proposals being considered
by Congress and by other states); Ellis Cose, After Affirmative Action: Proposition 209 May
Become Law, but Californians Are in No Rush to End All Racial Preferences, NEWSWEEK, Nov.
11, 1996, at 43 (same); Maura Dolan, U.S. Panel Upholds Prop. 209 Affirmative Action: Three
9th Circuit Justices Rule that Measure to Eliminate Preferences for Women and Minorities in
College Admissions and Government Employment is Constitutional. Opponents Will Appeal,
but Some Analysts Believe They Face an Uphill Battle, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1997, at A1 (same);
Not over Till It’s over, ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER, Nov. 16, 1996, at 27 (same); Tim Golden, Federal Appeals Court Upholds California’s Ban on Preferences, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1997, at A4
(same); Nicholas Lemann, Taking Affirmative Action Apart, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1995, § 6
(Magazine), at 36 (same).
Proposition 209 has also begun to attract scholarly attention. See, e.g., Vikram D.
Amar & Evan H. Caminker, Equal Protection, Unequal Political Burdens, and the CCRI, 23
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1019 (1996); Robert S. Chang, Reverse Racism!: Affirmative Action, the
Family, and the Dream That Is America, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1115 (1996); Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Impact of the Proposed California Civil Rights Initiative, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 999 (1996); Neil Gotanda, Failure of the Color-Blind Vision: Race, Ethnicity and
the California Civil Rights Initiative, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1135 (1996) [hereinafter Gotanda, Color-Blind Vision]; Neil Gotanda et al., Legal Implications of Proposition 209—The
California Civil Rights Initiative, 24 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Gotanda et al., Legal Implications]; Pamela A. Lewis, Debunking the Myth That Subdivision (c) of the California
Civil Rights Initiative Lessens the Standard of Judicial Review of Sex Classifications in California, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1153 (1996); Yxta Maya Murray, Merit-Teaching, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 1073 (1996); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action,
23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921 (1996); Catherine A. Rogers & David L. Faigman, “And to the
Republic for Which It Stands”: Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 1057 (1996); Winkfield F. Twyman, Jr., A Critique of the California Civil Rights
Initiative, 14 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 181 (1997); Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative: An Interpretive Guide, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1335 (1997).
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emption grounds.25 District Judge Thelton Henderson, a liberal black
judge appointed by President Carter,26 certified a plaintiff class and
issued a temporary restraining order on November 27, 1996.27 He
certified a defendant class on December 16, 1996,28 and issued a preliminary injunction on December 23, 1996 enjoining the implementation of Proposition 209 pending a trial on the merits.29 In issuing the
preliminary injunction, Judge Henderson determined that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of both
their equal protection claim and their Title VII federal preemption
claim.30
On April 8, 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit unanimously vacated the district court’s preliminary
injunction, holding that Proposition 209 was neither facially unconstitutional, nor preempted by Title VII.31 The judges on the court of
appeals panel were Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Edward Leavy, and
Andrew J. Kleinfeld32—three conservative white judges who had
been appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush.33 Judge O’Scannlain
wrote the Ninth Circuit opinion.34 On June 4, 1997, the plaintiffs filed

25. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 697.
26. See Claiborne, supra note 24, at A1 (characterizing Judge Henderson as a liberal
judge); Dolan, supra note 24, at A1 (same); Golden, supra note 24, at A1 (same).
27. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, No. C 96-4024 TEH, 1996 WL 691962, at *1
n.1, *3-*4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 1996) (noting certification of plaintiff class and granting temporary restraining order). On December 6, 1996, the district court extended its temporary restraining order to officials of the University of California, who wished to implement Proposition 209 immediately with respect to certain admissions and financial aid decisions. See
Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, No. C 96-4024 TEH, 1996 WL 788375, at *2-*3 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 6, 1996).
28. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, No. C 96-4024 TEH, 1996 WL 788376, at *2*3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1996) (certifying defendant class comprised of state and local government officials bound by Proposition 209, and appointing California Governor Pete Wilson and
California Attorney General Daniel Lungren to be class representatives). The defendant class
was certified even though some of the government officials bound by Proposition 209 agreed
with the plaintiffs that Proposition 209 was unconstitutional. See id. at *2.
29. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1520-21 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(granting preliminary injunction), rev’d, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397
(1997).
30. See id. at 1491, 1510, 1519, 1520.
31. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 710-11 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
32. See id. at 696.
33. See Claiborne, supra note 24, at A1 (noting conservative background of court of appeals judges in Coalition for Economic Equity); Dolan, supra note 24, at A1 (same); Golden,
supra note 24, at A1 (same).
34. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 696.
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a petition with the full Ninth Circuit requesting a rehearing en banc,
which the Ninth Circuit denied on August 21, 1997.35 On August 29,
1997, the plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari, 36 which the Supreme
Court denied on November 4, 1997.37
The national significance of the constitutional issues raised by
Proposition 209, combined with the striking divergence in the legal
analyses offered by the lower courts concerning the dictates of existing Supreme Court precedent, would normally seem sufficient to
warrant a grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court.38 This is particularly true in a case such as Coalition for Economic Equity, which presents the legal issues relevant to the facial validity of Proposition 209
in a clear manner that is unencumbered by justiciability difficulties.
Moreover, the reasoning of the court of appeals decision that the Supreme Court allowed to take effect was far from trouble-free,39 and
the result reached by the court of appeals seems equally trouble-

35. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, Nos. 97-15030, 97-15031, 1997 WL 528335, at
*1 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 1997). On August 26, 1997, the Ninth Circuit panel denied a motion to
stay the effectiveness of its decision pending the Supreme Court’s decision on whether to grant
certiorari, thereby permitting Proposition 209 to take effect on August 28, 1997. See Coalition
for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 719-20. On September 4, 1997, the Supreme Court denied a motion for an emergency stay, thereby permitting Proposition 209 to remain in effect while the
Supreme Court considered whether to grant certiorari. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 118 S. Ct. 17 (1997).
36. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), petition for cert.
filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3171 (U.S. Aug. 29, 1997) (No. 97-369).
37. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 118 S. Ct. 397, denying cert. to 122 F.3d 692
(9th Cir. 1997).
38. Rule 10(c) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, which enumerates
factors that the Court will consider in acting on petitions for writs of certiorari, states that one
of the circumstances in which the Court may grant certiorari is when “a state court or a United
States court of appeals has decided an important question of federal law that has not been, but
should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.” See SUP. CT. R. 10(c). The judges who dissented
from the Ninth Circuit’s denial of the motion to reconsider en banc the panel decision in Coalition for Economic Equity emphasized the importance of the constitutional issues raised by
Proposition 209 and the tension that the panel decision created with existing Supreme Court
precedents. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 711 (Schroeder, J., joined by Pregerson,
Norris and Tashima, JJ.) (“En banc review was warranted in this case for two reasons. First, the
case is extraordinarily important. . . . Second, the decision is contrary to controlling Supreme
Court precedent.”); id. at 712-17 (Norris, J., dissenting, joined by Schroeder, Pregerson and
Tashima, JJ.) (stating that the panel decision conflicts with controlling Supreme Court precedent); id. at 717-18 (Hawkins, J., commenting on denial of rehearing en banc) (discussing duty
to follow even questionable Supreme Court precedent).
39. See discussion infra Part II.A (discussing difficulties in analysis conducted by court of
appeals).
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some.40 It is also noteworthy that the Court’s denial of certiorari was
not accompanied by any dissent or comment from any justice,41 although it seems likely that at least some of the justices on the current
Court would have deemed the constitutional issues raised by Proposition 209 to be worthy of Supreme Court review.42 However, the Supreme Court’s certiorari practice in recent affirmative action cases
has not been predictable.43
The Supreme Court may have denied certiorari in Coalition for
Economic Equity because it preferred to address the constitutional
issues raised by Proposition 209 in the context of a particular affirmative action program that has been invalidated under Proposition 209,
rather than to resolve those constitutional issues in the context of a
facial challenge. The Court has revealed a preference for contextual
rather than facial adjudications of constitutional issues in other re-

40. See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing reasons why Proposition 209 does not satisfy
constitutional standards that Supreme Court has applied to traditional affirmative action programs).
41. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 118 S. Ct. 397, denying cert. to 122 F.3d 692
(9th Cir. 1997).
42. It is possible that the denial of certiorari in Coalition for Economic Equity resulted
from a political compromise between Justices who were content to allow the court of appeals
decision to take effect through a denial of certiorari, and Justices who opposed the court of appeals decision but feared that full Supreme Court review would result in the validation of
Proposition 209 on the merits if certiorari were granted.
43. In addition to denying certiorari in Coalition for Economic Equity, the Court has denied certiorari in other recent affirmative action cases of national significance. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.) (invalidating racial affirmative action program used by
the University of Texas School of Law), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996); Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 162 (4th Cir. 1994) (invalidating University of Maryland Scholarship program
reserved for black students), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995). Although the Supreme Court
denied certiorari in Coalition for Economic Equity, the Court recently granted certiorari, over
the objection of the Solicitor General, in another affirmative action case raising statutory and
potential constitutional issues under Title VII. See Taxman v. Piscataway Township Bd. of
Educ., 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997), granting cert. to 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996). The Coalition for
Economic Equity Proposition 209 case will have a direct impact on the many people who are
affected by every affirmative action program in the State of California, whereas the Piscataway
Title VII case will have a direct impact on only one public high school teacher in New Jersey.
See Piscataway, 91 F.3d at 1550-52 (adjudicating Title VII case involving decision of school
board to use race as dispositive factor in decision to lay off one of two teachers having equal
qualifications and equal seniority, in order to promote prospective racial diversity). However,
the Piscataway case was settled by the parties prior to oral argument in the Supreme Court,
thereby mooting the Supreme Court appeal. See Joan Biskupic, Rights Groups Pay to Settle
Bias Case: High Court Affirmative Action Ruling Avoided, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1997, at A1;
Linda Greenhouse, Settlement Ends High Court Case on Preferences: Tactical Retreat: New Jersey School Move Leaves Affirmative Action in Limbo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at A1.
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cent controversial cases.44 Notwithstanding the adoption of Proposition 209, the California constitution prohibits state administrative
agencies from withholding enforcement of statutory affirmative action programs until a state appellate court has formally held those
programs to be invalid.45 As a result, there will be numerous additional occasions on which the Supreme Court will be asked to determine the constitutionality of Proposition 209 in reviewing state appellate decisions as Proposition 209 begins to be applied to particular
affirmative action programs in the state. Ironically, the Supreme
Court may ultimately find it useful to rule on the facial validity of
Proposition 209—even in the context of resolving a dispute about a
particular affirmative action program—in order to avoid the need for
a prolonged adjudication each time Proposition 209 is applied to yet
another state affirmative action program.
If the validity of Proposition 209 varies with the validity of the
particular affirmative action program at issue, the Supreme Court
will have to determine the constitutionality of each California affirmative action program before it can determine the validity of
Proposition 209’s application to that program. The Supreme Court
can avoid the need for such extensive constitutional adjudication by
assuming for the sake of argument that the affirmative action program at issue in a particular case is constitutional, and by ruling on
the constitutionality of Proposition 209 against that background assumption. But this would entail the very facial adjudication that the
Court declined to conduct in the Coalition for Economic Equity case.
The issue may evaporate if, as Part III.B.1 suggests, any affirmative
action program that survives the Court’s stringent constitutional
standards is not only constitutionally permissible, but is constitu46
tionally required as well. If that is the case, then a ruling in any
Proposition 209 case will effectively be a ruling in all Proposition 209
cases.
44. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2317-23 (1997) (vacating on grounds of
standing lower court determination that Line-Item Veto Act violated United States Constitution); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 1067-75 (1997) (vacating on
grounds of mootness lower court determinations that Arizona constitutional provision declaring English to be official language of state violated United States Constitution).
45. See CAL. CONST. art III, § 3.5 (prohibiting state administrative agencies from declaring
unconstitutional, or otherwise refusing to enforce, any state statute, unless state appellate court
has first held statute unconstitutional).
46. See infra Part III.B.1 (suggesting that under current Supreme Court doctrine, affirmative action programs that are constitutionally permissible may also be constitutionally compelled).
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The language of Proposition 209 and the political context out of
which it has emerged make the general thrust of Proposition 209
seem relatively clear. The point of the ballot initiative was to eliminate affirmative action in response to political disenchantment with
the direction in which it had developed. Nevertheless, the many subtle ambiguities in Proposition 209 muddy its scope, thereby making it
difficult to ascertain the precise intent of those who voted to adopt
Proposition 209.47 If facial challenges to Proposition 209 continue to
be rejected, the need for judicial resolution of these ambiguities may
have the ironic effect of leaving the fate of affirmative action in the
hands of the courts rather than permitting it to be resolved by the
voters, as proponents of Proposition 209 apparently intended.48 The
ambiguities embedded in Proposition 209 appear to stem from difficulties inherent in traditional assumptions about neutrality and merit,
which in contemporary culture have increasingly come to be viewed
as contestable. In this sense, Proposition 209 has become not only a
referendum on affirmative action, but on the concepts of neutrality
and merit themselves.
A. Thrust of the Proposition
The language of Proposition 209 seems straightforward. It
amends the California Constitution by adding to the existing Article I
a new section 31, which provides in part: “The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual
or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin
in the operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting.”49

47. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 24 (discussing ambiguities in Proposition 209);
Gotanda et al., Legal Implications, supra note 24 (same); Volokh, supra note 24 (same).
48. See Gotanda et al., Legal Implications, supra note 24, at 102-04.
49. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a). The full text of Proposition 209, as enacted in the California Constitution, states:
Sec. 31. (a) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment
to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.
(b) This section shall apply only to action taken after the section’s effective date.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting bona fide qualifications
based on sex which are reasonably necessary to the normal operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as invalidating any court order or consent decree which is in force as of the effective date of this section.
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This language appears to do three things. First, as the court of
appeals and the district court emphasized, it reaffirms existing prohibitions on race and gender discrimination contained in the United
States and California Constitutions, and in the employment discrimination provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.50 Second, it adds a new prohibition on affirmative action by precluding the
state from granting race or gender preferences to any individual or
group.51 Third, it applies this new affirmative action prohibition to
the operation of three categories of state action: public employment,
public education, and public contracting. Proposition 209 does not
expressly address either private discrimination or private affirmative
action.52

(e) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting action which must be
taken to establish or maintain eligibility for any federal program, where ineligibility
would result in a loss of federal funds to the state.
(f) For the purposes of this section, “state” shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, the state itself, any city, county, city and county, public university system, including the University of California, community college district, school district, special district, or any other political subdivision or governmental instrumentality of or
within the state.
(g) The remedies available for violations of this section shall be the same, regardless
of the injured party’s race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin, as are otherwise
available for violations of then-existing California antidiscrimination law.
(h) This section shall be self-executing. If any part or parts of this section are found
to be in conflict with federal law or the United States Constitution, the section shall
be implemented to the maximum extent that federal law and the United States Constitution permit. Any provision held invalid shall be severable from the remaining
portions of this section.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 [hereinafter Proposition 209]. The Analysis by the Legislative Analyst
contained in the Ballot Pamphlet is reproduced in Gotanda et al., Legal Implications, supra
note 24, app. at 105, and in Volokh, supra note 24, app. at 1393. Additional background information concerning Proposition 209, including the full text of the initiative and Ballot Pamphlet,
as well as arguments for and against the ballot initiative, can be found at several Internet sites
on the World Wide Web. See, e.g., Prop. 209: Prohibition Against Discrimination or Preferential Treatment by State and Other Public Entities (visited Oct. 1, 1997) <http://www.democracy
net.org/cgi-bin/HyperNews/get/initiatives/6.html>; CA Secretary of State—Vote 96—Text of
Proposition 209 (visited Oct. 1, 1997) <http://vote96.ss.ca.gov/BP/209text.htm>; Proposition
209 Text (visited Oct. 1, 1997) <http://www.wolf1.com/caprop/prop-209text.htm>.
50. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 397 (1997); Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1488 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (emphasizing antidiscrimination provisions of Proposition 209), rev’d, 122 F.3d 692 (9th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
51. Like the court of appeals and the district court, I will use the term “race” to encompass
color, ethnicity and national origin. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 696 n.1; Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1488 n.1.
52. See Proposition 209, cl. a. (limiting scope of provision to measures involving state action). For the full text of Proposition 209, see supra note 49.
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The most salient feature of Proposition 209 is its new prohibition
on affirmative action. The California Ballot Pamphlet that explained
the effect of Proposition 209 to voters prior to the election stressed
that a “yes” vote on Proposition 209 would eliminate race- and gender-based affirmative action, while a “no” vote would leave existing
state and local government affirmative action programs in place.53
The Ballot Pamphlet went on to define “affirmative action” programs
as “programs intended to increase opportunities for various groups—
including women and racial and ethnic minority groups,”54 and to explain how Proposition 209 would affect public employment, contracting and education.55 It stated that the ballot initiative “would
eliminate affirmative action programs used to increase hiring and
promotion opportunities for state or local government jobs,”56 as well
as “programs that give preferences to women-owned or minorityowned companies on public contracts.”57 With respect to public education, the Ballot Pamphlet stated that Proposition 209 “could eliminate, or cause fundamental changes to, voluntary desegregation programs,”58 special funding for “magnet” schools,59 and programs “such
as counseling, tutoring, outreach, [and] student financial aid,”60 where
those programs “provide preference to individuals or schools based
on race, sex, ethnicity, or national origin.”61 It also emphasized that
Proposition 209 would prevent the University of California and California State University from continuing to use race and gender “as
factors in some of [their] admissions decisions.” 62
53. The court of appeals and the district court quoted the following language from the
Ballot Pamphlet:
A YES vote on [Proposition 209] means: The elimination of those affirmative action
programs for women and minorities run by the state or local governments in the areas of public employment, contracting, and education that give “preferential treatment” on the basis of sex, race, color, ethnicity, or national origin.
A NO vote on this measure means State and local government affirmative action
programs would remain in effect to the extent they are permitted under the United
States Constitution.
Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 696 (alteration in original); Coalition for Econ. Equity,
946 F. Supp. at 1493 (alteration in original).
54. Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1493 (quoting from Ballot Pamphlet).
55. See id.
56. Id. (quoting from Ballot Pamphlet).
57. Id. (quoting from Ballot Pamphlet).
58. Id. (quoting from Ballot Pamphlet).
59. Id. at 1494 (quoting from Ballot Pamphlet).
60. Id. (quoting from Ballot Pamphlet).
61. Id. (quoting from Ballot Pamphlet).
62. Id. (quoting from Ballot Pamphlet).
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The Ballot Pamphlet also included partisan arguments drafted
by proponents and opponents of Proposition 209. A statement
drafted by proponents of Proposition 209 argued:
A generation ago, we did it right. We passed civil rights laws to prohibit discrimination. But special interests hijacked the civil rights
movement. Instead of equality, governments imposed quotas, preferences, and set-asides.
....
“REVERSE DISCRIMINATION” BASED ON RACE OR
GENDER IS PLAIN WRONG! . . . [S]tudents are being rejected
from public universities because of their RACE. Job applicants are
turned away because their RACE does not meet some “goal” or
“timetable.” Contracts are awarded to high bidders because they
are of the preferred RACE. . . . Proposition 209 will stop [these] ter63
rible programs . . . .

A statement drafted by opponents of Proposition 209 argued:
California law currently allows tutoring, mentoring, outreach, recruitment, and counseling to help ensure equal opportunity for
women and minorities. Proposition 209 will eliminate affirmative action programs like these that help achieve equal opportunity for
women and minorities in public employment, education and contracting. Instead of reforming affirmative action to make it fair for
everyone, Proposition 209 makes the current problem worse.
....
The initiative’s language is so broad and misleading that it eliminates equal opportunity programs including:
-tutoring and mentoring for minority and women students;
-affirmative action that encourages the hiring and promotion of
qualified women and minorities;
-outreach and recruitment programs to encourage applicants for
government jobs and contracts; and

63. Id. at 1494 (alterations in original) (quoting from Ballot Pamphlet); see also Coalition
for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 696-97 (9th Cir.) (quoting some of the same material
from Ballot Pamphlet), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
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-programs designed to encourage girls to study and pursue careers in
64
math and science.

The district court made factual findings concerning the effect
that Proposition 209 would have on public contracting, employment,
and education.65 The government contracting programs encompassed
within the Proposition 209 prohibition on affirmative action ranged
from programs requiring prime contractors to make good faith efforts to hire women and minority subcontractors, to programs giving
advantages to women and minority contractors in bid evaluations.
The court found that these programs enabled women and minority
contractors, who previously had little or no success securing work on
government contracts because of prior discrimination, to establish
ties with prime contractors who would not otherwise have considered
using those subcontractors. In Los Angeles, for example, affirmative
action programs increased the percentage of businesses operated by
women obtaining City contracts from 0.3% to 8%, and the number of
minority businesses obtaining City contracts from 2% to 11.8%. The
district court found that Proposition 209 would reduce or even reverse such gains.66
In public employment, the district court found that past and present race and gender discrimination resulted in an underutilization of
women and minorities in State civil service jobs, but that affirmative
action had reduced this underutilization.67 Governor Ronald Reagan’s 1971 Executive Order establishing voluntary affirmative action
increased the utilization of women and minorities in the California
civil service.68 Between 1979 and 1986, the “‘index of gender and race
segregation in state agencies’”69 declined by 11% for women and 16%
for minorities, but the implementation of Proposition 209 “would
substantially reduce opportunities for women and minorities in public
employment.”70

64. Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 697 (quoting from Ballot Pamphlet).
65. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1495-98. Although the court of appeals
vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction, it did not question the district court’s findings, but, rather, held that the district court’s preliminary injunction was based on “an erroneous legal premise.” See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 698, 700-01, 705, 708.
66. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1495-96.
67. See id. at 1496-97.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 1497 (quoting Bielby Decl. ¶ 5).
70. Id.
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In education, the district court found that affirmative action in
the form of voluntary school desegregation, financial aid, and admissions programs from elementary through graduate and professional
school levels, benefited women and minorities. However, in the University of California system, Proposition 209 could reduce enrollments for blacks and other minority groups by as much as 50%. In
addition, knowledge of Proposition 209 could deter women and minorities from applying to schools even though they might qualify for
admission. The reduced minority enrollment in medical schools was
also likely to have an adverse effect on the delivery of medical services in minority communities, where minority physicians treat three
to six times more patients than white physicians.71
The district court also found that Proposition 209 would make it
very difficult for women and minorities to secure race- or genderconscious remedial programs for past and present discrimination;
they would have to amend the California Constitution either to repeal Proposition 209 or to exempt a particular program from its dictates. The California Constitution could be amended either through
an arduous initiative process—the way that Proposition 209 itself
amended the Constitution—or through an arduous legislative
amendment process. The initiative process would require the signatures of 8% of the voters within the space of 150 days. This would
mean that 7,000 signatures a day for each of those 150 days would
have to be obtained, at a likely cost of $500,000 to $1.5 million. The
legislative amendment process would require the lobbying expenditures necessary to secure a two-thirds majority in each House of the
California Legislature. Under either process, proponents of an affirmative action program would have to expend the further time and
money to secure passage of the desired program in the statewide
election. When Proposition 209 was passed, the cost of these efforts
exceeded $3.1 million.72
It seems evident that the general thrust of Proposition 209 was to
end race- and gender-based affirmative action as we now know it.
The California Ballot Pamphlet made voters aware that the continued existence of affirmative action was at stake in the vote on the
ballot initiative, and it advised voters that the adoption of Proposition 209 would have far-reaching effects on public employment, pub-

71.
72.

See id. at 1498.
See id. at 1499.
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lic education and public contracting.73 Moreover, the fact that Proposition 209 would amend the State Constitution made it clear that
these effects would be difficult to reverse through the ordinary political process.74 With this knowledge, the voters of California still chose
to adopt Proposition 209 by a margin of 8%.75
B. Unresolved Ambiguities
Despite its superficial clarity, the language of Proposition 209
contains subtle ambiguities that obfuscate, in several respects, the actual intent of the California voters who adopted the ballot initiative.
The primary ambiguity in Proposition 209 arises from its distinction
between prohibited “discrimination” and prohibited “preferences.”
Although the meanings of those terms are uncertain, the two prohibitions do seem to be in tension with each other. Proposition 209 also
contains provisions governing gender discrimination that could have
the effect of authorizing more gender discrimination than is permitted under present law. In addition, while the language of Proposition
209 prohibits preferences in the “operation of public employment,
public education, [and] public contracting,” it is not clear what the
phrase “operation of” entails. The precise reach of the state-action
provision of Proposition 209 is also ambiguous. Finally, it is uncertain whether Proposition 209 is intended to prohibit all race and gender preferences, or only those preferences that inflict some ascertainable harm on nonpreferred individuals or groups. If Proposition 209
is found to be facially invalid, these ambiguities will be largely inconsequential. But if facial challenges to Proposition 209 are rejected,
the judiciary will have to resolve these ambiguities, thereby frustrating the apparent desire of Proposition 209 supporters for political
76
rather than judicial resolution of the affirmative action debate.
1. Discrimination v. Preference. Proposition 209 adds to article I
of the California Constitution a new section 31(a), which provides
that “[t]he state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential
73. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 696-97 (9th Cir.) (citing California Ballot Pamphlet), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
74. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1498-99.
75. See id. at 1495.
76. For a recent article written by a proponent of Proposition 209 after its adoption, nominally offering a narrow interpretation of these and other Proposition 209 ambiguities, but nevertheless offering a broad interpretation of “discrimination” that is heavily dependent on the
presence or absence of facial classifications, see Volokh, supra note 24, at 1136-39.
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treatment to, any individual or group” on the basis of race or
gender.77 This language distinguishes between the concepts of
prohibited discrimination and prohibited preferences. Assuming that
the two prohibitions were not intended to be redundant—that the
Proposition 209 prohibition on preferences is not a mere superfluous
restriction on discrimination that had already been made unlawful—
Proposition 209 must contemplate a category of race and gender
preferences that are prohibited even though they are not
discriminatory.78
The primary ambiguity in Proposition 209 is what this category
of prohibited, nondiscriminatory preferences includes. The California Supreme Court has held that state constitutional provisions
adopted by the people are to be interpreted in a manner that effectuates the intent of the voters.79 Ballot initiatives are not accompanied
by committee reports, conference reports or other traditional forms
of legislative history that offer insight into the intent behind a law.
California courts therefore consider ballot pamphlets,80 as well as
ballot summaries and arguments,81 in seeking to ascertain the intent
of the voters. The California Supreme Court has also held that deference to the democratic process requires that ballot initiatives be interpreted to uphold their validity whenever possible.82 However, the
available evidence of voter intent does little to resolve the ambiguity
concerning the content of that category of nondiscriminatory preferences that are prohibited by Proposition 209. Indeed, sometimes

77. Proposition 209, cl. a. For the full text of Proposition 209, see supra note 49.
78. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 1004-13 (analyzing Proposition 209’s distinction between prohibited discrimination and prohibited preferences); Gotanda, Color-Blind Vision, supra note 24, at 1145-49 (same); Gotanda et al., Legal Implications, supra note 24, at 1927 (same). But cf. Volokh, supra note 24, at 1341-46 (arguing that prohibitions on discrimination and preferences are coterminous). Presumably, the category of nondiscriminatory preferences prohibited by Proposition 209 alludes to preferences that are not prohibited by federal
statutes or by the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
79. See Board of Supervisors v. Lonergan, 616 P.2d 802, 806 (Cal. 1980); see also Gotanda
et al., Legal Implications, supra note 24, at 7-14 (discussing proper interpretation of constitutional amendments by ballot initiative under California law); Volokh, supra note 24, at 9
(same).
80. See Legislature v. Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17, 25 n.14 (Cal. 1983) (citing Amador Valley
Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1300 (Cal. 1978)).
81. See Legislature v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1315 (Cal. 1991) (citing Amador Valley, 583 P.2d
at 1300); Lonergan, 616 P.2d at 807-08.
82. See Eu, 816 P.2d at 1313.
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ambiguities are intentionally placed in ballot materials in order to
advance partisan political goals.83
The ambiguity surrounding the category of prohibited preferences is evident from the disagreement between the California Legislative Analyst and the California Court of Appeals concerning
whether outreach programs fall within the scope of the Proposition
209 preference prohibition. The ballot pamphlet prepared by the
Legislative Analyst for distribution to California voters stated:
In addition, the measure would affect a variety of public school and
community college programs such as counseling, tutoring, outreach,
student financial aid, and financial aid to selected school districts in
those cases where the programs provide preferences to individuals
84
or schools based on race, sex, ethnicity, or national origin. . . .

This reading seems consistent with a literal interpretation of Proposition 209 because such outreach programs necessarily constitute preferences to the extent that they are directed to particular race or gender groups, even if the ultimate selection criteria for participation in
the programs are race- and gender-neutral. However, in pre-election
state court litigation concerning the proper description of Proposition
209 on the ballot, the California Court of Appeals stated that:
Most definitions of the term [affirmative action] would include not
only the conduct which Proposition 209 would ban, i.e., discrimination and preferential treatment, but also other efforts such as outreach programs. . . . Accordingly, any statement to the effect that
Proposition 209 repeals affirmative action programs would be over85
inclusive and hence “false and misleading.”

The state court viewed outreach programs as beyond the scope
of the Proposition 209 preference prohibition, presumably because
such outreach programs are commonly employed to prevent the
types of discrimination that are made unlawful by the Proposition 209
discrimination prohibition. The Legislative Analyst’s view was ad-

83. See, e.g., Gotanda et al., Legal Implications, supra note 24, at 6 (suggesting that the
ambiguities in language of Proposition 209 may have been intended by drafters).
84. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1494 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(quoting from Ballot Pamphlet); rev’d, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397
(1997); see also Volokh, supra note 24, at 1349-53 (arguing that Proposition 209 prohibits nonneutral outreach programs).
85. Lungren v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 694 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). Judge Sims
concurred in the judgment, apparently unwilling to commit himself to the view that Proposition
209 would permit outreach programs. See id. at 695 (Sims, J., concurring).
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vanced by opponents of Proposition 209 in the argument section of
the Ballot Pamphlet as a reason for voters to reject the ballot initiative.86 The California Court of Appeals view was advanced by proponents of Proposition 209, in an apparent effort to increase political
support for the ballot initiative.87
The disagreement between the Legislative Analyst and the California Court of Appeals reveals that the Proposition 209 discrimination and preference prohibitions are in tension with each other. Each
may prohibit what the other requires. For example, consider a school
that has traditionally steered boys to shop courses and girls to home
economics courses, but now wishes to adopt a remedial outreach program to encourage more girls to take shop and more boys to take
home economics. It is not clear how the California voters intended
such a program to fare under Proposition 209. It may be that the outreach programs are required to eliminate continuing gender inequality within the meaning of the Proposition 209 discrimination prohibition, or it may be that the gender-directed programs are barred by
the Proposition 209 preference prohibition. It is therefore understandable that California officials charged with interpreting Proposition 209 have been inconsistent in their views of what the ballot initiative requires.88
2. Gender. The prospective effect of Proposition 209 on gender
discrimination in California is also unclear.
Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky has argued that Proposition 209 reduces existing legal
protections against gender discrimination in several ways.89 Section
31(c) of Proposition 209 states: “Nothing in this section shall be
interpreted as prohibiting bona fide qualifications based on sex which
are reasonably necessary to the normal operation of public
86. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (quoting Ballot Pamphlet).
87. See Sally Pipes & Eugene Volokh, Women Need Not Fear the Civil Rights Initiative;
CCRI: Its Language Strengthens Rather Than Weakens Laws Against Sex Discrimination, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 1996, at B9; William A. Rusher, Using Women in Civil Rights Fight, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 23, 1996, at B10. For a discussion of these articles, see Gotanda,
Color-Blind Vision, supra note 24, at 1145-49.
88. For a more extended discussion of the Proposition 209 distinction between prohibited
discrimination and prohibited preferences see Gotanda et al., Legal Implications, supra note
24, at 6-7, 14, 16-32; see also Gotanda, Color-Blind Vision, supra note 24, at 1145-49 (analyzing
the extended scope of Proposition 209); Volokh, supra note 24, at 1339-59 (discussing the actions that are banned by Proposition 209).
89. See Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 1013-17; see also Gotanda et al., Legal Implications, supra note 24, at 75-80 (developing similar arguments about reduced protection from
gender discrimination resulting from Proposition 209).
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employment, public education, or public contracting.”90 Chemerinsky
notes that the Proposition 209 “reasonably necessary” standard is
broader than the “bona fide occupational qualification” exception
that exists under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,91 which
generally prohibits gender discrimination in employment as a matter
of federal law.92 He also notes that the language of Proposition 209
extends the “bona fide qualification” exception beyond the
employment context to which it is limited under Title VII to public
education and contracting, even though pre-existing law has never
applied such an exception in these latter areas.93 Although the
Supremacy Clause94 prevents Proposition 209 from superseding Title
VII in the public employment context, Chemerinsky argues that
Proposition 209 lowers the standard of judicial review for gender
classifications in public education and contracting—cases to which
Title VII does not apply.95
Additionally, although gender classifications have traditionally
been subject to only intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution, they have been subject to
more demanding strict scrutiny under the California Constitution.96
However, Proposition 209 replaces this stringent strict scrutiny standard with a mere rational basis standard of review that is very deferential. Chemerinsky suggests that this could allow public schools and
government contracting officials to disfavor women because of
stereotyped views about bona fide differences between men and
women that would not have been permitted under pre-existing law.97
90. Proposition 209, cl. c. For the full text of Proposition 209, see supra note 49.
91. See Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 1013-14.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 1014-17.
94. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
95. See Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 1015-16.
96. See id. at 1015.
97. See id. at 1016-17. As an example of the problems that could be caused by Proposition
209, Chemerinsky suggests that some of the infamous gender disparities in funding for male
and female athletic programs that have been deemed invalid under present state and federal
law could now become valid. In schools that are not covered by federal law because they do
not receive federal funds, such disparities could only be equalized by California law. But California law might deem those funding disparities to be reasonable responses to a greater societal
interest in men’s sports, and thereby uphold them under the reduced gender scrutiny that is
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Eugene Volokh, a Professor at UCLA Law School, and Pamela
Lewis, a California lawyer who has challenged the legality of California affirmative action programs containing set-asides and preferences, both argue that Proposition 209 does not reduce the level of
protection against gender discrimination that existed under prior
law.98 They suggest that the bona fide qualifications provision of
Proposition 209 does not broaden the bona fide occupational qualifications exception of Title VII and of California antidiscrimination
law, but rather tolerates only a narrow range of cases in which gender
classifications are warranted by factors such as privacy, hygiene or
physical safety.99 They further claim that Proposition 209 does not
reduce the strict scrutiny standard of review that previously applied
to gender classifications.100 Lewis argues that the reasonably necessary language of Proposition 209 does not announce a new standard
of judicial review, but merely constitutes part of the definition of a
bona fide qualification.101 Both Lewis and Volokh emphasize the language of Proposition 209, arguing that the “[n]othing in this section”
qualifier of subsection (c) limits the dictates of subsection (c) of
Proposition 209 to matters contained within Proposition 209 itself.
As a result, the reasonably necessary standard of Proposition 209
does not extend to the autonomous equal protection provisions of the
California Constitution, which will continue to require strict judicial
scrutiny of gender classifications.102 Volokh adds that under California law, Proposition 209 cannot effect an implied repeal of prior antidiscrimination standards in the absence of irreconcilable conflict, and
that such conflict can be avoided simply by reading Proposition 209
to continue California’s strict scrutiny of gender classifications.103
Lewis views the assertion that Proposition 209 would reduce prohibitions on gender discrimination as a political scare tactic that was designed to frighten middle-class white women into voting against
Proposition 209.104

prescribed by Proposition 209. See id. at 1017; see also Gotanda et al., Legal Implications, supra note 24, at 54-56 (discussing effects of Proposition 209 on gender disparities in athletic
funding).
98. See Volokh, supra note 24, at 1361-64; Lewis, supra note 24, at 1155.
99. See Volokh, supra note 24, at 1360; Lewis, supra note 24, at 1155, 1157-60.
100. See Volokh, supra note 24, at 1361; Lewis, supra note 24, at 1160.
101. See Lewis, supra note 24, at 1156-57.
102. See Volokh, supra note 24, at 1361; Lewis, supra note 24, at 1160.
103. See Volokh, supra note 24, at 1361-64.
104. See Lewis, supra note 24, at 1156.
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As these competing arguments demonstrate, it is difficult to ascertain the intent of California voters regarding the future of gender
discrimination in the State. The Supremacy Clause105 prevents Proposition 209 from diluting the antidiscrimination provisions of federal
law, and California canons of construction seem to preclude California courts from concluding that the voters intended such a violation
of federal law.106 Accordingly, Proposition 209 may simply reflect a
desire on the part of California voters to restate the demands of existing federal antidiscrimination law, as Volokh and Lewis suggest. If
that were the case, however, it is not clear why the subsection (c)
bona fide qualification exception had to be included in Proposition
209. If, on the other hand, Proposition 209 was intended to do something other than merely restate the pre-existing federal law of gender
discrimination, it seems that its purpose must have been to ensure
that state law prohibitions on gender discrimination would never exceed the requirements of federal law.107 Accordingly, state law restrictions that supplement federal prohibitions—such as the strict
scrutiny that applies to gender classifications under state but not federal law—may indeed be placed in jeopardy by Proposition 209, as
Chemerinsky suggests. Once again, however, it is difficult to be confident about the intent of the California voters with respect to doctrinal matters that are too technical for the voters realistically to have
understood.
3. Nexus. The dual Proposition 209 prohibitions on discrimination and preferences apply under Section 31(a) to “the operation of
public employment, public education, or public contracting.”108 The
scope of the qualifier “operation of” gives rise to an additional
ambiguity in Proposition 209. Presumably, this qualifier is intended
to ensure some appropriate nexus between the race or gender

105. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
106. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (discussing California canon of construction).
107. See Gotanda et al., Legal Implications, supra note 24, at 77-80 (suggesting that Proposition 209 may evidence intent of California voters to adopt the minimum level of judicial scrutiny for gender classifications that is permissible under federal law).
108. Proposition 209, § 31(a). For the full text of Proposition 209, see supra note 49.
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classification at issue, and a public employment, education or contracting practice. The qualifier therefore seems designed to serve the
same function as the proximate cause limitation on tort liability,109 or
the foreseeability limitation on contract damages,110 both of which
limit legal recognition of the link between an act and its vast array of
consequences. As in torts and contracts, it is difficult to determine
when the Proposition 209 nexus requirement is satisfied. California
law presently contains a number of race- and gender-related
programs that were valid under state and federal law prior to the
adoption of Proposition 209, but whose validity after adoption of the
ballot initiative is uncertain.
Some of these programs seem
intuitively to fall within the scope of Proposition 209, and others
seem intuitively to be beyond its reach, but there is no principled
distinction between those two groups of programs that would warrant
differential treatment under the terms of Proposition 209.111
The California State Civil Service Affirmative Action Program,
established by Ronald Reagan when he was Governor of California,
directs state agencies to “establish goals and timetables designed to
overcome any identified underutilization of minorities and women in
their respective organizations.”112 This program, which is valid under
both Title VII and pre-Proposition 209 California law, authorizes
state employers to remedy underutilization by considering race and
gender when choosing among applicants who have received qualifying scores on governing civil service examinations.113 Since it was established in the 1970s, this program has produced dramatic increases
in the number of women and minorities in civil service positions, al-

109. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 42 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing proximate cause limitation on tort liability).
110. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.14 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing
foreseeability as a limitation on contract damages).
111. See generally Gotanda et al., Legal Implications, supra note 24, at 33-69 (discussing
many programs that might be eliminated by Proposition 209); see also Chemerinsky, supra note
24, at 1004-13 (discussing the benefits of programs that might be eliminated by Proposition
209).
112. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 19,790 (West 1995); see also Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson,
946 F. Supp. 1480, 1496-97 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (discussing Civil Service Affirmative Action Program), rev’d, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997); Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 1006-08 (same); Gotanda et al., Legal Implications, supra note 24, at 45 (same).
113. See Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 1006; Gotanda et al., Legal Implications, supra
note 24, at 45. It is not clear whether this program would remain valid under the Equal Protection Clause after the Supreme Court’s decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 500 U.S.
200 (1995) (apparently invalidating congressionally-adopted minority construction preference
through application of strict scrutiny).
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though women and minorities have yet to achieve parity with white
men.114 Similar local government programs have successfully increased the representation of women and minorities in police, fire,
and public works departments.115
At first glance, such affirmative action programs seem to fall
squarely within the scope of Proposition 209, because they authorize
the use of race and gender preferences “in the operation of” public
employment.116 However, additional reflection makes it less certain
that the voters of California intended to eliminate such programs
when they adopted Proposition 209. Affirmative action was initially
“invented” as a response to subtle forms of societal discrimination
that operated against racial minorities even when they possessed the
same qualifications as the whites who were customarily granted priority over them in the allocation of jobs and educational opportunities.117 It may be that such affirmative action is still required to prevent subtle forms of societal discrimination.118 Although it seems
plain that California voters wished to terminate what they deemed to
be affirmative action abuses, the voters may have been focusing on
programs that substituted race and gender considerations for job
qualifications, and not on programs that authorized the remedial use
of race and gender as factors in choosing among qualified applicants.
This view of voter intent becomes more probable in situations in
which the absence of remedial programs and the ensuing resurgence
of subtle or unconscious discrimination seem likely to cause agency
staffs to revert to their former state of white male domination. When
we differentiate among types of preferences, it is possible to conclude

114. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1496-97; Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at
1006-07.
115. See Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 1008; Gotanda et al., Legal Implications, supra
note 24, at 45-46.
116. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 24, at 1341-46 (arguing that Proposition 209 bans all discriminatory preferences, including “goals” and “timetables”).
117. See Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448, 449-50 (1959-1963), reprinted in 1961
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1276 (1961), quoted in Volokh, supra note 24, at 1347 n.33 (“The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race,
creed, color, or national origin. The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to
their race, creed, color, or national origin.”); see also Middleton v. City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396,
404 n.6 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing evolution in use of term “affirmative action”); Lemann, supra note 24, at 40, 42 (discussing origin of “affirmative action” concept).
118. See, e.g., Twyman, supra note 24, at 191-94 (arguing that affirmative action is necessary
to combat subtle discrimination). Evidence of the continuing existence of race and gender discrimination is discussed infra in Part I.C.5.
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that the California voters could have wished to end affirmative action
abuses, but not to reinstitute subtle forms of race and gender discrimination that would again make state agencies and educational institutions white male bastions. However, if the reinstitution of white
male domination was the intent of voters who supported Proposition
209, that intent would not only be at odds with Proposition 209’s
nondiscrimination provision,119 but it would also present federal equal
protection problems that could run afoul of the California canon of
construction which presumes that the voters did not intend an unlawful enactment.120 It therefore seems plausible to conclude that, despite the language of Proposition 209, California voters did not intend
to eliminate all affirmative action programs, but only those programs
whose elimination would not lead to a reinstitution of prior discrimination. Under such a view, the effectiveness of an affirmative action
program in light of the available alternatives to that program would
be dispositive. But this is a complicated nexus issue that will vary
from case to case, rather than a simple issue of voter intent that is
apparent from the face of the ballot initiative.
The nexus that a race or gender preference must have to public
education in order to fall within the scope of the Proposition 209
preference prohibition is equally unclear. Public schools make
countless curriculum and other decisions in ways that are explicitly
conscious of the “race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin” categories that are enumerated in Proposition 209,121 and it is unlikely
that California voters intended to invalidate them all. But it is difficult to know which such decisions Proposition 209 allows and which it
outlaws. Although some programs seem intuitively to be inconsistent
with the anti-affirmative action thrust of Proposition 209, those programs are difficult to distinguish in any principled way from other
programs that seem intuitively to be beyond the reach of Proposition
209.
Intuitively, it seems as if Proposition 209 supporters would favor
the elimination of affirmative action programs like the Systemwide
Affirmative Action Support Services program, which provides academic advising, tutoring, workshops and summer bridge programs to

119. See Proposition 209, § 31(a). For the full text of Proposition 209, see supra note 49.
120. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (discussing California canon of construction). The federal equal protection problems that such an intent would present are discussed in
Part III.B, infra.
121. Proposition 209, § 31(a). For the full text of Proposition 209, see supra note 49.
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minority students,122 and the California State University residential
summer math and science programs for minority middle and high
school girls.123 However, the basis for this intuition is less clear. Because these programs are open to minority and female students, but
not to white males, it may be that the explicit use of race and gender
selection criteria is what causes the programs to seem to be prohibited by Proposition 209. But this explanation raises the question of
whether the very same programs, selecting the very same students,
would continue to constitute prohibited preferences if the explicit
race and gender selection criteria were eliminated. Although the intent and the effect of the modified programs would be precisely the
same, Proposition 209 does not indicate whether it is the intent, effect
or express nature of a preference that makes it objectionable.124
In addition, there is no obvious default position that a court can
use to determine the intent of the California voters concerning this
matter. An effects test is used for purposes of federal employment
discrimination law under Title VII,125 but an intent test is used for
purposes of federal equal protection law.126 Moreover, the law surrounding each of these tests has become so complex that sometimes
one test seems to be masquerading as the other,127 and sometimes it
seems as if both tests are tacitly being applied.128 It will be very diffi122. See Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 1010-11.
123. See id. at 1009-10; see also Volokh, supra note 24, at 1349-53 (arguing that such programs would probably be prohibited by Proposition 209).
124. See Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 1004 (noting that Proposition 209 does not define
the terms it uses).
125. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
126. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976).
127. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 649-60 (1989) (requiring
Title VII plaintiffs to demonstrate a specific causal relationship between the employment practice challenged and the alleged disparate impact in employment opportunities for whites and
non-whites); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991-99 (1987) (elaborating the
effects test requirement for Title VII plaintiffs); see also GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE
AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA
40-41 (1993) (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s elaboration of the effects test in Watson and
Wards Cove makes it more stringent than the intent test). Congress reversed the Wards Cove
elaboration of the effects test by passing the Civil Rights Acts of 1991. See Pub. L. No. 102-166,
105 Stat. 1071, 1071, 1074-75 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e to 2000e-16 (1995)); see also Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 1422, 1478-80 (1995) (discussing congressional overruling of Wards Cove effects test).
128. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 227 (1971) (upholding post-Brown decision to close municipal swimming pool rather than desegregate it, in seeming application of
both intent and effects test, rather than nominally applicable intent test); see also GEOFFREY R.
STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 619 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing Palmer tacit application of
intent and effects test).
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cult to know which sorts of preferences are prohibited under Proposition 209 prior to resolution of this issue by the California state courts,
and even then, there will be virtually no way to know whether the
California state courts have correctly ascertained the intent of the
Californians who voted to adopt Proposition 209.
Uncertainties about the validity of educational programs are exacerbated when one focuses on curriculum decisions concerning
courses and programs that are open to all students. For example, it is
unclear whether Proposition 209 invalidates the California Education
Code provision that requires public school curricula to include materials about Martin Luther King and the civil rights movement,129 or
prohibits research centers such as the California State University
Center for African-American Educational Excellence and Achievement,130 or prohibits the establishment of courses in African art,131 or
prohibits school assemblies celebrating Cinco de Mayo,132 or prohibits
the teaching of Ebonics to inner-city tutors.133 Those courses and
programs are nominally open to all students, but realistically, their
primary intent and effect is to benefit particular racial and ethnic
groups.134 However, if such courses and programs are prohibited by
Proposition 209, curriculum requirements mandating the inclusion of
materials about George Washington and the American Revolution,
research centers for English literature, courses in European art,
school assemblies celebrating St. Patrick’s Day, and the teaching of
French would also seem to be prohibited.135 It may be that Proposition 209 does not prohibit any of these courses or programs because
they are designed to benefit all students by providing diversity in the
range of ideas to which students are exposed as part of their general

129. See Gotanda et al., Legal Implications, supra note 24, at 58-59.
130. See id. at 59.
131. See id. at 57.
132. See id. at 59.
133. “Ebonics” is the term that recently has been applied to the English vernacular spoken
by blacks in inner-city environments. See Tim Golden, Oakland Scratches Plan To Teach Black
English, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1997, at A10 (discussing controversy surrounding Oakland School
Board’s proposal to treat Ebonics as a second language).
134. Cf. Volokh, supra note 24, at 1348-49 (arguing that programs “whose topic is a particular race, sex, or ethnic group” are valid as long as enrollment in the programs is not facially
restricted).
135. Cf. Gotanda, Color-Blind Vision, supra note 24, at 1146-47 (discussing potential impact
of Proposition 209’s preference prohibition on subjects such as American Studies or French
language courses).
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education.136 Certainly well-educated students from all backgrounds
should know about the civil rights movement as well as the American
Revolution, just as they should know about African art as well as
European art. However, this justification would almost certainly require upholding other educational practices that most supporters of
Proposition 209 probably intended to prohibit.
Most supporters of Proposition 209 probably intended to eliminate race- and gender-based admissions to educational institutions
that had previously been made in the name of promoting diversity.137
However, if the diversity justification is adequate to permit public
schools to teach both African and European art, why is it not also
adequate to justify the exposure of African and European art students to each other in an educational environment? The “wellrounded education” goals of both specialized courses and specialized
admissions seem analogous, if not identical. Artists who have studied
African art without any exposure to the history and techniques of
European art have had an educational experience that is skewed and
incomplete. Similarly, students who have discussed abortion or civil
rights without any exposure to the perspectives of women and minorities have also had an educational experience that is skewed and
incomplete. The principle of enhancing educational quality through
diversity therefore seems equally applicable to both curriculum and
admissions decisions.138 The fact that supporters of Proposition 209

136. For arguments that courses with such specialized topics can benefit all students, see
Gotanda et al., Legal Implications, supra note 24, at 57 (suggesting well-rounded-education
justification for specialized courses and programs); Volokh, supra note 24, at 1348-49 (arguing
that such programs can benefit all students as long as enrollment in them is not restricted on
the basis of race, sex, or another of the “forbidden factors”).
137. The Ballot Pamphlet argument section drafted by proponents of Proposition 209
stated “‘REVERSE DISCRIMINATION’ BASED ON RACE OR GENDER IS PLAIN
WRONG! . . . . [S]tudents are being rejected from public universities because of their
RACE . . . . Proposition 209 will stop [these] terrible programs. . . .” See Coalition for Econ.
Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1494 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (alterations in original) (quoting
from Ballot Pamphlet), rev’d, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
138. It could be argued that diversity concerns are not advanced by the admission of
women and minorities to educational institutions because viewpoints do not necessarily correspond to race and gender. See Volokh, supra note 24, at 1374-76 (providing some arguments
against diversity justifications for gender preferences in education and employment). But
whatever value such an argument might have in theory, it seems counterintuitive in practice. If
people thought that nothing turned on race or gender, it would be difficult to account for the
persistence of race and gender discrimination in the culture. However, because many people
obviously think that important things do turn on race or gender, diversity concerns would be
advanced by increased exposure in an educational context to whatever those important things
are. Although it is true that many views of race and gender are based on stereotypes rather
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seem to have rejected the diversity justification in the admissions
context suggests that they may also have intended to reject it in the
curriculum context. But the consequence of rejecting the diversity
justification in the curriculum context would be the elimination of
courses and programs that most California voters almost certainly did
not intend to eliminate. And if those voters had anticipated the curricular consequences of Proposition 209, they may have changed their
intent about its admissions consequences. Once again, it is unclear
what intent should be ascribed to the California voters with respect to
the nexus between preferences and educational programs.
Perhaps the most potentially far-reaching provision of Proposition 209 is its prohibition on race and gender preferences in public
contracting. Proponents of Proposition 209 seem to have desired the
elimination of enhancements or set-asides for women- and minorityowned enterprises in the award of government contracts.139 But the
language of Proposition 209 goes well beyond the likely intent of the
California voters because “the operation of . . . public contracting”
clause in section 31(a) of Proposition 209 is not limited to the mere
award of government contracts. Rather, it appears to apply to all aspects of public contracting, including conduct that occurs in the performance of a government contract.140 As a result, the language of
Proposition 209 seems to preclude government contracts to study or
treat sickle cell anemia, because the beneficiaries of those contracts
will be overwhelmingly of one race, and contracts to study or treat
prostate cancer, because the beneficiaries of those contracts will be
overwhelmingly of one gender.141 Proposition 209 might even prohibit the government from entering into a contract for the establishment and operation of a rape crisis center, because the primary benethan accurate information, it seems backwards to argue that race and gender stereotypes are
more likely to be eliminated by reducing student interactions with members of other races and
genders than by increasing such interactions.
139. The Ballot Pamphlet description of Proposition 209 states that “the measure would
eliminate programs that give preference to women-owned or minority-owned companies on
public contracts.” Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1493. The argument section of
the Ballot Pamphlet drafted by Proposition 209 proponents states, “Contracts are awarded to
high bidders because they are of the preferred RACE. . . . Proposition 209 will stop [these] terrible programs. . . .” Id. at 1494 (alteration in original) (quoting from Ballot Pamphlet).
140. See Gotanda et al., Legal Implications, supra note 24, at 68 (discussing potentially
broad scope of the Proposition 209 public contracting provision). But cf. Volokh, supra note
24, at 1339-41 (arguing that scope of Proposition 209 public contracting provision can be determined through existing “state action” doctrine).
141. See Gotanda et al., Legal Implications, supra note 24, at 68 (discussing sickle cell and
prostate cancer problems).
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ficiaries of that center would be women.142 Although such measures
are facially neutral, we do not know whether the California voters intended to prohibit facial preferences, preferential intent, or preferential effects.143 It seems unlikely that the voters intended to outlaw
these types of government contracts when they adopted Proposition
209, but the language of Proposition 209 seems to prohibit such contracts.
It might be that California voters intended only to prohibit consideration of race and gender in the selection of government contract
recipients, but that construction seems as underinclusive as the language of Proposition 209 seems overinclusive. Limiting the reach of
Proposition 209 to the selection of contract recipients would enable
the government to contract with private entities for affirmative action
programs that the government might be precluded from offering directly.144 For example, it is unlikely that Proposition 209 either permits public employers to offer special training programs for minority
job applicants or permits public schools to offer special training programs for women in math and science. However, an interpretation of
Proposition 209 that limited Proposition 209’s public contracting
preference prohibition to the mere selection of contract recipients
would enable the government to enter into contracts with private
contractors to run affirmative action programs. It seems that there is
no simple interpretation of voter intent that gives the public contracting provision of Proposition 209 a meaning that is both coherent
and intuitively plausible.
4. State Action. The uncertainties surrounding the Proposition
209 public contracting provision generate additional ambiguity
concerning the scope of the Proposition 209 state-action restriction,
which provides, “The state shall not discriminate against, or grant
preferential treatment to . . . .”145 By its terms, the discrimination and
preference prohibitions of Proposition 209 apply to the actions of
142. But cf. Volokh, supra note 24, at 1385-86 (arguing that even if a rape crisis hotline
could be linked to employment or education, it would be permissible under Proposition 209
because of the theoretical possibility that men would also use hotline).
143. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text (discussing uncertainty about test to be
used in applying Proposition 209).
144. See Volokh, supra note 24, at 1339-40 (arguing that Proposition 209 should not be read
to permit state to engage in non-neutral conduct by directing government contractor to engage
in such conduct).
145. Proposition 209, § 31(a) (emphasis added). For the full text of Proposition 209, see
supra note 49.
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government entities, but not to the actions of private parties. However, as the nexus discussion in Part I.B.3 reveals, the Proposition 209
prohibition on discrimination and preferences in the conduct of
government contracting might also extend to the practices of private
parties who contract with the government.146
The antidiscrimination and affirmative action provisions of many
federal programs extend to private recipients of federal funds. Executive Order 11,246 precludes private employers who receive government contracts from discriminating against their employees on the
basis of race or gender, and imposes affirmative action requirements
on large employers in connection with large contracts.147 Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits private recipients of federal
funds from engaging in race or gender discrimination,148 and Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits private institutions
of higher education that receive federal funds from engaging in gender discrimination in their admissions.149 In addition, pre-Proposition
209 California law contained antidiscrimination prohibitions on private recipients of government contract funds.150 In light of these prohibitions on private discrimination, it may be that Proposition 209
also prohibits private recipients of government contracting funds
from engaging in race- or gender-based affirmative action, even
though Proposition 209 by its terms applies only to the actions of
state instrumentalities.151
In addition, Proposition 209’s prohibitions might apply to private
entities who establish working relationships with public entities even
in the absence of a contractual relationship. For example, if a private
146. Although the Supreme Court has held that the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment is not satisfied by the actions of mere government contractors, see RendellBaker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839-43 (1982), the Proposition 209 preference prohibition extends
beyond the substantive scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it may extend beyond the
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment state-action requirement as well.
147. See 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), reprinted as amended in 3 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
148. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994).
149. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
150. See Gotanda et al., Legal Implications, supra note 24, at 62-65 (describing federal and
state restrictions on private recipients of government funds).
151. See id. at 69-75 (discussing possible application of Proposition 209 to conduct of private entities receiving government funds). But cf. Volokh, supra note 24, at 1339-40 (arguing
that Proposition 209 does not restrict actions of government contractors as long as state does
not require or become overly implicated in contractor’s non-neutral actions). The fact that
some statutes expressly extend their coverage to private recipients of government funds may
indicate that the lack of a similar express provision in Proposition 209 means that the drafters
of Proposition 209 did not intend for it to extend to private recipients.
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law firm accepted student placements in connection with a public law
school clinic or externship program, the private firm might be subject
to Proposition 209 prohibitions in connection with that placement because of its relationship to the public school program.152 The customary range of ambiguity about proper classification of quasigovernmental entities would also apply under Proposition 209. For
example, entities such as the Federal Reserve Banks have been held
to be public entities for some purposes, but private entities for others,
including the application of antidiscrimination laws.153 In the end, it is
not clear how far California voters intended affirmative action restrictions to intrude into voluntary affirmative action programs
adopted in the private sphere.
5. Harm. Finally, it is unclear whether Proposition 209 prohibits
formal preferences based on race or gender, or whether it prohibits
only preferences that inflict some actual harm of the sort that is
customarily required for standing.154 When a person of one race or
gender is hired, admitted to college, or awarded a government
contract because of her race or gender, the person who was denied
that job, college admission, or government contract suffers a direct
injury of the sort that Proposition 209 was probably intended to
prohibit. However, when an employer, college or government contracting agency establishes a remedial training program for women or
minorities who have been the victims of historical discrimination, it is
more difficult to identify the victims of that remedial preference.
Such programs do inflict some theoretical injury on white males, but
the injury is abstract and undifferentiated, especially with respect to
those programs that would not have been established in the absence
of a perceived need to aid women and minorities. The federal law of
standing has developed in a way that precludes women and minor-

152. See Gotanda et al., Legal Implications, supra note 24, at 74-75 (discussing publicprivate partnerships and the interaction of Proposition 209 with federal law).
153. See id. at 73-74 (discussing ambiguities in characterizing Federal Reserve Banks).
154. Cf. id. at 27-30 (discussing common understanding of difference between discrimination and preferences in ways that suggest importance of degree and particularity of injury); Gotanda, Color-Blind Vision, supra note 24, at 1139, 1145, 1147 (discussing whether affirmative
action preferences necessarily deny rights or benefits to others). The district court considered
but rejected a distinction between zero-sum affirmative action programs that benefit women
and minorities at the expense of white males and affirmative action programs that did not have
this zero-sum feature, finding that the distinction was not relevant under Supreme Court precedents. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1502-03 (N.D. Cal. 1996),
rev’d, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
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ities from challenging such abstract and undifferentiated forms of
societal discrimination,155 and a symmetrical reading of Proposition
209 would similarly deny standing to white males who challenge
equally abstract and undifferentiated forms of societal affirmative
action.156 Accordingly, the California voters who adopted Proposition
209 may have intended to outlaw only affirmative action preferences
that inflicted traditionally cognizable forms of injury, and not
affirmative action remedies that entailed only formal departures
from the ideal of race and gender neutrality without inflicting any
particularized injury on an identifiable victim. Stated differently,
California voters who believe that race and gender discrimination in
the culture has systemic causes may also believe in the need for
systemic remedies to end that discrimination.
Although the general anti-affirmative action sentiment of
Proposition 209 is clear at an abstract theoretical level, there are
many uncertainties about the intent of the California voters who
adopted Proposition 209 with respect to the future of particular public employment, public education, and public contracting programs.
If the district court view of the voters’ intent prevails, and Proposition 209 is ultimately held to be unconstitutional on its face, these uncertainties will be relegated to mere academic interest. However, if
the court of appeals view continues to prevail, and Proposition 209 is
ultimately held not to be facially invalid, subsequent rounds of litigation will be necessary both to establish contextual meanings of
Proposition 209 as a matter of state law, and to resolve the constitutionality of those meanings as a matter of federal law. Whichever
view prevails, as a result of the many uncertainties embedded in
Proposition 209, the courts will end up having the final say about
proper resolution of the affirmative action issue, just as they did prior
157
to the enactment of Proposition 209. Such a result is ironic, as the
whole point of Proposition 209 was to take the affirmative action issue away from the legislatures and the courts, and to have it resolved
by popular plebiscite through the ballot initiative process. One of the
reasons that the contextual meanings of Proposition 209 are so difficult to ascertain is that Proposition 209 does not rest on a shared con155. See Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1993) (discussing established standard that standing requires concrete, particularized and redressable injury).
156. But see id. at 666 (granting standing to challenge affirmative action program despite
apparent absence of concrete, particularized and redressible injury).
157. See Gotanda et al., Legal Implications, supra note 24, at 102-04.

SPANNPP WITH WIDOW PROTECT

1997]

05/26/98 9:03 AM

PROPOSITION 209

225

ception about the nature and scope of discrimination in contemporary culture. Assuming an absence of invidious intent, both proponents and opponents of Proposition 209 would seem to desire the
same goal. Both want to eliminate from contemporary society the
remaining vestiges of race and gender discrimination; but proponents
and opponents of Proposition 209 appear to view contemporary society in very different ways.
C. Contestable Assumptions
Proposition 209 rests on the assumption that prospective race
and gender neutrality constitutes the preferred strategy for eliminating unwanted discrimination from contemporary culture. Proponents
of Proposition 209 believe that such neutrality will promote the allocation of societal resources on the basis of merit rather than race or
gender, thereby allowing us to evolve into a society that is both just
and efficient. Accordingly, Proposition 209 supporters wish to eliminate affirmative action because they view race and gender preferences as simply a means of perpetuating the discrimination that undermines our efforts to become that society.
Opponents of Proposition 209, however, view affirmative action
as the most promising strategy for eliminating modern forms of race
and gender discrimination, which are often too subtle, unconscious
and systemic to be neutralized through mere reliance on antidiscrimination laws that require prospective neutrality. They argue that
past guarantees of race and gender neutrality have not succeeded in
eliminating discrimination, and that affirmative action has proved to
be the only effective method of redressing our persistent discrimination problems. Accordingly, Proposition 209 opponents view insistence on prospective neutrality, measured by reliance on traditional
indices of merit, as simply another form of discrimination.
The force of these competing arguments depends upon the coherence of the concepts that underlie them. To the extent that the
concepts of neutrality and merit are meaningful in contemporary society, the Proposition 209 strategy for eliminating discrimination has
logical appeal. However, to the extent that our history renders these
concepts incoherent, Proposition 209 appears sophomoric and counterproductive. Because the coherence of neutrality and merit is now
being vigorously contested, the Proposition 209 debate is best understood as a debate about the continued utility of these concepts in the
formulation of social policymaking.
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1. Morality. From the beginning, Proposition 209 supporters
have claimed the moral high ground.158 The Ballot Pamphlet arguments drafted by proponents of Proposition 209 state:
A generation ago, we did it right. We passed civil rights laws to
prohibit discrimination. But special interests hijacked the civil rights
movement. Instead of equality, governments imposed quotas, preferences and set-asides.

....
“REVERSE DISCRIMINATION” BASED ON RACE OR
GENDER IS PLAIN WRONG! . . . [S]tudents are being rejected
from public universities because of their RACE. Job applicants are
turned away because their RACE does not meet some “goal” or
“timetable.” Contracts are awarded to high bidders because they are
of the preferred RACE . . . . Proposition 209 will stop [these] terri159
ble programs.

This language does not argue that RACE OR GENDER-based
allocations of societal resources are undesirable. Rather, it assumes
that such allocations are self-evidently “PLAIN WRONG!” This
moral stance seeks to impose upon opponents of Proposition 209 the
burden of justifying any race- or gender-based departures from the
status quo. Inherent in this position is the belief that the status quo—
the present allocation of societal resources—is morally acceptable, or
at least morally superior to any race- or gender-conscious reallocation.
The Proposition 209 movement took great pains to define itself
as a movement committed to ending discrimination rather than a
movement designed to perpetuate it. The ballot initiative effort was
commenced in the early 1990s by Proposition 209 authors Glynn Custred and Tom Wood, two middle-aged white academics who had become disillusioned with affirmative action because they thought it
was reviving the obsession with racial classifications that had been
prevalent in the pre-civil rights South.160 The ballot initiative was
formally named the “California Civil Rights Initiative,” and its initial
158. See Gotanda, Color-Blind Vision, supra note 24, at 1135 (noting claim of moral superiority asserted by proponents of Proposition 209).
159. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1494 (alterations in original) (quoting
from Ballot Pamphlet); see also Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 696-97 (9th
Cir.) (quoting from Ballot Pamphlet), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
160. See Lemann, supra note 24, at 39-40 (discussing revival of southern pre-civil-rights obsession with racial classification).
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wording was intentionally based on antidiscrimination language
taken from the Civil Rights Act of 1964.161 Proponents of Proposition
209 invoked colorblind rhetoric from Martin Luther King, Jr. in support of their cause,162 and prompted voters to recall the personal
feelings of injustice that they experienced when they had lost jobs or
educational opportunities to less-qualified women or minority candidates who ended up performing poorly.163 The moral legitimacy of
Proposition 209 was enhanced for some when the anti-affirmative action movement attracted the support of prominent blacks such as
writer Shelby Steele and University of California Regent Ward Connerly.164 Proponents of Proposition 209 also formed an advocacy organization, named Californians Against Discrimination and Preferences (CADP), that supported the ballot initiative, initiated litigation
to end affirmative action in California, and later intervened as a defendant in the Coalition for Economic Equity case.165
The anti-affirmative action arguments of Proposition 209 proponents stressed both the illegitimacy of racial classifications and the
inefficiency of permitting affirmative action to interfere with a meritbased allocation of societal resources. The Proposition 209 founders
established a California Civil Rights Initiative Homepage on the
World Wide Web containing information and arguments offered in
support of the ballot initiative.166 The introductory message from
founders Glynn Custred and Tom Wood states:
This is an historic campaign which is aimed at building a better
and more inclusive California, where all can develop a sense of belonging and full participation, without regard to race, gender, or

161. See id. (discussing history of Proposition 209).
162. See id.; see also Gotanda, Color-Blind Vision, supra note 24, at 1136 & n.2 (discussing
invocation of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s vision of colorblind America on California Civil Rights
Initiative Internet World Wide Web Homepage); Ronald Turner, The Dangers of Misappropriation: Misusing Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Legacy To Prove the Colorblind Thesis, 2 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 101, 108 (1996) (discussing use of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “colorblind” rhetoric by
supporters of Proposition 209).
163. See Lemann, supra note 24, at 39-40 (discussing use of affirmative action “horror stories”).
164. See id. at 40 (discussing black support for Proposition 209).
165. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1505 n.26, 1506 n.29, 1520
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (discussing CADP involvement in anti-affirmative action litigation), rev’d, 122
F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
166. See Public Affairs Web (visited Oct. 1, 1997) <http://www.publicaffairsweb.com/ccri/>.
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ethnic origin. . . . We look forward to your participation and support
167
to realize this noble goal.”

An introductory message from Governor Pete Wilson states:
CCRI is an historic initiative that will end government-mandated
racial preferences in California and usher in a new era of equal opportunity for all of the people of this state. It will end the fundamentally un-American practices of quotas, set-asides and preferences
that are dividing our people along racial and gender lines.
....
These discriminatory preferences only serve to pit American
against American, and group against group. We can no longer ignore the harm it is doing by dividing our state and nation.
....
By joining me and the more than one million Californians who
lent their signatures in support of the California Civil Rights Initiative, you can strike a blow for the principles of equal opportunity
168
and individual merit.

University of California Regent Ward Connerly, chairman of the
“Yes on Proposition 209” campaign, included a message stressing the
need for Proposition 209 to restore merit-based admissions to California public schools:
The report released by the UCB [Berkeley] and UCLA management demonstrates the depth to which racial preferences are
being used at these campuses. If after Prop. 209 passes, the number
of under represented minority students at these campuses drops by
roughly 50%, we should all realize that students were being admitted to attend UCB and UCLA because of their race over other more
qualified students.
....
The opposition to Prop. 209 continues to tell the public that without preferences Black, Latino and other minority students will not
be admitted to UC campuses. That is plain wrong. Any student
who meets the UC qualifications is guaranteed a UC education. The
question is who will be admitted to the most prestigious campuses—

167. Id.
168. Pete Wilson, State of California (last modified June 17, 1996) <http://www.publicaffairs
web.com/ccri/wilson.htm>.
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Berkeley and UCLA, the best and brightest students we have to offer or students who, without a racial preference, would not otherwise
gain admission?
....
If we are not adequately preparing certain groups of minority
students to successfully compete for admission to UC Berkeley and
UCLA, then we must address that problem head on. We should not
continue to fool ourselves—or students—into thinking that we are
adequately educating minority populations simply because we meet
a certain quota in admissions. The real question is: would those students gain admission on merit alone. And if not, why? And if so,
why are we demeaning their achievements by calling them affirma169
tive action admits?

These Proposition 209 arguments echo the more general neutralityand merit-based arguments that have been offered against affirmative action in other contexts.170
As Proposition 209 gained grass roots popularity, it also began to
gain the support of national politicians and high-profile institutions.
Republican success in the 1994 elections moved anti-affirmative action sentiment from the conservative fringe to the middle of the political spectrum. Republican presidential candidates including Bob
Dole, Phil Gramm and Pete Wilson all adopted public campaign positions opposing racial preferences, and President Clinton, as part of
his re-election campaign, ordered an internal review of federal affirmative action programs.171 Bills were introduced in both Houses of
Congress to prohibit affirmative action.172 In California, the Board of

169. See Connerly Responds to UC Report on Prop. 209 (visited Nov. 1, 1997) <http://192.41.
11.185/ccri/pr/844238300.html>.
170. See, e.g., HERMAN BELZ, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 17-18 (1991) (commenting that racial preferences are inconsistent with
color-blind ideal originally incorporated into Civil Rights Act of 1964); Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1312, 1318-23 (1986)
(claiming that race-conscious remedies exacerbate racial tensions in a way that is inconsistent
with equal-opportunity goals of civil rights movement); Terry Eastland, The Case Against Affirmative Action, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33, 43-45 (1992) (advocating restoration of raceneutrality in civil rights laws); Clint Bolick, Discriminating Liberals, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1996,
at A15 (likening affirmative action to Plessy v. Ferguson racial classification).
171. See Lemann, supra note 24, at 36.
172. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 1001 (discussing House and Senate bills to
eliminate federal affirmative action); Lemann, supra note 24, at 36 (discussing the repeal of the
FCC minority distress sale tax certificate program); Kevin Merida, Senate Rejects Gramm Bid
to Bar Affirmative Action Set-Asides, WASH. POST, July 21, 1995, at A13 (describing legislative
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Regents of the University of California, led by Governor Wilson and
Regent Ward Connerly, voted to end three decades of affirmative action in University hiring and admissions.173 Governor Wilson also issued an Executive Order limiting California outreach programs for
women and minorities in state hiring, education, and contracts,174 and
filed suit in state court challenging the constitutionality of affirmative
action programs being implemented by certain California state agencies.175 On November 6, 1996, the day after California voters adopted
Proposition 209, Governor Wilson issued an Executive Order directing state agencies to promulgate implementing regulations. Attorney
General Daniel Lungren instructed state agencies immediately to
comply with Proposition 209 to the extent permitted by California
law.176
Despite the Proposition 209 claim of moral legitimacy, support
for Proposition 209 has been polarized. Overall, the California electorate adopted Proposition 209 by a vote of 4,736,180 (54%) to
3,986,196 (46%).177 Demographically, however, whites and males
were the only race or gender groups to vote in favor of the measure.
Whites voted in favor of Proposition 209 by a margin of 63 to 37 percent, and men voted in favor of the ballot initiative by a margin of 61
to 39 percent.178 Women voted against Proposition 209 with 48% in
favor and 52% opposed. Only 26% of blacks were in favor of the
measure while 74% were opposed.179 Latinos voted against Proposition 209 with 24% in favor and 76% opposed and Asians voted
against it with 39% in favor and 61% opposed.180 White males, there-

efforts by Phil Gramm and Bob Dole to limit affirmative action); Abigail Thernstrom, A Class
Backwards Idea: Why Affirmative Action for the Needy Won’t Work, WASH. POST, June 11,
1995, at C1 (describing a bill introduced by Rep. Charles T. Canady to end preferences in federal programs).
173. See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., California Board Ends Preferences in College System,
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1995, at A1; William Booth, U. of Calif. Ends Racial Preferences: Pioneer
in Diversity Adopts Stance Urged by Gov. Pete Wilson, WASH. POST, July 21, 1995, at A1.
174. See Vicki Torres, State May Be in the Minority in Affirmative Action Stance; Hiring:
Corporations Continue to Increase Outreach Efforts Even in the Wake of Appeals Court Ruling,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1997, at D1.
175. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1495 n.13 (N.D. Cal.
1996), rev’d, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
176. See id. at 1495.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 1495 n.12.
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fore, were the demographic group most persuaded by the moral
claims offered in support of Proposition 209.
Opponents of Proposition 209 are unwilling to concede the
moral high ground to Proposition 209 supporters. They view as highly suspect both the claim that Proposition 209 advances race and gender neutrality and the claim that it promotes merit-based allocations
of resources. Indeed, for many opponents of Proposition 209, the
concepts of neutrality and merit lack meaningful content. While
Proposition 209 supporters claim that neutrality and merit describe a
natural state of affairs that affirmative action preferences improperly
distort, Proposition 209 opponents view neutrality and merit as surrogates for normative preferences that favor one race or gender over
another. Proposition 209 opponents therefore view policy arguments
grounded in an appeal to neutrality or merit as arguments that actually favor the continuation of race and gender discrimination.
2. Neutrality. Professor Neil Gotanda argues that the “colorblind vision” invoked by proponents of Proposition 209 as a forwardlooking solution to race discrimination problems is actually a
backward-looking invocation of a nineteenth century white
supremacist mentality that interferes with our ability to solve
contemporary problems associated with discrimination.181 Gotanda
identifies a logical tension inherent in the concept of racial
colorblindness. Unlike the medical condition of colorblindness,
which precludes the ability to perceive different colors, the social
aspiration of colorblindness advocated by Proposition 209 entails the
nonrecognition of racial factors after they have already been
perceived. Race and gender are such salient social characteristics
that it is unrealistic to expect that they will go undetected in most
circumstances. Therefore, an employer, school admissions officer or
government contracting officer evaluating an applicant will first note
the applicant’s race and gender, and will then seek to disregard all of
the attributes associated with the applicant’s race or gender before
making a decision.182 Assuming that this conscious disregard is
possible in light of the unconscious race and gender biases that we

181. See Gotanda, Color-Blind Vision, supra note 24, at 1135-37; see also Neil Gotanda, A
Critique of “Our Constitution is Colorblind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1991) (arguing that the
Supreme Court’s use of “color-blind constitutionalism” legitimates white Americans’ social,
political and economic advantages and thereby helps to maintain those advantages).
182. See Gotanda, Color-Blind Vision, supra note 24, at 1139-40.
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have all been socialized to possess,183 a conscientious decisionmaker
would almost certainly wish to evaluate the applicant’s past
performance in light of the social and economic difficulties that the
applicant had to overcome. It is hard to imagine doing this without
again considering the applicant’s race or gender. Moreover, if the
decisionmaker also wishes to consider the applicant’s likely ability to
deal with future race or gender discrimination that the applicant may
encounter in the position for which he or she is being considered, it is
impossible to do so without yet again considering the applicant’s race
or gender.184 As long as the categories of race and gender remain
socially relevant, as they always have been in the past and seem
destined to remain in the foreseeable future, the disregard of race
and gender considerations in the allocation of societal resources will
artificially distort the allocation process.
Gotanda argues that the disregard of race and gender considerations is far from neutral. Instead, such disregard assumes that all
race- and gender-correlated characteristics are valueless and unworthy of attention.185 As an illustration of the problem that this assumption can cause, Gotanda points to Hopwood v. Texas,186 in which the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invalidated, on
equal protection grounds, a racial affirmative action program that the
University of Texas School of Law used to increase the enrollment of
black and Mexican-American students.187 In invalidating the program, the Fifth Circuit rejected the precedential value of the Supreme Court’s decision in Regents of the University of California v.
188
Bakke, in which Justice Powell’s frequently cited opinion endorsed
the limited use of racial preferences in college admissions for the
purpose of increasing the diversity of the student body.189 In rejecting
the Bakke diversity rationale, the Hopwood court was either denying
that race, ethnicity and gender could bring distinctive perspectives to

183. See infra notes 211-19 and accompanying text (discussing unconscious prejudices).
184. See Gotanda, Color-Blind Vision, supra note 24, at 1140-41 (discussing the difficulty of
assessing an African-American female candidate’s past ability to overcome racial adversity
without thinking about her race).
185. See id.
186. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
187. See id. at 945.
188. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
189. See id. at 311-20 (opinion of Powell, J.). Despite the Fifth Circuit’s departure from
Bakke, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Hopwood. See Thurgood Marshall Legal Soc’y
v. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996).
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classroom discussions, or was discounting the value of adding those
perspectives to the law school environment.190
Gotanda argues that the colorblind disregard of race and gender
perspectives advocated by cases like Hopwood and ballot initiatives
like Proposition 209 is not innocent happenstance. Rather, the vision
of colorblindness they invoke is the same vision of colorblindness the
first Justice Harlan endorsed in his famous Plessy v. Ferguson dissent.191 Although Justice Harlan dissented from the majority’s decision to tolerate official segregation, he did so confident that the white
race was, in his words, “the dominant race in this country . . . in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I
doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its
great heritage.”192 For Gotanda, Proposition 209’s vision of colorblindness does not encompass racial fairness or justice, but rather is
the contemporary form of the same racial superiority that was commonplace in the nineteenth century, when Harlan wrote his Plessy
dissent.193 Gotanda’s skepticism about the concept of neutrality is
shared by other commentators.194

190. Cf. Gotanda, Color-Blind Vision, supra note 24, at 1141-45 (using the Court’s conclusion that only remedial purposes are fostered by affirmative action to assert that the court did
not recognize the educational merit of diversity).
191. See 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
193. See Gotanda, Color-Blind Vision, supra note 24, at 1144, 1149-51 (comparing the Fifth
Circuit’s racial vision of the Fourteenth Amendment articulated in Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d
932, 939-40 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996), with the racial vision embodied by
Proposition 209).
194. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE
OF RACISM 139 (1992); ROY L. BROOKS, INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION: A STRATEGY FOR
RACIAL EQUALITY 204-06 (1996); RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES:
CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND RACE 69-73 (1995); STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO
SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT’S A GOOD THING, TOO vii-x, 3-138 (1994); CHARLES R.
LAWRENCE III & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON’T GO BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 67-87 (1997); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1060-63 (1991); John O. Calmore, Exploring Michael Omi’s “Messy”
Real World of Race: An Essay for “Naked People Longing to Swim Free,” 15 LAW & INEQ. J.
25, 28-29, 33, 73-80 (1997); Chang, supra note 24, at 1123-33; Marianne Constable, The Regents
on Race and Diversity: Representations and Reflections, 55 REPRESENTATIONS 92, 96 (1996);
Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy
Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162, 162-69 (1994); Richard
Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1843, 1844-47 (1994); Dwight L. Greene, Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance, and the Myth of Colorless Individualism in Bostick v. Florida, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1979,
1980-84 (1993); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness As Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1766-91
(1993); Charles R. Lawrence III, Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Transforma-
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3. Merit. The concept of merit has become as contestable as the
concept of neutrality. Philosopher Iris Marion Young argues that
opposition to affirmative action based on a preference for meritbased allocation of resources ignores the connection between social
power and the criteria used to measure merit. As a result, the concept of merit is used to defend the unjust oppression of marginalized
social groups through the allocation of resources to members of socially privileged groups who satisfy the criteria that they themselves
have identified as comprising merit.195 Young argues that the merit
principle can apply meaningfully only when it is “possible to identify,
measure, compare, and rank individual performance of job-related
tasks using criteria that are normatively and culturally neutral,” but
because “impartial, value-neutral, scientific measures of merit do not
exist . . . a major issue of justice must be who decides what are the
appropriate qualifications.”196 Young further argues that the present
focus of the affirmative action debate on distributive consequences of
particular allocation schemes diverts our attention from the structural features of society that permit privileged groups continually to
oppress marginalized groups.197 Accordingly, Young believes that the
proper focus of the affirmative action debate should be the broader
goal of ending oppression rather than the narrower goal of modifying
the distribution of resources.198
Young argues that an impartial, value-neutral measure of merit
cannot exist because the components of merit are simply too complex
to be identified for all but the most mundane social activities.199 We
simply do not know what combination of verbal skill, technical skill,
intelligence, imagination, judgment, discretion, organizational skill,
charisma, charm, diligence, and the like is necessary to make a good
employee, student or government contractor. Even if we did, we
would still know very little about how to assess in advance which
candidates for a job, school admission or government contract pos-

tion, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819, 819-22 (1995); Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and Discrimination, 39 HOW. L.J. 1, 48-63 (1995).
195. See generally IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 192225 (1990).
196. Id. at 193.
197. See id. at 199.
198. See id. at 192-93, 198-200.
199. See id. at 202.
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sessed the requisite combination of characteristics.200 When the white
males who presently possess most of the social power try to assess the
presence of merit in candidates, they use criteria that test for normative cultural attributes rather than merit. For example, an insistence on traits such as obedience, loyalty, positive attitude, articulateness, appearance, and ability to work well in groups simply measures the degree to which candidates share the cultural attributes that
the decisionmakers value rather than measuring any objective presence of merit.201
Aware that cultural bias undermines the legitimacy of our assessments of merit, we tend to rely on educational achievement and
standardized tests as ways of measuring merit in a manner that is less
culturally biased. However, educational achievements and standardized tests can rarely be validated in ways that establish a correlation
with objectively desirable performance.202 Moreover, those measures
are themselves culturally biased.203 Educational opportunities require
money and social status that largely restrict such opportunities to the
social classes that already have access to them.204 As members of lessprivileged classes begin to acquire educational credentials, credential
inflation raises the educational requirements for particular positions
so that they remain effectively restricted to members of the privileged classes who possess the better credentials.205 Standardized tests
also reflect cultural biases in favor of attributes such as competitiveness, ability to work well alone, ability to work quickly, ability to abstract, and possession of skills that are detected by questions with
yes-or-no answers.206 Not surprisingly, success on such tests tends to
correlate with race, gender, and social class.207
Young views the assessment of merit as “political” in the sense
that it implicates factors that are proper subjects for collective discussion and decisionmaking, but the concept of merit has become an
ideology that focuses discussion on the presence or absence of merit
in particular cases rather than on the features that should comprise
200. See id. at 202-04 (noting that jobs are too complex to allow for precise identification of
tasks or measurement of performance of those tasks).
201. See id. at 204-06.
202. See id. at 207.
203. See id. at 208-09.
204. See id. at 207.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 209.
207. See id. at 206-10.
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merit. She argues that the most just and least oppressive response to
the elusive problem of merit is for all affected social groups to have
democratic input into a non-hierarchical determination of what factors ought to govern the allocation of societal resources.208 However,
the present system of merit-based allocations is “coded” so that white
males end up being the ones who possess most of the merit.209
Young’s skepticism about the concept of merit is shared by other
commentators.210
The Proposition 209 prohibition on affirmative action makes
sense only to the extent that race and gender discrimination are conscious activities. To the extent that discrimination is an unconscious
or systemic phenomenon, it cannot be remedied through an act of
will, because the mere desire to refrain from engaging in acts of discrimination cannot prevent discriminatory acts of which the discriminator is unaware. Therefore, the only way to address unconscious
discrimination is through systemic remedies such as affirmative action programs, but Proposition 209 appears to preclude most affirmative action.211 This preclusion poses a serious problem if most acts of
contemporary discrimination turn out to be unconscious.
4. Unconscious Discrimination. Professor Charles Lawrence has
argued that unconscious discrimination is pervasive in contemporary
culture because the culture possesses discriminatory attitudes that are

208. See id. at 210-14.
209. See id. at 222.
210. See, e.g., FISH, supra note 194, at vii-x, 3-138; Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist
Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, in DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC.:
ESSAYS ON THE POWER AND POLITICS OF CULTURAL IDENTITY 34, 73-80 (1993); LAWRENCE
& MATSUDA, supra note 194, at 91-111; John O. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp,
and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 2129, 2219 (1992); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative
Action, 83 GEO. L.J. 1711, 1720-45 (1995); Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in
“General Ability” Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1158, 1220 (1991); Murray, supra note 24, at
1073-76; Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 778-79; Susan Sturm & Lani
Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV.
953, 968-97 (1996); Twyman, supra note 24, at 187-89.
211. Commentators who argue that affirmative action is needed to end lingering race and
gender discrimination include BARBARA R. BERGMANN, IN DEFENSE OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 32-61 (1996); BELL, supra note 194, at 139; DELGADO, supra note 194, at 69-73;
ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 10746 (1992); Delgado, supra note 210, at 1720-45; Oppenheimer, supra note 24, at 924-25; David
A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 99-100.
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transmitted to each of us through the process of socialization.212
Lawrence finds ubiquitous examples of unconscious prejudice:
Sportscaster Howard Cosell’s slip of the tongue in referring to a
black football player in racially demeaning terms on national
television; Nancy Reagan’s expressed wish that her husband Ronald
Reagan could be present to “see all these beautiful white people;”
and a liberal white person’s effort to express friendship to a black
person by saying “I don’t think of you as black,” are well-known
examples.213 More substantively, the Supreme Court’s decision not to
order immediate school desegregation after Brown v. Board of Education seems to have reflected more solicitude for white opposition to
desegregation than for the educational needs of black children—a
form of judicial discrimination that was presumably more
unconscious than intentional.214 The Court’s actions may also have
been motivated by unconscious racial stereotypes concerning the
unsuitability of black schools for the education of white children. In
addition, unconscious stereotypes can cause a white applicant to be
perceived as more qualified than a black applicant with respect to
subjective traits such as congeniality or thoughtfulness in the eyes of
white decisionmakers who must choose between the two.215
Lawrence emphasizes that one of the costs of viewing discrimination as a problem traceable to individual fault is that it places subtle and systemic unconscious discrimination beyond the reach of legal
remedies.216 No matter how real or harmful systemic discrimination
may be, it is not legally cognizable unless the court can identify an intentional discriminator who has engaged in some form of conscious
wrongdoing.217 In prescient anticipation of the Proposition 209
movement, Lawrence notes that this fault-based view of discrimination also increases popular resistance to affirmative action. Whites
and males who must bear the burdens of affirmative action preferences feel unfairly abused because they are being forced to suffer in
order to benefit women and minorities, who have not been found to
be the victims of conscious discriminatory acts. This reinforces the
view that women and minorities are inferior because they cannot
212. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322, 329-31 (1987).
213. See id. at 339-41.
214. See Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
215. See Lawrence, supra note 212, at 342-44.
216. See id. at 321-23.
217. See id. at 324.
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compete on their own, and it further exacerbates tensions between
race and gender groups.218 Lawrence’s view of the significance of unconscious discrimination is shared by other commentators.219
5. Lingering Discrimination. One consequence of the Proposition 209 prohibition on race and gender preferences is that current
levels of societal discrimination are likely to go unremedied. They
are too subtle to be reached by antidiscrimination laws, and under
Proposition 209 they can no longer be addressed through affirmative
action programs. One’s feelings about this situation are likely to be a
function of how bad one deems current levels of race and gender
discrimination to be. Proposition 209 proponents apparently believe
that current societal discrimination against women and minorities has
been reduced to acceptably low levels through the enforcement of
state and federal antidiscrimination laws.220 Proposition 209 opponents, however, focus on prejudicial attitudes and statistical
disadvantages that still confront women and minorities as evidence
that current levels of societal discrimination remain unacceptably
high.
After surveying a number of social science studies on discriminatory attitudes and practices in the United States, Professor David
Oppenheimer has concluded that race and gender discrimination remains a serious problem.221 In the last fifty years, the number of
white Americans openly espousing racial discrimination has declined,
but numerous studies show that whites still harbor significant levels
of covert prejudice against racial minorities.222 Of the whites who
openly oppose racial discrimination in employment and housing, only
33% favor federal enforcement of employment discrimination laws
like Title VII, and 50% oppose federal, state or local laws prohibiting

218. See id. at 324-26.
219. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 194, at 139; DELGADO, supra note 194, at 69-73; SPANN,
supra note 127, at 22, 25, 81, 163; YOUNG, supra note 195, at 193-97; Roy L. Brooks & Mary Jo
Newborn, Critical Race Theory and Classical-Liberal Civil Rights Scholarship: A Distinction
Without a Difference?, 82 CAL. L. REV. 787, 810-12 (1994); Delgado, supra note 210, at 172045; Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39, 92; David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141
U. PA. L. REV. 899, 900-02 (1993).
220. The Ballot Pamphlet argument section supporting Proposition 209 stressed reliance on
antidiscrimination laws rather than affirmative action as the appropriate means of achieving
race and gender equality. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
221. See Oppenheimer, supra note 24, at 946-97.
222. See id. at 947.
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homeowners from refusing to sell to someone on the grounds of race
or color.223 As recently as 1983, 34% of white Americans favored laws
prohibiting racial intermarriage, and in 1978 when given the choice
between desegregation, strict segregation or “something in between,”
60% of white Americans favored “something in between,” and only
35% favored desegregation.224 Over half the white Americans surveyed rated blacks and Hispanics as less intelligent than whites, and
36% rated Asians as less intelligent than whites.225 Sixty-two percent
rated blacks as less hard working than whites, 54% rated Hispanics as
less hard working, and 34% rated Asians as less hard working.226 Oppenheimer emphasizes that white decisionmakers are likely to act on
these views when making employment decisions.227
Oppenheimer also surveyed studies that demonstrate statistical
underrepresentation of women and minorities in many areas of
American life.228 White students tend to go to better schools than minority students, and per-pupil expenditures tend to be significantly
higher for white students than for minority students.229 Notwithstanding common beliefs, more alumni children are admitted to Harvard through special admission programs than are black, Hispanic
and Native American students combined.230 In employment, minorities earn less than whites. White women earn 72% of what men earn,
and minority women earn even less.231 White men are 43% of the
workforce, but they constitute 97% of the top executives.232 Black unemployment is 2.76 times higher than white unemployment.233 Employment discrimination claims are overwhelmingly filed by women
and minorities, while employment discrimination against white males
is rare.234 Racial segregation in housing is dramatic. Over 83% of
blacks in the twenty northern metropolitan areas with the largest
black populations live in segregated neighborhoods, regardless of

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

See id. at 948-49.
See id. at 949-50.
See id. at 951.
See id.
See id. at 952.
See id. at 958-96.
See id. at 960-66.
See id. at 965.
See id. at 966-67.
See id. at 967.
See id. at 968.
See id. at 969.
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their income levels.235 Minorities are less likely to own homes than
whites, and minority homes have a significantly lower median
value.236 Studies of racial steering indicate that 50%-60% of black
homeseekers encounter racial discrimination in the housing market.237
Oppenheimer surveyed additional studies showing similar race and
gender discrimination patterns in areas of health care, economic opportunity, crime victimization, and poverty.238 Oppenheimer’s conclusions about the scope of existing race and gender discrimination in
contemporary culture are shared by other commentators.239 Moreover, in an exhaustive statistical study of affirmative action in law
school faculty hiring, Professors Merritt and Reskin found that affirmative action gave white women and minority men only modest
advantages over white male candidates. Minority women secured no
affirmative action advantage whatsoever over white males in law
school hiring; however, the study did show that gender bias against
women remained persistent, despite the supposed existence of affirmative action preferences.240
Proponents and opponents of Proposition 209 seem to live in different worlds. Proponents tend to view the problems of past race and
gender discrimination as largely solved, so that the most serious
threat to equality in contemporary culture is discrimination against
white males resulting from affirmative action preferences. As a result, Proposition 209 proponents wish to return to a merit-based sys235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See id. at 975.
See id. at 976.
See id. at 976-77.
See id. at 978-96.
See e.g., BERGMANN, supra note 211, at 32-61; ROY L. BROOKS, RETHINKING THE
AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM 34-51, 69-83 (1990) (describing the “race problem” as an extension beyond statistical inequality, as a grid of class stratifications with inherently inequitable
conditions); A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 11-25 (Gerald David
Jaynes & Robin M. Williams, Jr. eds., 1989) (describing the continuing conditions of poverty,
segregation, discrimination, and social fragmentation to be of “serious proportions” for black
Americans); HACKER, supra note 211, at 121; LAWRENCE & MATSUDA, supra note 194, at 7174; DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID 148-85 (1993);
GARY ORFIELD, THE GROWTH OF SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS: CHANGING
PATTERNS OF SEPARATION AND POVERTY SINCE 1968, at 5-11 (1994); SPANN, supra note 127,
at 121-22; GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS & CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
REVIEW: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 20 (1995); Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 1004-13
(discussing the deleterious effects Proposition 209 would have in the areas of public employment, public education, and public contracting).
240. See Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials: The Truth
About Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 204-06, 299-300
(1997).

SPANNPP WITH WIDOW PROTECT

1997]

05/26/98 9:03 AM

PROPOSITION 209

241

tem of allocating resources in order to move society closer to its raceand gender-neutral aspirations. Opponents of Proposition 209 tend
to view the persistence of race and gender discrimination in contemporary culture as a substantial problem. Because such discrimination
reflects unconscious biases that are built into our concepts of neutrality and merit, Proposition 209 opponents believe that affirmative
action programs offer the only hope of neutralizing these subtle and
systemic forms of lingering discrimination. It is the battle between
these two views of contemporary culture that is at stake in the debate
over the constitutionality of Proposition 209.
II. DOCTRINAL INDETERMINACY
Determining the constitutionality of Proposition 209 is no easy
matter. The doctrinal rules that govern the validity of Proposition
209 under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are largely indeterminate, and therefore provide little guidance
about the proper resolution of the Proposition 209 constitutional dispute. The conflicting reasoning offered by the court of appeals and
the district court in support of their respective holdings reveals this
indeterminacy. The court of appeals decision upholding Proposition
209 views Proposition 209’s prohibition on race and gender preferences as a ban on race and gender discrimination, thereby making
Proposition 209 consistent with, rather than violative of, the Equal
Protection Clause. The district court opinion invalidating Proposition 209 on equal protection grounds views Proposition 209’s selective ban on race and gender preference as an unconstitutional race
and gender classification. Despite their reliance on doctrine, both
opinions are difficult to defend on doctrinal grounds.
A. The Court of Appeals Opinion
The three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in Coalition for Economic Equity emphatically upheld the constitutionality of Proposition 209. The court of appeals
held that there could be no “conventional” equal protection violation
because, by prohibiting race and gender preferences, Proposition 209
merely restated the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, and
could not, “as a matter of law and logic” violate the Equal Protection
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Clause.241 The court of appeals also held that Proposition 209 did not
restructure the California political process in a way that violated the
Equal Protection Clause.242 Although the court expressed skepticism
that women and minorities, who together constitute a majority of the
State electorate, could restructure the political process in a way that
violated their own equal protection rights,243 the court chose to root
its political structure holding in the belief that Proposition 209 did
not discriminate on the basis of race, but rather addressed racerelated matters in a neutral fashion.244 The court added that, even if
Proposition 209 did restructure the political process in a way that
made it more difficult for women and minorities to obtain preferences through the political process than it was for other groups to obtain such preferences, that burden ultimately resulted not from
Proposition 209 alone but also from the stringent standards that the
Equal Protection Clause itself imposes on race and gender classifications.245 Both of these holdings ultimately rest on the court’s assumption that Proposition 209 is race- and gender-neutral. But that assumption is difficult to defend.246
241. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 397 (1997).
242. See id. at 704-05.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 705-07.
245. See id. at 708-09.
246. The court of appeals panel was reviewing a district court order granting a preliminary
injunction that barred implementation of Proposition 209 pending a trial in the district court.
Although the three-judge court of appeals panel was initially presented with only the question
of whether to grant a stay of the district court order pending appeal, the panel chose to defer
ruling on the stay application and to assume jurisdiction over the merits of the state’s appeal
from the district court order. See id. at 699. Such an assumption of jurisdiction over the merits
by a panel presented with an application for a stay is unusual, but it is apparently authorized by
Ninth Circuit precedent. See id. at 699 n.5. Nevertheless, some commentators viewed the
panel’s expansion of its jurisdiction as a politically-motivated effort by a conservative panel to
ensure that it would be able to rule on the merits of the Proposition 209 constitutional controversy. See Dolan, supra note 24, at A1; Claiborne, supra note 24, at A1; Golden, supra note 24,
at A4.
As has been noted, Proposition 209 contains many ambiguities concerning the proper
scope of its application that have yet to be resolved by the California state courts. See supra
Part I.B (discussing state law ambiguities concerning scope of Proposition 209). The court of
appeals emphasized its familiarity with recent Supreme Court precedent disfavoring the adjudication of constitutional claims asserted against state enactments in the absence of a controlling state court interpretation. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 699-700 (citing Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 1072 (1997)). Nevertheless, the court of
appeals agreed with the district court that there was no need to order abstention or otherwise
delay a federal court constitutional ruling on Proposition 209 pending an authoritative state
court interpretation of the ballot initiative. See id. at 700. Like the district court preliminary
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1. “Conventional” Equal Protection Analysis. The assumption of
race and gender neutrality on which the court of appeals relies is
most explicit in what the court terms its “conventional” equal
protection analysis, which treats the claim of neutrality as if it were
self-evidently correct.247 According to the court of appeals, the
antidiscrimination objectives of both Proposition 209 and the Equal
Protection Clause are the same, and Proposition 209 cannot therefore
logically be deemed to violate the Equal Protection Clause.248 That
argument might make sense with respect to the antidiscrimination
provision of Proposition 209, because both the antidiscrimination
provision and the Equal Protection Clause contain prohibitions on
discrimination that are stated at high enough levels of generality to
make them appear analogous.249 However, the preference prohibition
of Proposition 209 is stated at a lower level of generality, which gives
injunction, the court of appeals panel disposition addressed the constitutionality of Proposition
209 on its face, rather than as applied in particular contexts. The district court did make extensive factual findings, see Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1493-99 (N.D.
Cal. 1996), rev’d, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. (1997), but the district
court’s preliminary injunction broadly extended to all affirmative action programs in public
employment, public education, and public contracting. See id. at 1520-21. Although the court
of appeals did not discuss the matter, the panel’s decision to uphold the constitutionality of
Proposition 209 on its face does not mean that all applications of Proposition 209 are constitutionally valid. Technically, it means only that at least some applications of Proposition 209 are
valid, thereby making it improper for the district court to have preliminarily enjoined implementation of Proposition 209 in all its applications. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
745 (1987) (stating that facial challenge can prevail only when “no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid”). Nevertheless, the tone of the court of appeals decision
suggests that the panel deemed Proposition 209 to be constitutionally valid in all of its applications. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 701 (“As a matter of ‘conventional’ equal
protection analysis, there is simply no doubt that Proposition 209 is constitutional.”). Moreover, the panel did not remand for a trial to sift the constitutional from the unconstitutional applications of Proposition 209, but rather remanded only “for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.” See id. at 711.
In addition to the equal protection issues that are discussed herein, the court of appeals also held that Proposition 209 was not preempted, under the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which authorizes affirmative action in some circumstances. See id. at 709-10.
247. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 702 (“If merely stating this alleged equal
protection violation does not suffice to refute it, the central tenet of the Equal Protection
Clause teeters on the brink of incoherence.”). The court of appeals treatment of Proposition
209 mirrors the self-evident-neutrality depiction of Proposition 209 that had been advanced by
Proposition 209 proponents in the Ballot Pamphlet. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
248. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 702 (“A law that prohibits the State from
classifying individuals by race or gender a fortiori does not classify individuals by race or gender.”).
249. The antidiscrimination provision of Proposition 209 states, “The state shall not discriminate against . . . any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or na-
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it both a more specific content and a capacity to violate the Equal
Protection Clause.250 As has been discussed, unless the preference
prohibition of Proposition 209 is a superfluous restatement of the
antidiscrimination provision, the preference prohibition must bar
race and gender preferences even when those preferences are not
themselves discriminatory.251
The Proposition 209 preference prohibition applies even in the
absence of discrimination, so it is not coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause, which only prohibits discrimination. And contrary to
the court of appeals holding, it is logically possible for the Proposition 209 preference prohibition to violate the Equal Protection
Clause. Such a violation will occur whenever the concept of equality
embodied in the Equal Protection Clause requires the preferential
treatment that Proposition 209 forbids. This can occur whenever two
individuals or groups are not similarly situated.252 For example, the
Equal Protection Clause probably requires the addition of women’s
restrooms at formerly all-male law schools once the schools begin to
admit women, even though the addition of women’s rooms would
constitute a gender-based preference. Because men and women are
differently situated with respect to restroom facilities at a law school
that has only men’s rooms, a women’s room preference would not
promote discrimination, but rather would be required to end discrimination. Accordingly, the court of appeals cannot be correct that
the Proposition 209 prohibition on all race and gender preferences is
necessarily neutral and therefore necessarily consistent with the
Equal Protection Clause.
It is not easy to determine when the Equal Protection Clause requires a preference. Whether a particular preference promotes or
undermines the goal of equality in a particular case is a function of
the perspective that an analyst brings to the case. For example, if two
tional origin . . . .” Proposition 209, § 31(a); see also supra note 49 (quoting full text of Proposition 209). The Equal Protection Clause states, “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
250. The preference prohibition provision of Proposition 209 states “The state shall not . . .
grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin . . . .” Proposition 209, § 31(a).
251. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing distinction between discrimination and preference
prohibitions of Proposition 209).
252. See generally STONE ET AL., supra note 128, at 564-70 (discussing the nature of
“equality” with respect to equal protection review); cf. North Carolina Bd. of Educ. v. Swann,
402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971) (holding “color-blind” pupil assignment unconstitutional as an inadequate remedy for prior school segregation).
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runners are competing against each other in a footrace, but the lead
runner has been given an unfair head start, a rule that requires the
lead runner to stop running until the trailing runner can catch up
seems appropriate to neutralize the lead runner’s unfair advantage.
The equality concept embodied in the Equal Protection Clause would
seem to require, rather than prohibit, such an equalization rule. But
the equalization rule would also constitute a preference, because it
would permit the trailing runner to run toward the finish line for
some period of time while the lead runner was forced to stand still.
To someone who witnessed the race from the start, the preference
would seem justified as a means of equalizing an unequal situation
produced by the lead runner’s head start—much as race and gender
preferences seemed justified to the district court that enjoined implementation of Proposition 209. But to someone who only began to
pay attention to the race after it was already underway, the rule requiring the lead runner to stop while the trailing runner had a chance
to catch up would look like an unfair preference. Because the inattentive observer was not focusing on the head start that the rule was
trying to neutralize, the rule would seem self-evidently unfair—much
as race and gender preferences seemed to the court of appeals. To
both observers, the rule would confer a preference on the disadvantaged runner, but whether the preference seemed to promote equality or discrimination would depend on the perspective of the observer.
An observer’s perspective is determined by the baseline facts
that are taken for granted when an equal protection analysis is performed. The observer who watched the race from the beginning
would consciously consider the lead runner’s head start in determining the fairness of granting a preference to the trailing runner. However, the observer who started watching in the middle of the race
would deem the trailing runner’s preference to be unfair because the
observer assumed that the race had begun with a fair start. More
precisely, the mid-race observer probably never thought about the
start of the race at all. That observer’s fair-start assumption belied
the baseline separating the facts that the observer consciously considered from the facts that the observer simply assumed to be true. It
was part of that vast array of background assumptions that we all
bring to our analytical activities without conscious contemplation,
unless we are given some particular reason to question them. If the
existence of a head start had been called to the mid-race observer’s
attention—if that fact had been raised above the baseline separating
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facts that are simply assumed from facts that are consciously considered—the observer would probably have concluded that the trailing
runner’s preference was an appropriate equalizing preference. On
the other hand, if the observer who witnessed the start of the race
were to learn that the trailing runner had previously wagered that she
could beat the lead runner even if the lead runner were given a head
start, it would no longer seem appropriate to force the lead runner to
stop and wait for the trailing runner to catch up. Conscious questioning of the fair-start assumption, whose unconscious influence operated beneath each observer’s baseline, would change each observer’s view of the need for an equalizing preference. Two observers are more likely to reach the same fairness conclusions if they
share the same baseline assumptions when they undertake their
analyses.
When the court of appeals glibly deemed all preferences to be
objectionable, it was ignoring the centrality of perspective and baseline assumptions to a proper equal protection analysis. As the
footrace and restroom examples demonstrate, differential treatment
may be required to promote equality if individuals or groups are not
similarly situated as an initial matter. Moreover, a refusal to permit
differential treatment would constitute an act of discrimination to the
extent that it froze or perpetuated the effects of a pre-existing inequality. That insight, of course, is the theory behind race- and gender-based affirmative action programs designed to neutralize the advantages that white males have historically given themselves over
women and minorities.
Whether the Equal Protection Clause prohibits or actually requires an affirmative action preference is a complex contextual question whose resolution ultimately turns on which baseline facts are
deemed relevant to the equal protection analysis. If the extant body
of evidence concerning the lingering effects of prior discrimination is
deemed relevant, then the Proposition 209 prohibition on remedial
253
preferences seems discriminatory. But, if that body of evidence is
ignored, the preference prohibition seems neutral. Accordingly, a
meaningful equal protection analysis of the Proposition 209 preference prohibition would make some effort to determine which baseline facts concerning prior discrimination are appropriate to consider
and which are properly deemed beyond the scope of judicial recogni253. See supra Part I.C.5 (discussing persistent race and gender discrimination in contemporary culture).
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tion. The court of appeals, however, offered no such analysis. In order to make its focus on prospective neutrality seem appropriate, the
court simply assumed that no judicially cognizable effects of past discrimination presently exist. In essence, the court merely looked up in
the middle of the race without ever considering whether anyone had
previously enjoyed a head start. Proposition 209 may be race- and
gender-neutral in this formal, inattentive sense, but it is a form of
neutrality that lacks any normative appeal.254
The court of appeals deferred to Proposition 209’s own characterization of itself as race- and gender-neutral, but the court should
have scrutinized that characterization more carefully. In fact, the
court should have subjected the threshold characterization issue to
heightened equal protection scrutiny. Because proper characterization of Proposition 209 turns on the analysis of complicated baseline
assumptions, the court of appeals should have used heightened scrutiny to identify and evaluate the baseline assumptions that it was
making, and to explain why it was rejecting the baseline assumptions
that it found to be inappropriate. Washington v. Davis arguably
holds that heightened scrutiny is not triggered until after a court has
determined that a classification constitutes a race or gender classification.255 However, the court may have refined that holding in Adarand
256
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena. In its effort to explain why heightened
scrutiny should apply to benign as well as to invidious classifications,
the Adarand Court emphasized that heightened scrutiny was required in order to ascertain whether a purportedly benign classifica254. In fairness to the court of appeals, the panel seems tacitly to have adopted what may
well have become the dominant Supreme Court view on this issue. An apparent majority of
the current Supreme Court believes that the lingering effects of general societal discrimination
are simply too subtle to be judicially cognizable for equal protection purposes. See City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-99 (1989); see also Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547, 610-14 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the interest in increasing
racial diversity of broadcast viewpoints is not a compelling interest so as to warrant strict scrutiny); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 288 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in
part and in judgment) (criticizing the majority’s reliance on the goals of “societal discrimination” and providing “role models” to withstand strict scrutiny, rather than the School Board’s
interest in remedying its own past discrimination). That view seems to have contributed markedly to the perception that invidious discrimination has become largely a phenomenon of the
past, and that affirmative action is the problem that now poses the most serious threat to the
equal protection principle. See generally Spann, supra note 194, at 48-63 (discussing tacit Supreme Court presumption that invidious discrimination no longer poses a significant social
problem). That view also seems to be at the heart of popular sentiment favoring antiaffirmative action measures such as Proposition 209.
255. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
256. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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tion was really benign or was surreptitiously invidious.257 The Court
viewed that inquiry as simply too complex to be determined by anything less than heightened scrutiny.258 The inquiry into whether a
categorical prohibition on affirmative action constitutes a race or
gender classification seems to be at least as complex, in light of the
difficult baseline determinations that a court should make in order to
resolve that inquiry properly. The reasoning of Adarand, therefore,
suggests that where a threshold classification issue is complex,
heightened scrutiny should be applied to enhance the reliability of a
court’s characterization of the threshold classification. The application of heightened scrutiny provides the only way to prevent a race or
gender classification from evading detection by masquerading as
something other than a race or gender classification—which is precisely what Proposition 209 seems successfully to have done before
the court of appeals.259
The assertion of the court of appeals that the Proposition 209
prohibition on race and gender preferences was neutral rather than
discriminatory is just that—an assertion. The court wrongly assumed
that prospective neutrality could never be discriminatory, because it
never questioned its baseline assumptions about the relevance of past
discrimination. As a result, the court’s analysis is strikingly incomplete. It offers little assistance in ascertaining whether the Proposition 209 preference prohibition is neutral or discriminatory. Although the doctrinal issue is a complex one, the court of appeals
opinion sidesteps the issue, substituting ipse dixit for legal analysis.
2. “Political Structure” Analysis. The view that Proposition 209
is race- and gender-neutral is also central to what the court of appeals
termed its “political structure” analysis. The court of appeals held
that, contrary to the district court conclusion, Proposition 209 did not
restructure the California political process in a manner that violated
257. See id. at 226.
258. See id. at 226-27.
259. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 702, 708-09 (9th Cir.) (treating
Proposition 209’s prohibition on state classification of individuals by race or gender as raceand gender-neutral for the purposes of equal protection analysis), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397
(1997). Similar analytical difficulties are posed in the voting rights context where heightened
scrutiny would seem to be required in determining whether racial considerations impermissibly
“predominate” over traditional districting principles in a voter apportionment plan, even
though heightened scrutiny is not technically triggered until after the “predominance” determination has been made. See Spann, supra note 194, at 60 (discussing difficulties entailed in
interpretation of Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995)).
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the Equal Protection Clause.260 The court first asserted that women
and minorities collectively constituted a majority of the electorate,
and expressed skepticism about the existence of equal protection
constraints on the power of the majority to disadvantage itself.261 The
court then held that Proposition 209 did not impermissibly
restructure the political process because Proposition 209’s neutrality
command prevented it from constituting a race or gender classification within the meaning of the Supreme Court’s political
structure cases.262 Finally, the court suggested that the special burdens imposed on the ability of women and minorities to secure
preferences through the political process ultimately resulted not from
Proposition 209, but from the Equal Protection Clause itself. 263
The “political structure” that the court of appeals and the district
court both address stems from a series of cases in which the Supreme
Court held that a state’s restructuring of its political process in a way
that disadvantages racial minorities can sometimes constitute an
equal protection violation. In Hunter v. Erickson,264 the Supreme
Court invalidated an amendment to the Akron, Ohio City Charter
that effectively precluded the Akron City Council from adopting fair
housing ordinances without the majority approval of Akron voters.265
The Supreme Court held that the Charter Amendment constituted an
unconstitutional racial classification that violated the Equal Protection Clause because it made it more difficult to secure the enactment
of fair housing ordinances that minorities tended to favor than it was
to secure the enactment of ordinances regulating any other aspects of
real estate transactions.266 The Supreme Court applied similar reasoning in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1267 to invalidate a
statewide ballot initiative that effectively precluded local school
boards from adopting busing plans to facilitate school desegregation.268 Most recently, in Romer v. Evans,269 the Supreme Court invalidated on equal protection grounds an amendment to the Colorado

260. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 701-06.
261. See id. at 704-05.
262. See id. at 707.
263. See id. at 708.
264. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
265. See id. at 387, 393.
266. See id. at 390-93.
267. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
268. See id. at 462-63, 470-82.
269. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
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Constitution that barred any division of Colorado State or local government from taking actions to prohibit discrimination against individuals with nontraditional sexual preferences.270 The fatal defect in
each of these three cases was the restructuring of the political process
in a way that required a disadvantaged group to take some extraordinary action—obtaining a charter amendment, ballot initiative or state
constitutional amendment—in order to protect its political interests,
while those who opposed the interests of the disadvantaged group
could have their way simply by utilizing the ordinary political process.
The problem with applying a political structure analysis is that
not all of the Supreme Court’s political restructuring cases have been
decided the same way. In Crawford v. Board of Education,271 a case
decided on the same day as Seattle, the Supreme Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause did not invalidate a California constitutional
amendment that effectively prohibited California state courts from
ordering busing as a remedy for de facto school segregation—a remedy that the California Supreme Court had previously held to be required by state law under the California Constitution.272 Crawford
made no serious effort to distinguish Seattle in terms of political restructuring.273 However, Crawford did cite a number of cases for the
proposition that the Supreme Court’s political restructuring doctrine
did not prevent a state from simply repealing a measure that had previously benefited racial minorities.274 The opinion also contained dic270. See id. at 1626-29. Although Romer can be read as a political restructuring case, see,
e.g., Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 704, 707 (9th Cir.) (treating Romer as a
political restructuring case), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997); Coalition for Econ. Equity v.
Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1510 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (same), rev’d, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997), Romer is better understood as a case that turns on the presence of discriminatory animus. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing significance of Romer). Although Romer contains some political restructuring language, see 116 S. Ct. at 1626-27, it also
distances itself from the political restructuring analysis used by the Colorado Supreme Court to
invalidate the Colorado constitutional amendment, see id. at 1624.
271. 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
272. See id. at 529-31, 535-36.
273. See id. at 536 n.12 (offering a weak distinction of Seattle). Justice Powell, the author of
the majority opinion in Crawford, dissented in Seattle, thereby suggesting that he may not have
viewed the two cases as distinguishable. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 488 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Indeed, a five-justice majority of the court thought that the two cases were indistinguishable.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell, Burger, and O’Connor thought that the enactments in both cases were constitutional, and Justice Marshall thought that the enactments in
both cases were unconstitutional. See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 528 (enumerating votes of justices); Seattle, 458 U.S. at 458 (enumerating votes of justices).
274. See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 538-39.
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ta distinguishing “between state action that discriminates on the basis
of race and state action that addresses, in neutral fashion, racerelated matters.”275
The court of appeals resolution of the political restructuring issue rests on the same neutrality assumption that undermined its conventional equal protection analysis. The court was initially troubled
by the suggestion that Proposition 209 could restructure the political
process in a way that unconstitutionally burdened women and minorities because women and minorities collectively comprised a majority of the electorate that adopted Proposition 209, and the court
did not see how the majority could choose to burden itself in a way
that violated the Equal Protection Clause.276 Although the court
viewed this problem as particularly “compelling” with respect to
women, because women themselves constitute a majority of the California electorate,277 the court relegated its skepticism to dicta rather
than elevating it to the level of holding.278 Nevertheless, the court’s
discussion implicates its neutrality assumption.
Leaving aside the thorny issue of how one identifies majority
and minority preferences in a coalition voting environment,279 the
court of appeals seems to be responding to a representationreinforcement-based concern that would limit judicial intrusion into
the political process to interventions that are necessary to protect underrepresented political minorities whose interests might be sacrificed by politically more powerful majorities.280 The court of appeals
appears to think that Proposition 209 is neutral in representationreinforcement terms because the women and minorities whom it disadvantages collectively outnumber the white males whom it benefits,
275. Id. at 538.
276. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 704-05 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
277. See id. at 705 n.13. The court did not consider the relevance of the fact that a majority
of women voted against Proposition 209. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F.
Supp. 1480, 1495 n.12 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (noting that 48% of women voted in favor of Proposition 209 while 52% voted against it), rev’d, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
397 (1997).
278. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 705.
279. See generally Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows At Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121,
2122-43 (1990) (describing social choice theory insights based on Arrow’s Theorem concerning
cycling difficulty entailed in seeking to ascertain majority preferences through democratic
processes).
280. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980) (elaborating representation-reinforcement theory of judicial review).
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which gives women and minorities the power to protect themselves in
the political process. This argument is not a silly one. The constitutional government that the framers envisioned was meant to rely
primarily on the formation of transitory political coalitions for the
protection of minority rights.281 Nevertheless, it is not clear that the
court of appeals appreciated the full significance of its offhanded
comment.
Under the now dominant Marbury v. Madison282 model of judicial review, the Supreme Court has assumed the role of protecting
the individual rights of minorities and women through heightened
scrutiny of race- and gender-based governmental classifications.283
Therefore, when the court of appeals questioned whether women and
minorities could properly be viewed as victims of majoritarian enactments, it did three significant things. First, it challenged the present vitality of the Marbury model by questioning the need for continued judicial protection of politically underrepresented groups. Second, it subjected women and minorities to the risk of overt discrimination, for if women and minorities now possess the ability to protect
themselves from burdensome political restructuring, they must also
possess the power to protect themselves from explicit race and gender discrimination. Third, it called into question the Supreme
Court’s recent line of cases invalidating majoritarian affirmative action programs on equal protection grounds, even though such programs entailed a decision by the majority to impose burdens on itself.284 Whether or not the court of appeals view has ultimate merit,
the court of appeals seems to have been unaware of the scope of its
dictum, and it has certainly failed to develop the arguments that
would be necessary to justify such a major jurisprudential revolution.
The court of appeals held that Proposition 209 did not restructure the political process in a way that violated the Equal Protection
Clause because the Proposition 209 preference prohibition is not a
race or gender classification.285 The court offered three arguments to

281. See generally STONE ET AL., supra note 128, at 5-23 (discussing Madisonian republicanism and structural safeguards for minority rights).
282. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
283. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (prescribing strict scrutiny for racial classifications); United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996) (requiring
“exceedingly persuasive” justification for gender classifications) [hereinafter The VMI Case].
284. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
285. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d. 692, 707-09 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
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support this conclusion, but all three arguments simply beg the question of Proposition 209’s neutrality. First, the court quoted the language in Crawford distinguishing “between state action that discriminates on the basis of race and state action that addresses, in neutral
fashion, race-related matters.”286 The court held that Proposition 209
merely addressed race- and gender-related matters in a neutral fashion, and was therefore not unconstitutional.287 But this holding is true
only if one adopts an analytical baseline that assumes away all lingering effects of prior discrimination. If one adopts a different baseline that considers past discrimination, Proposition 209 reemerges as
a discriminatory effort to preclude any remedy for that prior discrimination. As was the case with its conventional equal protection
discussion, the court of appeals offered no justification for its baseline selection, and showed no awareness of the baseline-assumption
problem.288
Second, the court invoked Crawford to support the proposition
that neither the Equal Protection Clause nor the Supreme Court’s
political restructuring cases prevented a state from merely repealing
a race or gender preference.289 The court then argued that Proposition 209 was constitutionally valid because Proposition 209 merely
repealed the California race and gender preferences that had predated its adoption.290 This argument does little more than restate the
problem, though, because all of the Supreme Court’s political restructuring cases involved a repeal of some pertinent preference.291 In
Crawford, the Supreme Court stated that the distinction between the
repeals that had been upheld and the repeals that had been invalidated was whether the repeal “allocate[d] governmental or judicial
power on the basis of a discriminatory principle.”292 Under Crawford,
therefore, the constitutional validity of Proposition 209’s repeal of
race and gender preferences turns once again on whether Proposition
209 is itself neutral or discriminatory.
Third, the court of appeals held that Proposition 209 was controlled by the Crawford line of political restructuring cases, rather
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
cases).
292.

Id. at 705 (quoting Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 538 (1982)).
See id. at 709.
See supra notes 252–54 and accompanying text (discussing baseline assumptions).
See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 705-06.
See id. at 709.
See supra notes 264-75 and accompanying text (discussing political restructuring
Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 541 (1982).
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than the Hunter and Seattle line, because Proposition 209 did not single out antidiscrimination laws for special treatment, but rather invalidated all race and gender preferences.293 This argument, of
course, is yet another way of asserting that Proposition 209 is neutral
rather than discriminatory. The court of appeals did not deny that
Proposition 209 singles out race and gender preferences for special
treatment based on their content—race and gender preferences are
prohibited, while all other preferences are allowed. But the court
emphasized that Proposition 209 does not discriminate among race
and gender preferences based on the viewpoints that they espouse—
Proposition 209 is neutral with respect to such preferences, prohibiting them all, whether they favor men, women, whites or minorities.294
Once again, proper characterization of Proposition 209 turns on the
perspective of the analyst. But once again, the court of appeals offered no doctrinal or policy reason for focusing on the ways in which
Proposition 209 is neutral while disregarding the ways in which it is
discriminatory.
Finally, the court of appeals held that even if Proposition 209 did
restructure the political process, it was not unconstitutional because it
did not deny anyone a right to equal treatment.295 In so doing, the
court not only implicated its contestable assumption of neutrality yet
again, but the court seems to have committed a logical error as well.
The court of appeals reasoned that Proposition 209 prohibits preferential treatment, but not the equal treatment that is required by the
Equal Protection Clause.296 This claim, however, is not responsive to
the equal protection challenge that has been leveled against Proposition 209. The challenge asserts not that Proposition 209 is unconstitutional because it fails to permit preferences that favor women and
minorities, but rather because it fails to permit preferences that favor
women and minorities while permitting preferences that favor all
other groups. It is by permitting preferences for veterans, and alumni
children, and golfing partners at the country club—preferences for
everyone except women and minorities—that Proposition 209 allegedly discriminates against women and minorities in a way that violates the Equal Protection Clause.

293.
294.
295.
296.

See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 707.
See id.
See id. at 707-09.
See id. at 708.
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What the court of appeals needed to uphold the constitutionality
of Proposition 209 was a justification for Proposition 209’s special
treatment of race and gender preferences that would withstand the
heightened scrutiny that applies to suspect classifications under the
Equal Protection Clause. What the court of appeals offered was the
assertion that “[t]he alleged ‘equal protection’ burden that Proposition 209 imposes on those who would seek race and gender preferences is a burden that the Constitution itself imposes.”297 In other
words, the court of appeals argued that Proposition 209 was justified
in singling out race and gender classifications for special treatment
because the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution itself demands such special treatment. This argument, however, ignores the
fact that meaningful application of the Proposition 209 preference
prohibition extends only to those race and gender preferences that
are valid under the Equal Protection Clause. (Invalid preferences are
already prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause and by the antidiscrimination provision of Proposition 209). If the Equal Protection
Clause does not prohibit the race and gender preferences barred by
Proposition 209, compliance with the Equal Protection Clause cannot
constitute a justification for Proposition 209’s discriminatory invalidation of race and gender preferences.
Thus far in its opinion, the court of appeals had offered no justification whatsoever for the Proposition 209 imposition of special political burdens on women and minorities, let alone a justification that
could survive heightened scrutiny. Then, in an abrupt change of direction that undermined the relevance of its prior discussion, the
court of appeals suddenly appeared to recognize that the race and
gender preferences prohibited by Proposition 209 were valid under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
court stated, “[t]hat the Constitution permits the rare race-based or
gender-based preference hardly implies that the state cannot ban
298
The court then added that “[t]he Fourteenth
them altogether.”
Amendment, lest we lose sight of the forest for the trees, does not
require what it barely permits.”299 Once again, however, the court’s
discussion was wholly nonresponsive. It is true that the Constitution
will often permit a state to abstain from the adoption of race and
gender preferences, but that is not the issue raised by Proposition
297.
298.
299.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 709.

SPANNPP WITH WIDOW PROTECT

256

05/26/98 9:03 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:187

209. The issue is whether a state that chooses to adopt other types of
preferences can constitutionally do so without adopting race and
gender preferences as well. As a doctrinal matter, the court of appeals opinion offers no help at all in determining what the proper
resolution of that issue should be.
Each of the arguments offered by the court of appeals ultimately
rests on the court’s belief that Proposition 209 is race- and genderneutral. This observation is true of the court’s assertion that Proposition 209 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause under
“conventional” analysis, and it is also true of the court’s assertion
that Proposition 209 does not restructure the political process in a
way that discriminates against women and minorities. Whether the
preference prohibition of Proposition 209 is properly characterized as
neutral or discriminatory will be a function of whether existing levels
of race and gender discrimination in contemporary culture are considered or ignored in conducting an equal protection analysis of
Proposition 209. The court of appeals adopted an analytical baseline
that ignored the existence of such lingering discrimination, but the
court offered no justification for why that baseline was appropriate.
As a result, the court of appeals opinion seems more like a reflection
of political preference than the product of doctrinal analysis. But this
feature also colors the district court opinion finding equal protection
problems with Proposition 209.
B. The District Court Opinion
The district court in Coalition for Economic Equity issued a preliminary injunction preventing implementation of Proposition 209
pending a full trial on the merits of the claim that Proposition 209
300
The district court found as a matter of fact
was unconstitutional.
that women and minority members of the plaintiff class would suffer
irreparable injury from Proposition 209’s invalidation of race and
gender preferences,301 and concluded as a matter of law that Proposition 209 was likely to be held unconstitutional after trial.302 The district court believed that Proposition 209 would be held unconstitutional because its preference prohibition discriminated against
women and minorities. By amending the state constitution to pro300. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1520-21 (N.D. Cal. 1996),
rev’d, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
301. See id. at 1493-99.
302. See id. at 1499-510.
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hibit race and gender preferences while permitting all other types of
preferences—such as preferences based on age, disability, or veteran
status—Proposition 209 impermissibly singled out race and gender
for the imposition of special political burdens.303 The district court
found that after Proposition 209, proponents of race and gender preferences could advance their political interests only at the statewide
level by amending the California Constitution, while proponents of
all other preferences could advance their interests at any level of
government through the ordinary political process.304 Proposition 209
therefore restructured the California political process in a way that
seemed to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment under Hunter v. Erickson305 and Washington v. Seattle
306
Unlike the court of appeals, which treated
School District No. 1.
Proposition 209 as if it implicated distinct “conventional” and
“political structure” equal protection issues,307 the district court focused exclusively on whether Proposition 209 had impermissibly restructured the California political process.308
Doctrinally, the district court held first that Proposition 209 constituted a race- and gender-based classification,309 and second that it
restructured the political process in a way that could not survive
heightened equal protection scrutiny.310 On its face, the district court
opinion seems more persuasive than the court of appeals opinion, because the district court is cautious and doctrinally meticulous where
the court of appeals was more ideologically cavalier. Ultimately,
however, both of the holdings of the district court rest on the assumption that Proposition 209 discriminates on the basis of race and gender. And like the neutrality assumption made by the court of ap-

303. See id. at 1499, 1504-06.
304. See id. at 1506-08.
305. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
306. 458 U.S. 457 (1982). See supra notes 264-75 and accompanying text (discussing the
Hunter and Seattle decisions).
307. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 701, 702-03 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
308. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1499.
309. See id. at 1499-506.
310. See id. at 1506-10. For an academic version of the argument that Proposition 209 is
unconstitutional because of its discriminatory restructuring of the political process, see Amar &
Caminker, supra note 24, at 1041-45.
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peals, the district court’s discrimination assumption is difficult to defend on the basis of legal doctrine alone.311
1. Race and Gender Classification. As noted above, the district
court held that the Proposition 209 preference prohibition
constituted a race and gender classification because it prohibited race
and gender preferences while permitting other types of preferences.312
It is clear that Proposition 209 treats race and gender preferences
differently than other preferences, but it is less clear that this
differential treatment constitutes discrimination that is prohibited by
the Equal Protection Clause. The district court conceded that the
Proposition 209 preference prohibition does not contain a race or
gender classification on its face.313 Nevertheless, the district court
believed that Proposition 209 constituted a race and gender
classification under Seattle because of its race and gender focus. The
court stated:
The Seattle opinion sets out the framework for analysis: if an
“initiative removes the authority to address a racial problem—and
only a racial problem—from the existing decisionmaking body, in
such a way as to burden minority interests,” it must be examined for

311. The district court’s constitutional determinations were contingent rather than absolute
because the district court was ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction rather than issuing a final ruling on the merits. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1490-91
(discussing preliminary injunction posture of case before district court). The district court’s
final constitutional determinations would have been made after a trial on the merits if the decision of the court of appeals reversing the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction had
not been written in terms so broad as to seemingly preclude the need for a trial. See supra note
246 (discussing breadth of court of appeals reversal).
Some commentators viewed efforts by the conservative court of appeals panel to expand its jurisdiction over the Proposition 209 case as politically motivated. See supra note 246
(discussing expansion of court of appeals jurisdiction). However, commentators have also suggested that the plaintiffs in Coalition for Economic Equity made strategic efforts to get their
case assigned to a liberal district judge. See, e.g., Ed Mendel, State Voters Are Smacked by
Slapstick Legal Antics, COPLEY NEWS SERV., Feb. 23, 1997, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Curnws File. In addition, lawyers on both sides may have been “shopping” for sympathetic
judges. See Golden, supra note 24, at A4; Dolan, supra note 24, at A1 (noting political liberalness of district court judge).
Like the court of appeals, the district court thought that the constitutionality of Proposition 209 could be determined in a broad facial challenge, and that abstention was not required
to resolve the ambiguities raised by Proposition 209 as a matter of state law. See Coalition for
Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1492 n.8 (declining to abstain); see also supra Part I.B (discussing
state law ambiguities concerning scope of Proposition 209).
312. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1499, 1505.
313. See id. at 1502 (“[T]he plain language of Proposition 209 . . . concededly contains no
classification on its face . . . .”).
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equal protection purposes as if it were a racial classification. Keeping the earlier discussion regarding the extension of this analysis to
the gender context in mind, the Court applies the Seattle test to
314
Proposition 209.

Both the language and the outcome of the Seattle case support
the district court conclusion that Proposition 209 constitutes a race
and gender classification.315 However, this language from the Seattle
opinion was immediately qualified by the Supreme Court in Crawford, the case decided the same day as Seattle, that the court of appeals relied on in upholding Proposition 209.316 In Crawford, the Supreme Court stated:
Similarly, the Court has recognized that a distinction may exist
between state action that discriminates on the basis of race and state
action that addresses, in neutral fashion, race-related matters. This
distinction is implicit in the Court’s repeated statement that the
Equal Protection Clause is not violated by the mere repeal of racerelated legislation or policies that were not required by the Federal
317
Constitution in the first place.

Both the language and the outcome of Crawford support the
court of appeals conclusion that Proposition 209 does not constitute a
racial classification, but is merely a repeal of existing race and gender
preferences that were not constitutionally compelled.318 Accordingly,
the district court’s bare invocation of Seattle alone is not sufficient to
establish which of the two precedents should be deemed controlling.
Realizing this difficulty, the district court attempted to distinguish
Crawford in order to establish that Seattle controlled the interpretation of Proposition 209.
According to the district court, the doctrinally material feature
of Proposition 209 was not its mere repeal of existing race and gender
preferences but rather its prohibition on the adoption of such prefer314. Id. at 1504 (citation omitted) (quoting Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S.
457, 474 (1982)).
315. Seattle invalidated a statewide initiative that effectively prohibited local school boards
from using busing to facilitate school desegregation. See supra notes 267-68 and accompanying
text (discussing Seattle case).
316. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 705 (9th Cir.) (quoting Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 538 (1982)), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
317. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 538 (footnote omitted).
318. Crawford upheld a California constitutional amendment that effectively precluded
state courts from ordering busing to remedy de facto segregation. See supra notes 271-75 and
accompanying text (discussing Crawford case).
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ences in the future.319 In that regard, Proposition 209 was like the
busing initiative invalidated in Seattle, which prospectively prohibited
local school boards from using busing to remedy de facto segregation.
And it was distinguishable from Crawford because the California
constitutional amendment upheld in Crawford merely repealed the
authority of the courts to use busing programs to remedy de facto
segregation; it did not preclude local school boards from adopting
such busing programs in the future.320 Therefore, Proposition 209 was
unconstitutional because it was controlled by Seattle and was distinguishable from Crawford.
The problem with the district court’s distinction is that it can be
deconstructed to show that Proposition 209 is governed by Crawford
rather than Seattle. According to a deconstructed version of the district court argument, the material feature of Proposition 209 is not its
mere repeal of existing race and gender preferences but rather its
prohibition on the adoption of such preferences in the future. In that
regard, Proposition 209 is like the California constitutional amendment upheld in Crawford, which prospectively prohibited state courts
from using busing as a remedy for de facto segregation. And it is distinguishable from Seattle, because the anti-busing initiative invalidated in Seattle merely repealed the authority of local school boards
to use busing programs as a remedy for de facto segregation; it did
not preclude state courts from adopting such busing programs in the
future, when they deemed busing to be required. Therefore, Proposition 209 is constitutional because it is controlled by Crawford and it is
distinguishable from Seattle.
The district court’s efforts to apply Seattle and distinguish Crawford seems no more valid than does the above transposition of the
two precedents. Each precedent contains both a repeal and a pro321
spective prohibition. Supreme Court dicta notwithstanding, the distinction between a mere repeal and a prospective prohibition cannot
be the factor that accounts for the different outcomes in the two
precedents.322 This argument indicates that there is nothing in the
precedents themselves that establishes whether Proposition 209 is
discriminatory or neutral. And the district court offers no other
319. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1508.
320. See id. (distinguishing Crawford).
321. See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 538 (stating that mere repeal of legislation or policies relating to race is insufficient for finding of unconstitutionality).
322. See infra note 500 (discussing supposed distinction between repeal and prospective
prohibition).
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guidance in ascertaining which characterization of Proposition 209 is
correct. The district court’s decision to characterize Proposition 209
as discriminatory rather than neutral was undoubtedly motivated by
the court’s baseline assumption that the Proposition 209 elimination
of race and gender preferences would perpetuate the lingering effects
of past race and gender discrimination.323 However, the district court
did not explain why its baseline assumption of discrimination was
preferable to the baseline assumption of neutrality that the court of
appeals chose to make. Like the court of appeals, the district court
failed to address the pivotal role of baseline assumptions in a sophisticated equal protection analysis of Proposition 209.324
The reason that proper characterization of Proposition 209 is so
difficult is that Proposition 209 is both discriminatory and neutral. It
is discriminatory in the way that it singles out race and gender preferences for special treatment, but its treatment of racial and gender
preferences is neutral. How then is a court supposed to determine
which characterization should prevail? Crawford initially seems to
offer a solution. Crawford suggests that the Equal Protection Clause
does not prohibit “state action that addresses, in neutral fashion,
race-related matters.”325 Proposition 209 certainly addresses “racerelated matters,” but isn’t its treatment of those matters “neutral,” as
the court of appeals insisted? On one level, this language merely
reignites the dispute concerning the definition of neutrality in a context where different analysts come to the issue with different baseline
assumptions. But it also presents a deeper doctrinal problem: Loving
326
v. Virginia seems to say that the Supreme Court’s dicta in Crawford
327
is wrong.
323. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1495-99 (finding facts concerning effect
that Proposition 209 would have on opportunities for women and minorities in public contracting, employment, education and political influence).
324. See supra notes 253-54 and accompanying text (discussing unexamined baseline assumption of neutrality made by court of appeals).
325. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 538.
326. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
327. There is a technical difference between Loving, on the one hand, and Crawford on the
other. As is discussed below, see infra note 328 and accompanying text, the miscegenation
statute at issue in Loving made explicit reference to race, while the amendment at issue in
Crawford never mentioned race at all. See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 537. However, it is difficult
to attribute any doctrinal significance to this difference. If both enactments are neutral in the
way that they treat race, it is unclear why it should matter for equal protection purposes
whether the enactments explicitly mention race or not. And if both enactments are discriminatory, it is equally unclear why the presence or absence of an explicit reference to race should
matter.
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In Loving, the Supreme Court invalidated, on equal protection
grounds, a Virginia criminal statute that prohibited racial intermarriage, even though the statute was racially neutral in its imposition of
the miscegenation prohibition.328 Merely singling out the topics of
race and gender for special burdens relative to other topics seems to
be enough under Loving to establish an equal protection violation,
even if the special burdens are imposed neutrally within those topics.
This reading of Loving suggests that the district court is right and the
court of appeals is wrong, and that Proposition 209’s treatment of
race and gender preferences—even if neutral—is unconstitutionally
discriminatory after all. But under this reading, Loving itself may
well be wrong.
In Loving, the Supreme Court asserts that a racially neutral miscegenation statute would violate the Equal Protection Clause, but the
Court never explains why.329 Like the court of appeals opinion
deeming the neutrality of Proposition 209 to be self-evident,330 Loving
treats the discriminatory nature of the miscegenation statute as if it
were self-evident. In Loving, the Court found that the racialintegrity goal of the statute was “obviously an endorsement of the
doctrine of White Supremacy.”331 In language reminiscent of the language used by the court of appeals to uphold the constitutionality of
Proposition 209, the Supreme Court in Loving concluded, “[t]here
can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because
of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”332
When assertions of self-evident correctness are substituted for
doctrinal analysis, the conclusions that follow lack any principled justification. They have only the support of the intuitions that created
328. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12. In fact, the Virginia statute that the Supreme Court invalidated was not racially neutral. It prohibited intermarriage with white people, but not intermarriage among racial minorities. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court stressed that even a
miscegenation statute that applied neutrally to all races would fail to survive constitutional
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 11-12 n.11.
329. See id. (discussing unconstitutionality of neutral miscegenation statutes).
330. See supra text accompanying note 247 (discussing court of appeals treatment of Proposition 209 as self-evidently neutral).
331. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7 (characterizing justification for miscegenation statute offered by
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955)); see also id. at
11 (“[T]he racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to
maintain White Supremacy.”).
332. Id. at 12; cf. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 701 (9th Cir.) (“As a
matter of ‘conventional’ equal protection analysis, there is simply no doubt that Proposition
209 is constitutional.”), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
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them, and those intuitions can be both transitory and fleeting.
Nothing illustrates this phenomenon better than the history of the
statute that Loving invalidated. Although the Loving Supreme
Court found the Virginia miscegenation statute self-evidently to violate “the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause,” eleven
years earlier the Supreme Court had declined to invalidate the very
same statute in Naim v. Naim.333 In Naim, the Supreme Court apparently had different intuitions about the constitutionality of miscegenation statutes in the more volatile post-Brown political climate.334
Similarly, the intuitive correctness of affirmative action preferences
that characterized the beginning of the civil rights movement is now
being replaced by the intuitive skepticism about affirmative action.
This skepticism underlies Proposition 209. The whole point of doctrinal analysis is that mere intuitions are too transitory to serve as a
reliable foundation for constitutional analysis, but judicial analysis of
Proposition 209 seems to be overwhelmingly intuitive.335
While Loving may lend precedential support to the district court
characterization, it does not provide any analytical support for the
district court view. And the district court does not point to any other
analytical basis for characterizing Proposition 209 as discriminatory
rather than neutral. The district court characterization of Proposition
209 as a race and gender classification is therefore analytically no
more defensible than the court of appeals characterization of Proposition 209 as race- and gender-neutral. Nevertheless, even if one
were to accept the district court characterization of Proposition 209
as a race and gender classification, it is still not clear that Proposition
209 restructures the political process in a way that violates the Equal
Protection Clause.
2. Political Restructuring. The district court held that Proposition 209 violates the Equal Protection Clause by restructuring the
California political process in a way that makes it harder for women

333. 350 U.S. 891, 891 (1955) (per curiam) (declining to rule on the validity of the Virginia
statute and remanding for further proceedings due to factual questions that prevented the court
from considering the issue in a “clean-cut and concrete form, unclouded” by such problems)
and 350 U.S. 985, 985 (1956) (per curiam) (dismissing appeal for want of a properly presented
federal question).
334. See SPANN, supra note 127, at 106-07 (discussing Loving and Naim).
335. But see infra Part III (suggesting that doctrinal indeterminacy ultimately leaves intuitive analysis as the only meaningful option for assessing the constitutionality of Proposition
209).
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and minorities than it is for other interest groups to secure the
political preferences that they desire.336 The district court bolstered
this holding with factual findings concerning the magnitude of the
burden that Proposition 209 is likely to impose on women and
minorities.337 Even assuming the validity of these factual findings,
and that Proposition 209 will have a differential impact on women
and minorities, the district court argument still does not work. It is
not so much that the court’s argument is wrong, as that it relies on
assumptions about the nature of a properly functioning political
process that are not only difficult to defend, but are also ultimately
self-consuming.
The essence of the political restructuring argument on which the
district court relies is that consigning some issues exclusively to remote levels of the state political process while permitting other political issues to be resolved at local or remote levels is discriminatory.
Such a structure engenders discrimination because it is typically more
difficult to secure political victories at remote levels of the political
process than at local levels. For example, it is more difficult to be
elected President of the United States than mayor of the town you
grew up in, and supermajority requirements make it more difficult to
amend the Constitution than to secure the enactment of ordinary
legislation.338 When the issues consigned to the more demanding levels of the political process are issues in which women or minorities
have a special interest, that discrimination violates the Constitution
unless the state can justify its actions with reasons that are sufficient
to satisfy heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. 339
In the case of Proposition 209, women and minorities won political concessions in the form of affirmative action preferences at the
local political level from school boards, city councils, state agencies,
courts, and even the state legislature.340 Then Proposition 209 removed the affirmative action issue from the local political level, and
336. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1506-08 (N.D. Cal. 1996),
rev’d, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
337. See id. at 1495-99, 1506-08.
338. Note that remote levels of the state political process need not always be the most politically demanding. Women and minorities living in a particularly discriminatory community
within a generally nondiscriminatory state might find it easier to secure the adoption of statewide antidiscrimination measures than to secure the adoption of a local antidiscrimination ordinance.
339. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1508-10.
340. In this context, the term “local” means any political level below the state constitution,
including the state legislature, administrative agencies and courts.
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consigned it to the state constitutional level. By prospectively requiring a state constitutional amendment in order to secure a race or
gender affirmative action preference, Proposition 209 made it politically very difficult for women and minorities to regain the political
victories that they had secured as majorities at the local level.341
Quoting the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Romer v. Evans, the
district court emphasized that “‘[a] law declaring that in general it
shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to
seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection in
the most literal sense.’”342
In order to make this argument work, the district court would
have to offer some way of determining the level of the state political
process at which each political issue should properly be resolved.
However, it seems that there is no way in which such a determination
could be made.343 It cannot be that all issues must be resolved at the
state constitutional level, for that would not only deny any legitimate
role to the state and local legislative, administrative and judicial
bodies as decentralized policymaking bodies, but it would also make
the state Constitution read like a detailed tax code or a set of administrative regulations. Similarly, it cannot be that all decisions must be
made at the local level, for that would not only deny any role to the
state legislative, administrative and judicial bodies as centralized
policymaking bodies, but it would also preclude the possibility of including any substantive rights in the state Constitution. Once the
polar extremes are recognized to be unacceptable, the problem seems
insurmountable. It is hard to see how one could decide which issues
were properly local and which were properly statewide in nature.
The most obvious solution to this problem is to let the state political process itself decide which levels of the process are appropriate
341. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1510.
342. Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996)).
343. One might argue that any issue can be resolved at any level of the political process as
long as both sides of the issue are compelled to operate at the same level. But that cannot be
right. Proponents of free speech are free to implement their preferences for fostering speech at
the local political level, but proponents of censorship can implement their preferences for suppressing speech only at the constitutional level by repealing the First Amendment. Similarly,
one might argue that any issue can be resolved at any level of the political process, but that
race and gender issues cannot be restricted to one level when other comparable issues are allowed to be resolved at other levels. The problem with this argument is that it is difficult to
know which issues are comparable. If the government can require proponents of censorship to
operate at the constitutional level by repealing the First Amendment, why can the government
not also make proponents of affirmative action operate at the constitutional level by repealing
Proposition 209?
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for which political issues. Local political bodies could exercise any
policymaking jurisdiction that they desired unless state political
bodies exercised their superior power to divest local bodies of policymaking jurisdiction. That way, the political “market” would determine the most efficient allocation of political issues over the various levels of the state political process. But that is exactly what the
State of California did prior to the district court’s determination that
it had restructured its political process improperly. California first
permitted local political authorities to formulate race- and genderbased affirmative action policies, but the California voters became
dissatisfied with the policies that had been adopted by local authorities and chose to formulate a substitute affirmative action policy at
the state constitutional level. The district court held that this political
restructuring was constitutionally impermissible, but it never explained why the race and gender preference issue was an issue that
had to be resolved at a local rather than a constitutional level of the
state political process.
The district court’s political structure analysis seems inconsistent
on this point. The district court held that the Proposition 209 preference prohibition issue must be resolved at the local political level, but
that the Proposition 209 antidiscrimination provision issue was properly resolved at the state constitutional level.344 It is very difficult to
see what feature of antidiscrimination provisions makes them properly the subject of state constitutional law and preference prohibitions properly the subject of local policymaking. Both deal with the
same race and gender issues, and both adopt the same antidiscrimination goals as their stated objectives. Therefore, if the state is free to
address discrimination at the constitutional level, it should be equally
free to address preferences at that same level. While the district
court believes that the Proposition 209 preference prohibition does

344.

The district court opinion states:
This argument [that fundamental issues regarding individual rights should be resolved by the state Constitution] has substantial merit with respect to Proposition
209’s broad antidiscrimination provision—the general ban on invidious race and
gender discrimination is certainly a matter of constitutional decisionmaking. As the
Court has pointed out, however, it is Proposition 209’s ban on preferences, not its
general ban on discrimination, that is the focus of the instant suit. In this narrower
context, defendants’ argument falls short. Prior to the passage of Proposition 209,
the discretion to adopt constitutionally-permissible race- and gender-conscious affirmative action programs was, as defendants’ counsel conceded at oral argument,
lodged with state and local government entities, not reserved at the constitutional
level.

Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1507.
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not advance its stated antidiscrimination goals, and that Proposition
209 is unconstitutionally discriminatory, those beliefs cannot justify
the district court’s distinction between the levels of the political process at which the discrimination and preference provisions must be
addressed.
If the preference prohibition is discriminatory, it violates the
Equal Protection Clause and cannot be implemented at any level of
the California political process. And if it is not discriminatory, it is
valid and may for that reason be implemented at any level of the political process. However, the level of the state political process at
which the preference issue is addressed cannot be the reason for its
validity or invalidity; if it could, local antidiscrimination laws would
be unconstitutional under the district court’s reasoning because antidiscrimination laws are properly addressed at the constitutional level.
The district court might mean that antidiscrimination provisions are
somehow special and that they can, therefore, be adopted at any level
of government. But why would that not also be true of laws prohibiting race and gender preferences? After all, for proponents of
Proposition 209, the prohibition on race and gender preferences is an
antidiscrimination law, which was adopted at the constitutional
level—precisely where the district court says that such provisions
should be adopted. It seems that the district court’s distinction between the Proposition 209 discrimination and preference prohibitions
does more to weaken the district court’s argument than it does to
strengthen it.
It may be that the district court argument is more subtle than I
have presented it to be. It may be that what the district court objects
to is the decision by the California electorate to move the affirmative
action preference issue to the state constitutional level after it was
first resolved at the local level. It may be that political issues are not
inherently local or constitutional, but that the relocation of an issue to
a more demanding level of the political process if it was initially decided at a less demanding level is what constitutes an impermissible
restructuring of the political process. Indeed, there is language in the
district court opinion suggesting that the vote dilution implicit in such
a relocation is what the court found to be constitutionally offensive
345
But that argument also fails to withstand
about Proposition 209.
345. The district court opinion states:
Once those who support race- and gender-conscious affirmative action prevail at one
level of government, however, the Equal Protection Clause will not tolerate an effort
by the vanquished parties to alter the rules of the game—solely with respect to this
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analysis. As Justice Powell pointed out in his Seattle dissent, such a
reading of the Equal Protection Clause would permit local policymaking bodies to preempt higher state authorities from ever changing—even via amendments to the state Constitution—the local resolution of a controversial issue whenever the local body was the first to
address the issue. Such a radical restructuring of a state’s internal
sovereignty cannot be what the Equal Protection Clause was intended to accomplish.346
The district court’s response to this contention is that the Equal
Protection Clause does not prohibit a state authority from reversing a
policy decision made by a local authority per se, but it does prohibit
such a reversal from being made in a manner that is discriminatory.347
Once again, however, the district court argument is internally inconsistent. If relocation of the race and gender preference issue to the
constitutional level is the factor that makes Proposition 209 discriminatory, there will be no cases in which this relocation is not discriminatory, and the local preemption of higher state authority that Justice
Powell fears will always be present. Alternatively, if there are cases
in which political relocation of the preference issue is not discriminatory, then political relocation cannot be the factor that causes Proposition 209 to be discriminatory, and the district court has still not explained why Proposition 209 is unconstitutional.
There is an additional problem with the district court political
structure argument that stems from its self-consuming nature. The
district court seems to believe that a neutrally-structured political
process will produce results that are constitutionally preferable to the
results produced by a discriminatorily-structured political process.
However, the very existence of Proposition 209 seems to belie that
assumption. The district court views the pre-Proposition 209 political
structure that permitted race and gender preferences as neutrallystructured and therefore constitutionally permissible under the Equal
Protection Clause. However, that neutrally-structured political procsingle issue—so as to secure a reversal of fortunes. Plaintiffs have borne their burden of showing that Proposition 209, by removing authority over race-and genderconscious affirmative action to “a new and remote” level of government, has precisely such an effect. Such a reordering of the political process is tantamount to vote
dilution in the most literal sense: the relevant voting pool is effectively expanded until the prior victory is undone.
Id. at 1510.
346. Cf. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 494-95 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (discussing consequences of Seattle decision).
347. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1510.
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ess produced Proposition 209, which prohibits race and gender preferences. Why then is not Proposition 209 the valid product of a
properly functioning political process?
Stated differently, all the voters of California had equal access to
the state ballot initiative process prior to the adoption of Proposition
209. Proponents of Proposition 209 were able to take advantage of
that process to constitutionalize their political preferences, while opponents of Proposition 209 were not. Indeed, proponents and opponents of Proposition 209 still have equal access to the ballot initiative
process, and opponents can secure the repeal of Proposition 209 simply by amassing the same level of political support for their affirmative action agenda as proponents of Proposition 209 were able to
amass for theirs. If there is some substantive reason that even a neutrally-structured political process cannot eliminate race and gender
preferences, the district court has not disclosed what it is. And one
cannot help but wonder why the district court chose to rely on a political structure defect if Proposition 209 runs afoul of some substantive prohibition. This analysis suggests that complex theoretical
questions may surround the interaction of substantive and procedural
goals in American constitutional law. But it does not suggest that
Proposition 209 restructured the California political process in a way
that violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. If the district court is correct that Proposition 209 violates the
Equal Protection Clause, it has yet to explain in a convincing manner
why such a violation exists.
Each of the arguments the district court offers ultimately rests
on the court’s belief that Proposition 209 discriminates on the basis of
race and gender. This is true of the court’s argument that Proposition
209 constitutes a race and gender classification, and it is true of the
court’s assertion that Proposition 209 restructures the political process in a way that discriminates against women and minorities. In arriving at these conclusions, the district court adopted an analytical
baseline that took account of the lingering consequences of prior race
and gender discrimination that the prospective neutrality requirement of Proposition 209 would perpetuate. But, like the court of appeals, the district court failed to justify its baseline as the appropriate
one for equal protection analysis. As a result, the district court
opinion, like the opinion of the court of appeals, seems more a reflection of political preferences than the product of doctrinal analysis.
The reason that neither the district court nor the court of appeals
was able to articulate a doctrinally satisfying justification for the out-
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come that each deemed appropriate is that equal protection doctrine
itself is simply too indeterminate to produce a resolution of the constitutional issues raised by Proposition 209. It seems that a judge’s
only choice is to fall back on his own political preferences in order to
give the Equal Protection Clause operative meaning. The language
of the Equal Protection Clause is entirely unhelpful, because the
clause insists on a concept of “equality” that is as likely to require
race and gender preferences as it is to prohibit them. And because of
this conceptual imprecision, the equal protection precedents that the
lower courts applied proved similarly unable to provide much guidance in conducting the proper equal protection analysis. The doctrinal indeterminacy that frustrates principled application of the
Equal Protection Clause to Proposition 209 suggests that the representative branches of government may be institutionally more competent than the unelected judiciary to resolve the current affirmative
action dispute. However, the Supreme Court may be unwilling to relinquish its control over social policymaking concerning the issue of
affirmative action.
III. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
The existence of doctrinal indeterminacy surrounding a controversial social issue is a clue that the Supreme Court has a limited role
to play in the resolution of that issue. Because the Supreme Court is
structured to be politically insular rather than politically accountable,
it lacks the institutional competence to resolve social policy disputes
that rest primarily on political preference rather than doctrinal principle. The doctrinal indeterminacy that surrounds the proper application of the Equal Protection Clause to Proposition 209, therefore,
suggests that the Supreme Court should defer to political resolution
of the affirmative action debate. In the absence of an ascertainable
principle to guide the exercise of its discretion, Supreme Court intervention into that debate not only poses the risk that judicial preferences will be improperly substituted for political preferences, but it
also poses the risk that the Court will adversely affect the interests of
the political minorities that the Court is typically called on to protect.
The Supreme Court’s historical reluctance to defer to political resolutions of contentious social disputes suggests, however, that the Court
will continue to supervise the ongoing affirmative action dispute.
Moreover, the Court’s prior interventions in the political process to
invalidate majoritarian affirmative action programs now seem to re-
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quire the Court to invalidate Proposition 209 in order to prevent the
Court itself from acting in a discriminatory manner. Although this
outcome is less desirable than Supreme Court withdrawal from the
affirmative action debate, it does prevent the Court’s political intervention in that debate from becoming indefensibly one-sided.
If the Supreme Court is not willing to overrule its recent decisions invalidating politically-enacted affirmative action programs,
consistency requires the Court to invalidate Proposition 209. This is
because Proposition 209 is indistinguishable from the affirmative action programs that the Court has chosen to invalidate. Like traditional affirmative action programs, Proposition 209 redistributes societal resources on the basis of race and gender. And it does so for
the purpose of altering the status quo in a way that will benefit white
males. Proposition 209 is, therefore, an affirmative action program
for white males, and it should be subject to the same constitutional
standards that govern other affirmative action programs.
If the Court is unwilling to view Proposition 209 as simply an affirmative action program for white males, the Court should still view
Proposition 209 as a race and gender classification under the intentional discrimination standard of Washington v. Davis.348 This is because the passage of Proposition 209 was motivated more by a desire
to divert resources from women and minorities than by a desire to
promote race and gender equality. The political climate out of which
Proposition 209 emerged, its potential to perpetuate existing allocations of social, economic and political power, its demographically
polarized support, its relationship to other xenophobic political
measures, and other factors all suggest that Proposition 209 is better
understood as an effort by the majority to reserve societal resources
for itself than as an effort to bring about an end to race and gender
discrimination. This inference is sufficient to trigger heightened judicial scrutiny of Proposition 209 as a race and gender classification
under the intentional discrimination test of Washington v. Davis.
Once heightened scrutiny is applied to Proposition 209, it is difficult to see how its constitutionality could properly be upheld since
most governmental classifications fail to survive heightened scrutiny.
Moreover, even if heightened scrutiny is not applied, the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Romer v. Evans349 suggests that the discriminatory animus embedded in Proposition 209 precludes the ballot
348. See 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976).
349. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
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initiative from satisfying even rational-basis scrutiny.350 Accordingly,
if the Supreme Court is not willing to withdraw from the affirmative
action debate, it can at least remain consistent in that debate by invalidating Proposition 209.
The argument presented in Part III of this Article is intended to
be intuitive rather than doctrinal in nature. I readily concede that
cases such as Washington v. Davis and Romer v. Evans are doctrinally
capable of producing outcomes different from the outcome that I ascribe to them. Indeed, I am committed to the view that the doctrinal
effect of such decisions is largely indeterminate. However, the existence of doctrinal indeterminacy does not mean that all outcomes are
equally up for grabs. Rather, doctrinal indeterminacy is merely an
indication that one must look to something other than legal doctrine
for normative guidance in distinguishing between good outcomes and
bad ones. I do not claim to know precisely what those other sources
of normative guidance may be. Nevertheless, I do have a strong intuitive sense that the Supreme Court would be behaving in an inconsistent manner if it were to uphold Proposition 209 after having invalidated affirmative action programs that were adopted through the
political process. And I have a strong intuitive sense that Proposition
209 is the product of an intentional effort to discount the welfare of
women and minorities because American culture considers women
and minorities to be less deserving of societal resources than are
white males. I cannot prove these intuitions in any syllogistic sense,
but I believe that once the doctrinal distractions have been neutralized by exposing the ways in which doctrinal rules are so readily manipulated, others will come to share my intuitions about the discriminatory nature of Proposition 209. My hope is that readers will not
ask themselves whether they can think of any counterarguments to
rebut the arguments that I offer, but that readers will instead ask
themselves whether the arguments that I offer seem correct. My goal
is to get beyond the doctrine so that, with the doctrinal hiding places
eliminated, we will be forced to confront the difference between right
and wrong in assessing the constitutionality of Proposition 209.

350. Cf. id. at 1627 (holding that a provision of the Colorado Constitution which prohibited
any protected status based on sexual orientation failed to satisfy rational-basis scrutiny since it
appeared to be motivated by “animus toward the class it affects”).
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A. Institutional Competence
In a democracy, social policy is supposed to be made by the politically accountable representative branches of government, not by
the politically insulated Supreme Court. The role of the judiciary is
properly limited to the application of intelligible principles, which reduces the countermajoritarian danger that the Court will substitute
its own policy preferences for the policy preferences of the electorate.351 But where legal doctrine is indeterminate, there is no intelligible principle to constrain the exercise of judicial discretion and
the countermajoritarian problem becomes particularly serious.
When principled resolution of a social problem is difficult because of
ambiguities inherent in governing principles, political resolution of
that problem can at least claim the legitimacy accorded by the democratic process. Judicial resolution of such a problem, however, can
claim no legitimacy at all.352
1. Political Question. As a formal matter, the Supreme Court
has always recognized the limits on its institutional competence to
resolve social problems that are more amenable to political than
principled resolution. In Marbury v. Madison,353 Chief Justice John
Marshall emphasized that the Supreme Court could not properly
supplant the discretion of one of the representative branches of government with respect to questions that are “in their nature political.”354 Marshall stressed that the Supreme Court was authorized to
protect individual rights, but inherently political questions were “by
the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive.”355 This dicta
from Marbury has evolved into the contemporary political question
doctrine, under which courts treat an issue as nonjusticiable if, inter
alia, there is “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-

351. See generally BICKEL, supra note 12, at 16-23 (discussing limited competence of Supreme Court to make social policy).
352. One could, of course, question the assumption that democratic policymaking is desirable, or that the United States political process is, in fact, democratic. For present purposes,
however, I am adopting an analytical baseline that accepts the validity of these assumptions,
only because I believe that most people accept their validity.
353. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
354. See id. at 169-70 (holding that mandamus is not available to compel discretionary actions by executive branch because of political nature of issue).
355. Id. (discussing deference to executive branch without discussing deference to larger
political process).
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dards for resolving it.”356 Although the political question doctrine is
primarily directed at separation of powers concerns within the
federal government,357 under the doctrine of federalism its focus on
the need for an intelligible principle to guide the exercise of judicial
discretion should apply with equal force to Supreme Court review of
political determinations made by state authorities.
As a matter of federal administrative law, the existence or nonexistence of an intelligible governing legal principle is one of the factors that determines whether judicial review of agency action has
been precluded under the Administrative Procedure Act.358 The Supreme Court has held that in the absence of such a standard, administrative “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law,”359
underscoring the belief that “review is not to be had if the statute is
drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against
which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”360 Even when an
issue is justiciable, or when judicial review has not been formally precluded, the standard of review that the Court typically applies is
nonetheless deferential. In the administrative law context, the Chevron doctrine requires a reviewing court to defer to the policy preferences of an administrative agency unless a governing legal standard
unambiguously precludes the agency’s policy choice.361
Similar judicial deference is typically required under the Equal
Protection Clause because the equal protection standard is not sufficiently precise to allow a reviewing court to second guess the policy
determinations made by the representative branches in the normal
range of cases.362 The Court does apply nondeferential heightened

356. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (discussing factors that make an issue a nonjusticiable political question).
357. See id.
358. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 823 (1985) (discussing preclusion of review in
administrative agency context).
359. Id. at 828 (quoting Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1994))
(specifying statutory standard for preclusion of review).
360. Id. at 830.
361. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984) (stating that where the governing statute “is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue,” agency policy preferences concerning that issue “are given controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute”).
362. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 594 (1979) (“No matter how
unwise it may be for [the Transit Authority] to refuse employment to individual car cleaners,
track repairmen, or bus drivers simply because they are receiving methadone treatment, the
Constitution does not authorize a federal court to interfere in that policy decision.”); see also
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scrutiny where suspect classifications such as race and gender are implicated,363 but when the absence of an intelligible principle makes it
difficult to determine whether a classification discriminates on the
basis of race or gender, the arguments that favor deferential review in
the typical case again apply with full force. Even when an issue does
seem to be governed by an ascertainable legal principle, presentation
of that issue in a volatile political context has caused the Court to decline to adjudicate the issue because of the danger that intense political volatility will overwhelm legal doctrine, and thereby transform an
issue of legal principle into an issue of political expediency. This is
what happened the year after Brown v. Board of Education was decided, when the Supreme Court declined to apply the Brown principle to invalidate the Virginia miscegenation statute in Naim v.
364
Naim.
In both the administrative law and equal protection spheres, the
Supreme Court has recognized the primacy of the directive that the
Court is to apply legal principles and not to make political policy under the guise of judicial discretion. The distinction between proper
application of legal principles and improper formulation of social
policy suggests that the Supreme Court should withdraw from the
political debate about affirmative action. The Court’s affirmative action decisions have done little to promote political consensus on the
issue of affirmative action. On the contrary, they have arguably upset the political consensus that existed during the formative stages of
the civil rights movement concerning the situations in which affirmative action was an appropriate remedy for discrimination. Moreover,
the history of Supreme Court involvement in the controversial issue
of affirmative action suggests that the affirmative action issue has
now become so politicized that it simply cannot be resolved through
principled judicial decisionmaking. This claim is true in both empirical and theoretical terms.
As an empirical matter, the Court’s attitude toward affirmative
action has vacillated with the prevailing political climate. The Su-

STONE ET AL., supra note 128, at 570 (discussing lack of judicial competence to override
means/ends determinations made by representative branches).
363. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (prescribing “most rigid”
scrutiny for racial classifications); The VMI Case, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996) (requiring
“exceedingly persuasive” justification for gender classifications).
364. See supra notes 333-34 and accompanying text (discussing Naim); see generally
BICKEL, supra note 12, at 111-98 (discussing justiciability “passive virtues” that permit Supreme Court to avoid adjudication of legal issues that have become overly politicized).
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preme Court first entered the affirmative action debate in 1974, when
it declined to rule on the constitutionality of affirmative action, preferring instead to sidestep the issue on justiciability grounds.365 In the
twenty-three years that have elapsed since that time, the Supreme
Court has considered twenty-two racial affirmative action cases raising constitutional or Title VII claims.366 It has upheld the affirmative
action plans at issue in some, invalidated the plans at issue in others,
and resolved still others on justiciability grounds.367 The Supreme
Court’s decisions throughout most of this period were fractured, with
the Court resolving the cases in plurality rather than majority opinions.368 The Court was not able to issue its first majority opinion in a
constitutional affirmative action case until 1989.369 Since then, most
of its majority opinions have been five-to-four decisions.370 Affirmative action case outcomes have largely depended on the Court’s
personnel at the time that a particular case was decided.371 Supreme
Court voting patterns have also been very polarized, with most Justices voting consistently in blocs that are divided along liberal and
conservative political lines.372 The Justices in the conservative bloc
have virtually never voted in favor of affirmative action, and the Justices in the liberal bloc have virtually never voted against it.373 Since
1993, a conservative five-Justice majority appointed by Presidents

365. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1974) (per curiam).
366. See Spann, supra note 194, at 14-21 (discussing the eighteen Supreme Court affirmative action cases then decided that raised constitutional or Title VII claims). Since that article
was written, the Supreme Court has decided four additional constitutional affirmative action
cases, all in the voting rights context. See Lawyer v. Department of Justice, 117 S. Ct. 2186
(1997); Abrams v. Johnson, 117 S. Ct. 1925 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996); Shaw
v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996). The Court has also decided three additional voting rights cases
on statutory grounds. See City of Monroe v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 400 (1997); Reno v.
Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997); Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997).
367. See Spann, supra note 194, at 14-17 (discussing case outcomes).
368. See id. at 17 (discussing plurality decisions).
369. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (first majority opinion);
see also Spann, supra note 194, at 17 n.84 (noting plurality opinions in affirmative action cases
before Croson).
370. See Spann, supra note 194, at 17.
371. See id. at 21 (voting chart).
372. See id. at 18-20 (discussing Supreme Court voting blocs).
373. See id. at 18-21 (discussing consistency in voting patterns). But see Lawyer v. Department of Justice, 117 S. Ct. 2186, 2189 (1997) (Chief Justice Rehnquist voting with liberal bloc to
uphold Florida redistricting plan incorporated as part of district court consent decree). The
plan at issue in Lawyer, however, arguably did not constitute “affirmative action” because it
omitted the majority-black district at issue, and it did not trigger heightened scrutiny by treating race as the “predominant” districting factor. See id. at 2195.

SPANNPP WITH WIDOW PROTECT

1997]

05/26/98 9:03 AM

PROPOSITION 209

277

Reagan and Bush has invalidated each of the affirmative action programs before the Court on constitutional grounds.374 Because of this
polarization, the Supreme Court’s affirmative action cases to date
have exhibited the properties of political plebiscites rather than principled adjudications.
As a theoretical matter, the affirmative action issue seems to
defy all efforts at principled resolution. The abstract principle of
equality is stated at too high a level of generality to be useful in resolving the debate about the constitutionality of affirmative action.
The inadequacy of the equality principle is clearly illustrated by the
analytical difficulties encountered in evaluating the opinions issued
by the district court and the court of appeals in Coalition for Eco375
nomic Equity. The reasoning of each opinion followed logically
from the tacit background assumptions on which each opinion was
based, but neither opinion offered any principled reason to prefer its
particular set of background assumptions to the assumptions made by
the other. The district court assumption that lingering effects of past
discrimination had to be considered in order to make an equality determination led naturally to the court’s conclusion that Proposition
209’s prohibition on race and gender preferences is discriminatory.376
Likewise, the court of appeals assumption that lingering effects of
past discrimination were too subtle to be considered in making an
equality determination led naturally to its conclusion that Proposition
209’s requirement of prospective race and gender neutrality is nondiscriminatory.377 The problem is that there is no principled way to
decide whether the present effects of past discrimination should or
should not count in assessing the constitutionality of affirmative action. The intensity of the present affirmative action debate reveals
that people have dramatically different normative views about the issue, but the abstract principle of equality says nothing about the issue’s proper resolution. That doctrinal silence makes questions
374. See Spann, supra note 194, at 18, 21; see also Abrams v. Johnson, 117 S. Ct. 1925, 1937
(1997); Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1949 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1904-05
(1996). These three recent cases are not included in the voting chart in Spann, supra note 194,
at 21. See also STONE ET AL., supra note 128, at cii-ciii (chart showing Presidents who appointed particular justices). Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas were ReaganBush appointees, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was appointed Associate Justice by President Nixon, was later appointed Chief Justice by President Reagan. See id. at cii-ciii. But see
supra note 373 (noting Chief Justice Rehnquist’s vote with liberal bloc in Lawyer).
375. See supra Part II.
376. See supra Part II.B.
377. See supra Part II.A.
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about the desirability of affirmative action appropriate for democratic resolution in the political process, but not for Supreme Court
resolution in the judicial process. The constitutionality of affirmative
action is a classic political question in the functional sense in which
the term was used by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury.378
2. Majoritarian Bias. Supreme Court participation in the
affirmative action debate is not only inappropriately political, but it is
likely to be inappropriately biased as well. Although the prevailing
representation-reinforcement theory of judicial review views the
Supreme Court as the branch of government responsible for
protecting the interests of women and racial minorities, whose discrete and insular status makes them likely to be underrepresented in
the political process,379 the Supreme Court has not historically served
this function. I have argued elsewhere that, for systemic reasons, the
Supreme Court is better understood as a veiled majoritarian
institution than as a countermajoritarian institution.380 This constitutional status means that when the Court is called upon to make social
policy that implicates minority interests, it is more likely to sacrifice
minority interests for the benefit of the majority than to protect
minority interests from majoritarian exploitation. Once again, there
are empirical and theoretical reasons to believe that this is the case.
378. It is sometimes argued that race-conscious affirmative action can never be justified
because the long-term pernicious effects of reinforcing race-conscious modes of thought will
always outweigh whatever benefits are hoped to flow from race-conscious affirmative action.
See, e.g., William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution,
46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 778 (1979) (“Race-based laws . . . have generally tended to yield byproducts and side-effects . . . vastly more divisive and wretched than the benefits that were supposed to be forthcoming . . . .”); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 22731 (1995) (claiming that so-called benign racial classifications exacerbate racial prejudice);
Amar & Caminker, supra note 24, at 1023-24 (commenting that some advocates of the “colorblind” approach to addressing racial problems believe that affirmative action programs “do
more damage than they are worth”). Once again, however, the utilitarian balancing that such
an assertion demands seems to be quintessentially political, because it will ultimately turn on
the clash of normative preferences rather than the application of judicially manageable standards.
379. See generally ELY, supra note 280, at 181 (elaborating representation-reinforcement
theory of judicial review).
380. See generally SPANN, supra note 127, at 19-35 (arguing that institutional features make
Supreme Court more likely to protect majority interests than to protect interests of racial minorities). Although my characterization of the Supreme Court as a veiled majoritarian institution might initially seem inconsistent with my suggestion that Supreme Court intervention into
the politics of affirmative action is undemocratic, I believe that the effect of Supreme Court
decisions is often to provide more protection for majority interests than the majority has provided for itself through the ordinary political process. See id. at 130-36.
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Empirically, the Supreme Court has a poor record of protecting
minority interests. In fact, minorities have had more success protecting their interests in the political process than they have had before the Supreme Court.381 For example, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,382
the Pennsylvania legislature protected the interests of blacks by enacting a statute that prohibited whites from bypassing state legal
processes and using force or violence to kidnap and remove from the
state blacks who were alleged to be escaped slaves.383 The Supreme
Court, however, invalidated the Pennsylvania statute on the grounds
that it conflicted with federal constitutional and statutory provisions
protecting the property rights of white slave owners.384 The Supreme
Court also invalidated, on constitutional grounds, the Missouri Compromise Act of 1820, which Congress enacted to limit the spread of
slavery in the new federal Territories acquired through the Louisiana
Purchase. In the infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford385 decision, the Supreme Court held, in language by Chief Justice Taney, which has become noteworthy for its racially demeaning tone, that the subhuman
character of blacks deprived them of the capacity to be citizens of the
United States within the meaning of the diversity jurisdiction provision of the Constitution.386 Despite the Court’s holding that it lacked
jurisdiction, the Court went on to hold that the Missouri Compromise
effort to limit slavery in the Louisiana Territory was an unconstitutional interference with the property interests of slave owners.387
Dred Scott was politically overruled by the Civil War and the ensuing federal Reconstruction legislation and constitutional amendments adopted to protect the civil rights of newly-freed slaves. These
Reconstruction measures included the Equal Protection Clause of

381. See generally id. at 89-99 (discussing minority successes in the political process and minority frustrations before the Supreme Court).
382. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
383. See id. at 608.
384. See id. at 611, 613, 625-26 (invalidating Pennsylvania statute as conflicting with the
Rendition Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, and congressionally enacted Fugitive Slave Act of 1793).
385. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
386. See id. at 404-05, 407; see also SPANN, supra note 127, at 94-97 (discussing Dred Scott
decision). Although one of my colleagues always insists that I point out that Chief Justice
Taney purports to be describing the views of the framers when he offers his demeaning depiction of blacks, it is difficult to read Chief Justice Taney’s language and not have the firm conviction that the views he is expressing are his own.
387. See id. at 451-52.
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the Fourteenth Amendment.388 However, the Supreme Court invalidated some Reconstruction measures,389 limited the scope of others390
and imposed a state-action limitation on the Fourteenth Amendment
that was designed to place private discrimination beyond the reach of
congressional remedial power.391 Once Reconstruction had lost its
political momentum, the Supreme Court held, in Plessy v. Fergu392
son, that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was satisfied by separate-but-equal treatment, thereby permitting states to engage in official racial segregation without violating
the Constitution.393 The Supreme Court overruled Plessy in Brown v.
394
Board of Education, but Brown is also problematic.
Brown is typically pointed to as the case that established the Supreme Court’s countermajoritarian capacity to protect minority
rights in the face of massive political opposition. Brown is said to
have both desegregated the public schools and to have invalidated
the general use of racial classifications by government actors.395 In reality, however, Brown did neither of those things.396 As a result of Supreme Court decisions upholding the constitutionality of de facto
segregation,397 and precluding interdistrict remedies for de jure segregation,398 many public schools are still badly segregated. Sixty-six
percent of all black students nationwide attend schools that have
predominantly minority enrollments; more than half of these stu-

388. See SPANN, supra note 127, at 41-50, 97 (discussing Reconstruction amendments and
statutes).
389. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 8-19 (1883) (invalidating public accommodations provisions of Civil Rights Act of 1875).
390. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70-83 (1872) (limiting
reach of Reconstruction amendments and holding that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
shift general responsibility for protecting civil rights from state to federal governments).
391. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 8-19 (imposing state-action requirement).
392. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
393. See id. at 544-52.
394. See Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
395. See SPANN, supra note 127, at 104-06 (discussing common understanding of Brown).
396. See generally id. at 104-10 (discussing difficulties with common understanding of
Brown).
397. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 198-205, 208-09 (1973) (adopting de jure
rather than de facto test for unconstitutional school segregation); see also SPANN, supra note
127, at 73-80 (discussing school desegregation cases).
398. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-47 (1974) (limiting desegregation to districts
guilty of de jure segregation); see also SPANN, supra note 127, at 73-80 (discussing de jure versus de facto school desegregation cases).
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dents attend virtually all-black schools.399 The Supreme Court has
reconciled this outcome with the desegregation command of Brown
by holding that a public school that was once officially segregated can
now become formally desegregated even though the composition of
its student body remains all-black.400 As a result, the Brown desegregation requirement can now be satisfied by the very separatebut-equal schools that Plessy permitted—except that the Supreme
Court’s constitutional authorization of unequal public school funding401 means that the racially separate schools need no longer be
“equal,” as they were nominally required to be under Plessy.402
Brown also failed to end governmental use of racial classifications. Explicit governmental use of racial classifications is now common in matters as ubiquitous as the census,403 adoption standards,404
399. See STONE ET AL., supra note 128, at 558-59 (discussing current levels of school desegregation).
400. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 102 (1995) (holding that an improvement in the
quality of education was a sufficient remedy to previous de jure segregation despite the persistence of an overwhelmingly black enrollment); see also Spann, supra note 194, at 54-57
(discussing Missouri v. Jenkins).
401. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 11-17, 54-55 (1973)
(upholding racially disparate property-tax based funding of public schools).
402. See SPANN, supra note 127, at 108-09; Spann, supra note 194, at 57. Both discuss the
Supreme Court’s tacit revival of the Plessy segregation doctrine, without the equality requirement of Plessy.
403. For discussions of the controversy surrounding the proposal to include a new multiracial category in the census compilation for year 2000, see Nancy A. Denton, Our Private Obsession, Our Public Sin: Racial Identity and Census Categories: Can Incorrect Categories Yield Correct Information?, 15 LAW & INEQ. J. 83 (1997); Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One
Drop Rule: Racial Categories, African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161
(1997); Michael Omi, Racial Identity and the State: The Dilemmas of Classification, 15 LAW &
INEQ. J. 7 (1997); see also Steven A. Holmes, Panel Balks at Multiracial Census Category, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 1997, at A12 (reporting that federal task force representing 30 agencies recommended rejection of proposal to add multiracial category to census, but recommending that
individuals be permitted to check more than one of four existing racial categories); cf. Hamm v.
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156, 158 (E.D. Va.) (upholding under apparent
rational-basis scrutiny, Virginia statute requiring compilation in racial categories of public divorce records but invalidating racial compilation of voting and property records), aff’d sub
nom. Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964).
404. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents’ Racial
Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875 (1998) (emphasizing that
public adoption agencies routinely classify children by race in order to facilitate preferences of
adoptive parents); Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race
Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1183-1200 (1991) (discussing laws and policies
employing racial criteria for adoption); David S. Rosettenstein, Trans-racial Adoption and the
Statutory Preference Schemes: Before the “Best Interests” and After the “Melting Pot,” 68 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 137, 139-40, 145-49 (1994) (same); see also Catherine M. Brooks, The Indian
Child Welfare Act In Nebraska: Fifteen Years, A Foundation for the Future, 27 CREIGHTON L.
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drug profiles,405 and immigration stops,406 and Supreme Court dicta
have suggested that racial segregation of inmates could be used to
prevent prison disorders.407 Laws that provide for special treatment of
Native Americans also constitute explicit racial classifications that
are routinely upheld.408 In addition, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to permit race and ethnicity to

REV. 661, 679-80 (1994) (discussing the preference expressed in the Indian Child Welfare Act
for adoption of Native American children by Native American families); cf. Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984) (holding that Equal Protection Clause prohibits divesting mother of
child custody because of mother’s remarriage to man of different race); Recent Legislation:
Transracial Adoption—Congress Forbids Use of Race as a Factor in Adoptive Placement Decisions—Small Business Jobs Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1808 (1996), 110 HARV. L.
REV. 1352, 1352-57 (1997) (discussing likelihood that race will continue to be used as factor in
adoption placements despite federal legislation, codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(18) (West
Supp. 1997), prohibiting use of race as dispositive factor).
405. See, e.g., United States v. Ceballos, 654 F.2d 177, 185-86 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that
reliance on Latino appearance by Drug Enforcement Agency drug courier profile is adequate
for further investigation in limited airport stop, but is not adequate to establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause); id. at 187 (Meskill, J., dissenting) (arguing Latino appearance was
“an appropriate factor to consider” in drug courier profile); see also United States v. OrnelasLedesma, 16 F.3d 714, 717, 719 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that use of “‘drug courier profile’ that
seems only a little better than a dragnet for Hispanics” may be used with other factors to establish reasonable suspicion for investigative stop); United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 58283 (6th Cir. 1992) (Keith, J., dissenting) (objecting to Drug Enforcement Agency use of
“generic drug courier profile that openly targets African-Americans”).
406. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563-64 (1976) (upholding use of
racial factors in making selective stops at immigration checkpoints); cf. United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885-87 (1975) (holding that Mexican appearance is relevant factor in roving INS border patrol stops, but cannot be sole factor).
407. See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1967) (Black, J., concurring, joined by Harlan and Stewart, JJ.) (“[P]rison authorities have the right, acting in good faith and in particularized circumstances, to take into account racial tensions in maintaining security, discipline,
and good order in prisons and jails.”).
408. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-55 (1974) (upholding Indian Reorganization Act employment preference for Native Americans hired by Bureau of Indian Affairs);
id. at 548 (describing Native American preference in government programs to train teachers of
Native American children); id. at 552-53 (noting that Title 25 of United States Code contains
many special preferences for Native Americans that are constitutionally valid); Morton v. Ruiz,
415 U.S. 199, 237-38 (1974) (upholding federal welfare benefits for Native Americans living on
or near reservations); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (upholding Native American
tribal court jurisdiction over reservation affairs); Board of County Comm’rs v. Seber, 318 U.S.
705, 718 (1943) (upholding federally-granted tax immunity for Native Americans). Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has announced that federally recognized Native American tribes constitute a political group rather than a racial group. See Morton, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24. See generally David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38
UCLA L. REV. 759, 760-61 (1991) (discussing the special legal treatment of Native Americans
and the Supreme Court’s determination that the category “Indian” and tribal subcategories are
political, not racial, categories).
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be taken into account in formulating legislative redistricting plans.409
However, the Court has not been racially neutral in authorizing the
consideration of these factors under the Voting Rights Act. The
Court has permitted ethnicity to be used to create white voting districts in which particular ethnic groups are concentrated to produce a
voting majority.410 But it has invalidated redistricting plans that use
race as the “predominant motive” in their efforts to increase minority
voting strength by creating majority-minority districts.411 This is not to
say that the Supreme Court never invalidates racial classifications
that harm minorities. In recent years, however, the Court’s invalidations of racial classifications have tended to come in affirmative action cases, where the Court has invalidated racial affirmative action
programs in order to advance the interests of the white majority.412

409. See Lawyer v. Department of Justice, 117 S. Ct. 2186, 2194-95 (1997) (holding that
legislators can consider race when drawing voting district lines); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900, 916 (1995) (same); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993) (same); Miller, 515 U.S. at 92829 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that Miller and Shaw v. Reno did not invalidate “vast
majority of Nation’s 435 congressional districts,” even though race may have been taken into
account in creating them); see also United Jewish Orgs. v. Cary, 430 U.S. 144, 155-62 (1977)
(plurality opinion of White, J.) (upholding use of race-conscious districting under Voting Rights
Act of 1965); cf. Miller, 515 U.S. at 945-47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority
black districts should not be treated differently from districts that have been recognized as valid
even though they group Irish or Italian voters together). But see id. at 914-15 (suggesting that
United Jewish Organizations and Miller are distinguishable because United Jewish Organizations involved vote dilution while Miller involved voter separation).
410. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 947 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that Court has not invalidated districts grouping Irish or Italian voters together).
411. See Abrams v. Johnson, 117 S. Ct. 1925, 1936 (1997); see also Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct.
1941, 1951-52 (1996) (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.) (holding that race cannot be the predominant factor in districting decisions); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1900-01 (1996) (same);
Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-17 (same); cf. Lawyer, 117 S. Ct. at 2194-95 (upholding, under rationalbasis scrutiny, use of race as factor that did not predominate over traditional districting principles in consent decree that omitted disputed majority-minority district).
412. See, e.g., Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1952 (invalidating majority-minority voting districts
adopted by state legislatures); Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1901 (same); Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-17
(same); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235-37 (1995) (requiring application
of strict scrutiny to congressionally-adopted minority construction preference and therefore
apparently invalidating preference); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511
(1989) (invalidating minority construction set-aside adopted by city council); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 284 (1986) (invalidating layoff preference for minority teachers
adopted by board of education as part of a collective bargaining agreement). But cf. Lawyer,
117 S. Ct. at 2194-95 (upholding, under rational-basis scrutiny, constitutionality of voter redistricting plan that used race as factor, where race did not predominate over traditional districting principles and plan was part of consent decree that omitted disputed majority-minority district); Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at 1930 (upholding districting plan adopted by court that substituted
one majority-minority district for three majority-minority districts contained in a plan adopted
by state legislature).
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In the post-Brown era, racial minorities have continued to fare
better in the majoritarian political process than they have before the
supposedly countermajoritarian Supreme Court. Most of the school
desegregation that has occurred since Brown has occurred as a result
of guidelines developed by the United States Department of Health,
Education and Welfare to implement the fund cutoff provisions for
segregated schools required by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.413 Most desegregation in federal contracting occurred as a result of a Presidential Executive Order imposing affirmative action
obligations on federal contractors.414 Many of the affirmative action
programs invalidated by the Supreme Court were programs that had
been adopted by the majoritarian political process.415 Moreover, the
majority-minority voting districts that the Supreme Court has recently become committed to invalidating were created by state legislatures, at the urging of the United States Attorney General, in order
to comply with the congressionally-enacted Voting Rights Act of
1965.416 In recent times, racial minorities have had some success protecting their interests before the political process, but have often had
their political victories nullified by the Supreme Court—just as the
Supreme Court nullified minority political victories during the eras of
Dred Scott and Reconstruction. In both the past and the present, the
political process has been a better friend to racial minorities than the
Supreme Court has been.
Women have also fared better under the political process than
before the Supreme Court. After the Supreme Court declined to
give women the right to vote,417 women obtained suffrage through the
adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment.418 Although the Reconstruction-era Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed equal protection,

413. See SPANN, supra note 127, at 98 (discussing political forces producing school desegregation).
414. See id. (discussing political forces that increased minority participation in federal construction).
415. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235-39 (seemingly invalidating, under strict scrutiny,
congressional statute containing minority construction preference); Croson, 488 U.S. at 469
(invalidating municipal ordinance containing minority construction set-aside); cf. Wygant, 476
U.S. at 267 (1986) (invalidating layoff preference for minority teachers adopted by school
board as part of collective bargaining agreement).
416. See, e.g., Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1950-51 (invalidating majority-minority voting districts
adopted by state legislatures to comply with Attorney General’s interpretation of Voting
Rights Act of 1965); Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1899 (same); Miller, 515 U.S. at 927-28 (same).
417. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874).
418. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (granting women right to vote).
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the Court seemed wholly unconcerned with gender discrimination
until 1971, when it first invalidated a gender classification on constitutional grounds.419 The Court’s lack of concern for the rights of
women often went beyond mere neglect. In Bradwell v. Illinois,420
when the Supreme Court denied women the right to practice law, a
concurring opinion by Justice Bradley described the natural state of
women as dependent adjuncts to their husbands, using language so
demeaning that it rivals the language used by Chief Justice Taney to
describe blacks in Dred Scott.421 Because most gender-based discrimination against women is often rooted in stereotypes about appropriate societal roles for women,422 Supreme Court reinforcement
of those stereotypes is likely to be particularly counterproductive.
In modern times, the Court has continued to reinforce gender
stereotypes by upholding statutory rape statutes as a means of reducing teenage pregnancies, in the apparent belief that underage
women do not have the same capacity as underage men to consent to
sexual intercourse.423 The Court has also upheld the constitutionality
of a congressional statute that requires men but not women to register for the draft, on the assumption that women are not as well-suited
as men for military combat.424 On occasion, the Supreme Court has
upheld affirmative action programs for women on the grounds that

419. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (invalidating gender-based preference for
decedent’s estate administrators); see also STONE ET AL., supra note 128, at 697-99 (discussing
early gender discrimination cases).
420. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
421. See id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring) (“The natural and proper timidity and delicacy
which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life . . . .
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife
and mother.”); cf. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856) (“[Blacks] had . . .
been regarded as beings of an inferior order, . . . and so far inferior, that they had no rights
which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit”).
422. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198-99 (1976) (discussing need to avoid “‘archaic and
overbroad’ generalizations” about women (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508
(1975))); see also STONE ET AL., supra note 128, at 721-30 (discussing gender stereotypes as basis for discrimination against women).
423. See Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 470 (1981)
(upholding statute defining statutory rape as “an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a
female . . . under the age of 18 years”).
424. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 79 (1981) (“The fact that Congress and the Executive have decided that women should not serve in combat fully justifies Congress in not
authorizing their registration, since the purpose of registration is to develop a pool of potential
combat troops.”).
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women are not as able as men to achieve in the military,425 or that
women are less able than men to support themselves financially.426
Sometimes the Supreme Court’s solicitude for women has been characterized as protective in nature, although it has actually treated
women as less than full citizens, or placed women at a competitive
disadvantage in the job market.427 And sometimes the Supreme
Court’s refusal to protect the interests of women has seemed artificially strained, as when the Court permitted the exclusion of pregnancy from disability insurance coverage on the grounds that the exclusion discriminated on the basis of a medical condition rather than
on the basis of gender.428 With the recent exception of The VMI
429
Case, which invalidated the Virginia Military Institute’s practice of
refusing to admit women,430 the Court has not actively made use of
the Constitution to guard against gender discrimination.431
Although women were not successful in securing adoption of an
Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution, which would have
subjected gender classifications to strict scrutiny,432 women have had
notable political successes. While the Supreme Court was electing to
give gender classifications only the protection of intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, rather than the full protection of strict scrutiny accorded other suspect classifications, 433 women

425. See Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 508 (1975) (upholding federal statute giving women more
time than men to make rank in Navy).
426. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316 (1977) (upholding federal statute effectively
giving women higher social security benefits than men).
427. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 69 (1961) (giving women automatic exclusion
from jury duty); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (upholding restriction on women
working as bartenders); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908) (upholding maximum-hours
restriction on women working in factories).
428. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974) (holding that the exclusion of pregnancy from disability insurance coverage does not violate the Equal Protection Clause); cf.
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976) (holding that exclusion of pregnancy
disability coverage did not violate Title VII prohibition on employment discrimination). But
see Pregnancy Disability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994) (rejecting Gilbert for statutory purposes and defining sex discrimination under Title VII to include discrimination based on pregnancy).
429. The VMI Case, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
430. See id. at 2269.
431. See STONE ET AL., supra note 128, at 742.
432. See id. (describing fate of proposed Equal Rights Amendment).
433. Compare Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (according gender classifications
intermediate equal protection scrutiny), with Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944) (prescribing strict scrutiny for racial classifications). However, the Court may have recently heightened the standard of scrutiny for gender classifications. See The VMI Case, 116 S.
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successfully added gender to the list of categories for which employment discrimination is prohibited under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.434 The Supreme Court did dilute this political victory by
interpreting Title VII to permit, rather than to prohibit, discrimination based on pregnancy, but women successfully had the Supreme
Court’s ruling legislatively reversed.435 Title IX of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,436 which has been especially significant in efforts to
equalize athletic opportunities for women students,437 prohibits gender discrimination in schools receiving federal funds.438 Primary enforcement of this restriction is political, rather than judicial, coming
from federal agency monitoring of nondiscrimination as a condition
on the continued receipt of funding.439 Women have also been successful in securing political adoption of affirmative action programs.
For example, the federal minority construction preference program
that the Supreme Court subjected to strict scrutiny and likely invalidation on racial grounds in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena440 also
contained a gender preference provision.441 However, the continuing
validity of such gender affirmative action preferences is uncertain,
because we do not yet know whether the Supreme Court will invalidate gender affirmative action programs under the more deferential
intermediate scrutiny applied to gender as it has invalidated racial af-

Ct. at 2275 (requiring “exceedingly persuasive” justification for gender classifications (quoting
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982))).
434. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994). Ironically, the addition of gender to the list of prohibited forms of discrimination under Title VII came as a result of a political miscalculation by
opponents of Title VII who believed that the addition of a prohibition on gender discrimination
would cause the bill to be so politically unpopular that it would be defeated. See Nicole L.
Gueron, Note, An Idea Whose Time Has Come: A Comparative Procedural History of the Civil
Rights Acts of 1960, 1964, and 1991, 104 YALE L.J. 1201, 1218-19 (1995) (discussing history of
Civil Rights Act of 1964).
435. See supra note 428 and accompanying text.
436. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
437. See Susan M. Shook, Note, The Title IX Tug-of-War and Intercollegiate Athletics in the
1990’s: Nonrevenue Men’s Teams Join Women Athletes in the Scramble for Survival, 71 IND.
L.J. 773, 773-82 (1996) (discussing effects of Title IX); Note, Cheering on Women and Girls in
Sports: Using Title IX to Fight Gender Role Oppression, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1627, 1627 (1997)
(discussing feminist theory and effect of Title IX on women’s sports).
438. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
439. See Shook, supra note 437, at 773-74.
440. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
441. See id. at 208 (stating that women are included within category of “socially and economically disadvantaged individuals” entitled to construction contract preference (quoting Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101
Stat. 132, 146)).
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firmative action programs under the more demanding strict scrutiny
applied to race.442
In addition to the Supreme Court’s empirical failures to protect
the interests of women and racial minorities, theoretical reasons give
rise skepticism about the Court’s ability to protect such interests. As
Alexander Hamilton emphasized in The Federalist No. 78, “[t]o avoid
an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they
should be bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve to
define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them.”443 When the governing doctrinal rules are indeterminate,
the danger of “an arbitrary discretion in the courts” becomes very
real. Doctrinal indeterminacy precludes the Supreme Court from
having any productive role to play in the ongoing affirmative action
debate, because doctrinal indeterminacy deprives the Court of its capacity to behave in a countermajoritarian manner. If a doctrinal rule
prescribes the outcome of a legal dispute, the Supreme Court can
simply apply that doctrinal rule without regard to majoritarian preferences and generate the result that the doctrine requires. However,
when a governing doctrinal rule is indeterminate, the Supreme Court
must engage in an act of doctrinally-unconstrained judicial discretion
in order to resolve the dispute. This unconstrained discretion bodes
ill for the interests of minorities and women. Because the Supreme
Court is statistically more representative of the demographic majority than of racial minorities and women, the Court is statistically
more likely to exercise its unconstrained discretion in ways that advance majority interests than it is to advance the interests of women
and minorities.444 The political preferences of the Justices are likely
to be the same as the political preferences of the majority, and different than the preferences of women and racial minorities. Moreover,
to the extent that majoritarian tendencies to discount the interests of

442. See id. at 246 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that current law makes it easier for government to adopt gender-based affirmative action programs than race-based affirmative action
programs, even though primary purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to end racial discrimination against former slaves).
443. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton J. Rossiter ed., 1961).
444. My use of the term “majority” in this context encompasses the interests of whites and
males, and disregards the fact that women constitute a numerical majority of the population.
This use of the term makes sense because Proposition 209 benefits whites and males by prohibiting preferences for women and racial minorities, and because the Supreme Court has accorded special judicial protection to women and racial minorities, who have historically been
disadvantaged in the majoritarian political process.
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women and minorities are unconscious rather than deliberate,445 there
is no way that a Justice can consciously guard against such discounting when exercising judicial discretion.446 The amorphous doctrinal standard of “equal protection” is too indeterminate to constrain the Court’s discretion in resolving constitutional disputes about
affirmative action in general, or Proposition 209 in particular, and it
invites precisely this kind of discounting.447 As a result, the Supreme
Court should withdraw from the cultural debate about affirmative action and permit the undistorted political process to resolve the debate
without judicial intervention that artificially skews the debate in favor of the majority and against the interests of women and minorities.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court is unlikely to withdraw from
the affirmative action debate. Institutions, like individuals, are rarely
anxious to relinquish power. Indeed, the Framers counted on the
predictable phenomenon of institutional jealousy as part of the separation-of-powers strategy that they adopted to check the excessive
accumulation of power in one branch of the national government.
They believed that “[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition,” in a way that would serve as a system of checks and balances
adequate to prevent abuses of governmental power.448 However, the
Framers did not count on the exercise of judicial discretion for the
formulation of social policy. They assumed that the limited role of
the judiciary in applying legal principles would make the judiciary
“the least dangerous” branch of government.449 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has historically shown a consistent inclination to seize
control over the formulation of social policy that affects women and
racial minorities.
In 1973, the Supreme Court intervened in the political debate
about abortion, announcing in Roe v. Wade450 that women possessed a
constitutional right to obtain abortions.451 The Court intervened even
though there was no particular reason to believe that the political

445. See supra Part I.C.4 (discussing unconscious nature of much discrimination).
446. For a fully developed version of this argument see SPANN, supra note 127, at 19-26
(discussing veiled majoritarian conception of Supreme Court).
447. See supra Part II (discussing doctrinal indeterminacy concerning constitutionality of
Proposition 209).
448. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 321-22 (James Madison) (Clinton J. Rossiter ed., 1961)
(discussing separation of powers and checks and balances).
449. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 443, at 465.
450. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
451. See id. at 164-66 (finding trimester-based constitutional right to abortion).
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process lacked the ability to resolve the abortion debate in a satisfactory manner. In the absence of Roe, the political process would
probably have caused abortion to become freely available in some
states, somewhat restricted in others, and highly restricted in yet
other states—much as it is now. Although Supreme Court constitutionalization of the abortion issue took it out of ordinary politics, judicial resolution of the abortion issue does not seem to have been
more stable or satisfying than political resolution would have been.
The content of the constitutional right to abortion has waxed and
waned with political shifts in Presidential administrations and ensuing
Supreme Court appointments, and no one seems very satisfied with
the Court’s resolution of the issue.452 Although the Court recognized
a constitutional right to abortion, it never recognized a right to abortion funding.453 As a result, indigent women who suffered the most
serious hardships prior to Roe continued to suffer similar hardships
after Roe was handed down.454
The Court’s current position on abortion has not improved matters. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,455 the Court reaffirmed the existence of a constitutional right to abortion,456 but made that right
subject to an “undue burden” balancing test457 that makes the constitutionality of particular restrictions on the right a function of what
five members of the Supreme Court happen to think about the policy
desirability of those restrictions. This balancing approach hardly exemplifies the constrained judicial discretion that Hamilton envisioned
in The Federalist No. 78.458 Some have even argued that the very reason the abortion issue presently remains so politically contentious is
that Supreme Court constitutionalization of the issue has precluded a
452. See STONE ET AL., supra note 128, at 962-90 (discussing post-Roe Supreme Court abortion decisions).
453. See Harris v McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326-27 (1980) (upholding federal “Hyde Amendment,” which denied Medicaid coverage to recipients of therapeutic abortions where the
mother’s life was not threatened); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1977) (upholding state
exclusion of nontherapeutic abortions from Medicaid coverage).
454. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 243-44 (1985)
(discussing hardships imposed on indigent women by abortion funding cases); Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L.
REV. 375, 377, 383-85 (1985) (commenting on the plight of women who wish to have abortions
but cannot afford them).
455. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
456. See id. at 870.
457. See id. at 878.
458. See supra note 443 and accompanying text (discussing Hamilton’s recognition of need
for constraints on judicial discretion).
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stable political equilibrium from developing; instead, Roe v. Wade
provided an issue around which conservative political sentiment
could coalesce, and mobilized a political movement that might not
otherwise have made the abortion issue so politically volatile.459 Supreme Court intervention has not made the resolution of the abortion issue less political, but has merely made the politics of abortion
less accountable.
The history of Supreme Court intervention in the politics of race
has produced similar consequences. Prior to the Civil War, when the
State of Pennsylvania tried to legislate a political compromise on the
controversial issue of slavery, the Supreme Court invalidated the
compromise in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.460 When Congress attempted
to solve the problem of slavery through enactment of the Missouri
Compromise, the Supreme Court invalidated the effort in Dred Scott,
this time leading to the Civil War.461 During the post-Civil War Reconstruction period, when Congress attempted to protect former
slaves from virulent racial discrimination, the Supreme Court invalidated congressional efforts to reach private discrimination.462 In
modern times, when federal, state and local governments have attempted to protect the interests of racial minorities through affirmative action programs, the Supreme Court has begun routinely to invalidate those programs.463 And when Congress and the Attorney
General have attempted to prevent minority vote dilution under the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Supreme Court has begun routinely to
invalidate those efforts as well.464 As was true with the Supreme
Court’s intervention in the abortion issue, the Court’s interventions

459. See, e.g., STONE ET AL., supra note 128, at 986-87 (suggesting that well-organized prolife movement may not have developed if right to abortion had emerged from political process
rather than from Supreme Court); Mark V. Tushnet, Rights: An Essay in Informal Political
Theory, 17 POL. & SOC’Y 403, 414 (1989) (same); cf. Ginsburg, supra note 454, at 376, 379-83
(suggesting that Roe might have generated less public opposition if it had been rooted in equality rather than substantive due process concerns). See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 185-89, 234-35 (1991)
(detailing the heightened abortion-related political activity following the Court’s decision in
Roe).
460. See supra notes 382-84 and accompanying text (discussing Prigg).
461. See supra notes 385-88 and accompanying text (discussing Dred Scott and Civil War).
462. See supra notes 389-91 and accompanying text (discussing Reconstruction and state-action requirement).
463. See supra note 412 and accompanying text (discussing invalidated affirmative action
programs).
464. See supra notes 409-12 and accompanying text (discussing invalidated majorityminority districts under Voting Rights Act).
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into racial politics “feel” very political. And under the politics of the
current Supreme Court, those efforts “feel” destined to have an adverse effect on the interests of racial minorities as well.
The highly political nature of the affirmative action issue indicates that there is no democratically useful role for the Supreme
Court to play in its resolution. The Court should treat the desirability of affirmative action as a political question rather than as a judicial question, but the Court’s history suggests that the Court is unwilling to do this. The Supreme Court seems attracted to political
controversy and distrustful of political solutions to social problems,
which it deems itself better equipped to resolve. It is unclear why the
Court believes that it has a useful policymaking role to play when
governing legal standards are doctrinally indeterminate. But it is
clear that the Court often does believe such judicial intervention to
be appropriate. Accepting the inevitability of Supreme Court participation in the process of controversial political policymaking, it
seems reasonable to ask that the Court’s interventions at least be
evenhanded rather than one-sided. Because the Supreme Court has
now intervened to invalidate most affirmative action programs, evenhanded intervention requires the Court also to invalidate most categorical prohibitions on affirmative action, including Proposition 209.
B. Washington v. Davis
The Supreme Court has decided that the judiciary, rather than
the political branches of government, should control the availability
of affirmative action. As a result, the Court permits the political
process to implement affirmative action programs only when the
Court determines, after subjecting such programs to heightened scrutiny, that those programs comply with norms that the Court finds in
the Constitution. Proposition 209 is an affirmative action program
because it redistributes resources on the basis of race and gender just
as other affirmative actions programs do. To be consistent, therefore, the Court should permit Proposition 209 to ban traditional affirmative action programs only if the Court, after applying that same
heightened scrutiny, determines that Proposition 209 complies with
those same constitutional norms. If the Court were to override the
political process when it took actions designed to benefit women and
racial minorities, but not when it took actions designed to benefit
white males, the Court would be engaged in classic race and gender
discrimination.
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If the Supreme Court declines to treat Proposition 209 as a race
and gender classification that is analogous to traditional affirmative
action, Proposition 209 is still subject to heightened scrutiny under an
equal protection analysis. Under Washington v. Davis465 and its progeny, the constitutionality of a governmental classification that is not
expressly based on race or gender is to be determined by the intent
which motivated the classification. If a classification was adopted
with discriminatory intent, it constitutes a race or gender classification that is subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause.466 Although a Washington v. Davis analysis cannot eliminate
doctrinal indeterminacy from the Court’s equal protection analysis, it
can resolve the constitutional issues raised by Proposition 209 in a
way that is intuitively compelling. When the Washington v. Davis intent test is applied to Proposition 209, a number of factors indicate
that the Proposition 209 categorical prohibition on affirmative action
constitutes a race and gender classification that triggers heightened
equal protection scrutiny.
Proposition 209 is ultimately best understood as an effort to discount the interests of women and racial minorities in order to advance the interests of white males. As a result, Proposition 209 cannot withstand heightened scrutiny. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Romer v. Evans467 indicates that the animus embedded in such invidious discrimination could not even withstand rational-basis review. The Supreme Court should therefore hold that
Proposition 209 is unconstitutional for the same reason that it has
held affirmative action programs to be unconstitutional: Proposition
209 constitutes an intentional effort by the majority to allocate societal resources on the basis of race and gender.
1. Consistency. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,468 the
Supreme Court went to great pains to stress the need for
465. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
466. See id. at 238-48; see also Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-74 (1979)
(applying Washington v. Davis intentional discrimination test to gender classifications). See
generally Cass R. Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause,
1982 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 131-38 (arguing that the overarching theme uniting equal protection
jurisprudence under rational-basis review, as well as heightened scrutiny, is that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits classifications based on “naked preferences” designed to advantage
one group over another rather than to advance some public value).
467. 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628-29 (1996) (invalidating Amendment 2 to the Colorado Constitution because it was not “directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose”).
468. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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“consistency” in the application of equal protection principles,
emphasizing that the Equal Protection Clause extends the same
equality guarantee to all individuals regardless of race, or,
presumably, gender.469 As a result, the Court held that heightened
scrutiny applies to all suspect classifications, whether benign or
invidious, irregardless of where the benefits and burdens fall.470
Although the Adarand Court was attempting to explain why the
Equal Protection Clause should be read to protect the interests of the
white majority from majoritarian enactments, it certainly cannot be
that the equal protection guarantee applies with less force to the
interests of women and racial minorities. Women and racial
minorities are typically deemed to be more vulnerable than members
of the majority to majoritarian abuses, and therefore are more in
need of countermajoritarian judicial protection.471
In Adarand, the Supreme Court held that racial affirmative action programs were subject to strict equal protection scrutiny,
thereby effectively invalidating most race-based affirmative action. 472
The Court’s treatment of gender as a suspect classification indicates
that Adarand also invalidates gender-based affirmative action programs that cannot survive the stringent intermediate scrutiny standard presently applicable to gender-based classifications.473 If the Supreme Court were to apply a more deferential level of constitutional
analysis to the Proposition 209 preference prohibition than the Court
applies to the affirmative action plans that it invalidates, the Court
would itself be acting in a discriminatory manner. Such selective judicial intervention would invalidate governmental affirmative action
programs that benefit women and racial minorities, but would permit
governmental actions, such as Proposition 209, that benefit white

469. See id. at 224, 229-30.
470. See id. at 227. Although Adarand concerned the issue of race, there is no reason to
believe that its consistency requirement does not apply to gender.
471. See generally ELY, supra note 280, at 135-79 (elaborating representation-reinforcement
theory of judicial review).
472. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-27, 235; see also STONE ET AL., supra note 128, at 601
(noting that the Supreme Court has not upheld a racial classification under strict scrutiny since
its 1944 decision in Korematsu). But cf. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (“[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’”); Lawyer v. Department of Justice,
117 S. Ct. 2186, 2194-95 (1997) (applying what appears to be rational-basis scrutiny, based on
evidence that race was not predominant factor, to uphold voter redistricting plan that considered race as factor, but did not result in majority-minority district).
473. See The VMI Case, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996) (requiring “exceedingly persuasive”
justification for gender classifications to be upheld).
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males by prohibiting affirmative action. To satisfy the Adarand
command of consistency, therefore, the Court should subject prohibitions on constitutionally valid affirmative action to the same heightened scrutiny that it applies to affirmative action itself. In that way,
affirmative action programs and prohibitions on affirmative action
programs will be treated in an equivalent manner. Both will be upheld only to the extent that they can survive heightened equal protection scrutiny.
Although it might at first seem that the Supreme Court could
behave in a consistent manner by both invalidating affirmative action
and upholding political efforts to invalidate affirmative action, those
actions would, in fact, be inconsistent. Proposition 209 reallocates resources on the basis of race and gender in precisely the same sense
that affirmative action does. Both alter the status quo, and both do
so for explicitly race- and gender-conscious reasons. Affirmative action alters the status quo by taking resources that would go to white
males under a pre-affirmative action allocation scheme and redistributing them to women and minorities. Proposition 209 alters the
status quo by taking resources that would go to women and minorities under an affirmative action allocation scheme and redistributing
them to white males. Proposition 209 also redistributes resources by
prohibiting future affirmative action programs that would have been
adopted but for the Proposition 209 injunction on affirmative action,
because it diverts to white males resources that the political process
474
would otherwise have allocated to women and minorities. In terms
of resource redistribution, therefore, Proposition 209 and affirmative
action are simply opposite sides of the same coin. Proposition 209 is
an affirmative action program for white males.
Although Proposition 209 redistributes resources on the basis of
race and gender, Proposition 209 proponents nevertheless claim that
Proposition 209 is race- and gender-neutral.475 What they must mean
474. One of my colleagues suggested that on the date that Proposition 209 took effect it
might be a race- and gender-conscious redistribution measure with respect to existing but not
future affirmative action programs. With respect to future programs, Proposition 209 would
not change the status quo, and therefore would not redistribute any resources. This formalist
argument employs a view of the status quo that reads the Equal Protection Clause to be more
concerned with Proposition 209’s date of enactment than with its discriminatory or nondiscriminatory effect. It seems more meaningful to use a functional conception of the status quo as
consisting of whatever outcome the political process would have produced in the absence of
Proposition 209.
475. See, e.g., Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir.) (“A law
that prohibits the State from classifying individuals by race or gender a fortiori does not classify
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by this claim is that they favor Proposition 209 redistributions over
affirmative action redistributions because Proposition 209 redistributes resources in a way that restores the allocations that existed before affirmative action programs began tampering with the “normal”
distribution of resources.476 But that preference for pre-affirmative
action allocations is both doctrinally irrelevant and analytically
problematic. The preference is doctrinally irrelevant because the
Adarand consistency requirement subjects all race- and genderconscious redistributions of resources to the same heightened scrutiny regardless of whether the redistributions are benign or invidious,
and regardless of which groups they benefit and burden. Although
the arguments favoring a particular redistribution are relevant to the
issue of whether the redistribution can survive heightened judicial
scrutiny, those arguments are not relevant to the threshold issue of
whether the redistribution triggers heightened scrutiny. Under Adarand, heightened scrutiny is triggered by both affirmative action and
Proposition 209, simply because both are race- and gender-conscious
redistribution measures.
The Proposition 209 preference for pre-affirmative action allocations of resources is analytically problematic because it ultimately
turns the Equal Protection Clause on its head. Although Proposition
209 and affirmative action are both race- and gender-conscious redistribution measures, their reasons for redistributing resources are very
different. Affirmative action redistributes resources in order to remedy the lingering effects of a prior discriminatory allocation scheme,
while Proposition 209 redistributes resources in order to nullify affirmative action remedies and reinstate prior discriminatory allocations. The accuracy of this characterization becomes particularly apparent when one focuses upon the Supreme Court’s current affirmative action jurisprudence.
As has been noted, Proposition 209 meaningfully prohibits only
those affirmative action preferences that the Equal Protection Clause
477
itself permits. Under current law, the Equal Protection Clause appears to permit only affirmative action programs that are necessary to
individuals by race or gender. Proposition 209’s ban on race and gender preferences, as a matter of law and logic, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause in any conventional sense.”),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
476. Use of the term “normal” in this context, of course, simply states a normative preference for a particular analytical baseline. See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text
(discussing baseline assumptions).
477. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing distinction between discrimination and preferences).
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remedy identifiable and particularized acts of past discrimination,
where the need to provide a remedy for that discrimination is either
“compelling” or is based upon an “exceedingly persuasive” justification.478 Indeed, if any race-neutral or more narrowly-tailored alternatives to affirmative action exist for redressing past discrimination, the Supreme Court appears unwilling to uphold the constitutionality of an affirmative action remedy.479 Therefore, when Proposition 209 invalidates a constitutionally valid affirmative action program it precludes the possibility of any meaningful remedy for past
discrimination.480 It relegates the victims of past discrimination to
remedies that the Supreme Court would by hypothesis hold to be inadequate means of pursuing a goal that the Supreme Court would by
hypothesis hold to be compelling. A reading of the Equal Protection
Clause that permitted Proposition 209 to preclude remedies that the
Equal Protection Clause itself recognized as the only adequate way
to eliminate the continuing effects of past discrimination would be
perverse. It would turn the Equal Protection Clause into a device for
promoting rather than preventing race and gender discrimination.

478. Racial affirmative action is constitutional only if it is narrowly tailored to advance a
compelling governmental interest, see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227
(1995), and the only interest that the Court currently seems willing to recognize as compelling
is the interest in remedying relatively specific acts of past discrimination, see City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497-99 (1989). Because gender-based classifications are now
subject to stringent intermediate scrutiny requirements, see The VMI Case, 116 S. Ct. 2264,
2275 (1996), gender affirmative action may also be limited to cases in which affirmative action
is a necessary remedy for past discrimination. It is possible, but not likely, that the Supreme
Court will hold the promotion of prospective diversity to be an adequate basis for valid affirmative action. See Spann, supra note 194, at 28-30 (suggesting that prospective diversity might
also constitute a compelling governmental interest). But see Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932,
944 (5th Cir.) (rejecting prospective diversity as compelling governmental interest), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996). The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Taxman v. Piscataway
Township Board of Education, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997),
which presented the statutory issue of whether Title VII permits the non-remedial use of racial
affirmative action for prospective diversity reasons, would have given the Court an opportunity
to provide clearer guidance with respect to the permissible bases for affirmative action. However, the Piscataway case was settled by the parties prior to oral argument in the Supreme
Court, thereby mooting the Supreme Court appeal. See Biskupic, supra note 43, at A1; Greenhouse, supra note 43, at A1.
479. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237-38; see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 507-08 (requiring narrow
tailoring).
480. If you are tempted to argue that Proposition 209 does not prohibit prior discrimination
from ever being undone, but only prohibits remedies for prior discrimination from being implemented through race- or gender-conscious means, remember that the Supreme Court will
permit race- and gender-conscious affirmative action remedies only when neutral remedies
would not be effective. See supra notes 430-31 and accompanying text.
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Although the affirmative action programs prohibited by Proposition 209 are by hypothesis constitutional,481 that fact alone would not
normally preclude a state constitution from prohibiting them. States
are not obligated to follow policies simply because the United States
Constitution does not prohibit them. In the affirmative action context, however, constitutional authorization may well coincide with
constitutional compulsion. The Supreme Court has adopted such
stringent standards to govern the constitutionality of affirmative action programs that the only programs that will continue are those
programs that constitute the sole available alternative for eliminating
past discrimination.482 As a result, most race and gender affirmative
action programs will now be unconstitutional. But the programs that
survive the demanding Supreme Court standards will necessarily be
so essential to the elimination of ongoing discrimination that it may
well violate the Equal Protection Clause for the government to prohibit them. Because the Proposition 209 ban on affirmative action is
a race- and gender-conscious redistribution, it will not be constitutional unless its justification for banning affirmative action can survive heightened scrutiny. However, when the only justification for
prohibiting affirmative action is to foreclose the only available remedy for discrimination, a ban on affirmative action becomes an act of
discrimination that cannot survive heightened scrutiny.483
It is important to remember that the Constitution applies to the
Supreme Court as well as to the political branches of government.
Just as the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the California electorate from according more favorable political treatment to white males
than it accords women and minorities, the Equal Protection Clause
also prohibits the Supreme Court from according more favorable judicial treatment to white males than it accords women and minorities.
The fact that no other branch of government can easily enforce the
Equal Protection Clause against the Supreme Court does not mean
that the Court has license to ignore the Constitution. Rather, it
means that the Court must demonstrate a particularly high level of
judicial integrity in order to preserve its own constitutional legiti481. Again, the Proposition 209 preference prohibition is meaningful only with respect to
affirmative action programs that are not already prohibited by the Constitution. See supra Part
I.B.1.
482. See supra notes 477-80 and accompanying text (describing stringency of current Supreme Court affirmative action standards).
483. The application of heightened scrutiny to Proposition 209 is discussed in more detail in
Parts III.B.2-3, infra.
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macy. If the Court were to apply different constitutional standards to
Proposition 209 than it applies to other affirmative action programs,
it would be discriminating against women and minorities in both substantive and procedural ways.
As a substantive matter, if the Court were to apply deferential
scrutiny to uphold Proposition 209 redistributions of resources when
it has consistently applied heightened scrutiny to invalidate affirmative action redistributions would constitute race and gender discrimination favoring white males. As has been shown, the Court would be
acquiescing in the discriminatory allocation of resources when that
allocation benefited white males, but not when it benefited women or
minorities. And the Court would be permitting the political process
to use race- and gender-conscious techniques to perpetuate past discrimination, but not to provide remedies for such discrimination.
That would violate both the consistency requirement of Adarand and
the nondiscrimination requirement of the Equal Protection Clause
itself.
As a procedural matter, the application of relaxed evidentiary
standards to Proposition 209 would also discriminate against women
and minorities, since the Court has consistently applied stringent evidentiary standards to affirmative action programs that benefit women
and minorities. The Supreme Court now insists on a fact-specific,
case-by-case analysis of affirmative action programs that benefit
women and minorities in order to determine whether those programs
484
are constitutional. The Proposition 209 “affirmative action” program for white males, however, applies across the board. It is not
limited to any of the fact-specific, case-by-case demonstrations of
momentous need and narrow tailoring that the Court requires for affirmative action programs that benefit women and minorities.485
Therefore, if the Supreme Court were to uphold Proposition 209 despite its overbreadth, it would be applying a different, lessdemanding evidentiary standard to affirmative action programs that
benefited white males than it applies to affirmative action for women
and minorities. This would again violate the consistency requirement
of Adarand and the neutrality requirement of the Equal Protection
Clause.

484. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 225-29 (emphasizing need for strict scrutiny to determine
whether affirmative action plan is truly benign and remedial).
485. See supra notes 478-80 and accompanying text.
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Proposition 209 is a race and gender classification that should be
subjected to heightened equal protection scrutiny. It is a race and
gender classification because it redistributes resources based on race
and gender, in precisely the same sense that affirmative action does.
Moreover, it expressly singles out race and gender for special treatment that is not applied to preferences for veterans, athletes, and the
other preferences identified by the district court for which Proposition 209 leaves the status quo allocation of resources in place.486 However, even if Proposition 209 is somehow deemed not to be an affirmative action program for white males, it is still a race and gender
classification triggering heightened equal protection scrutiny under
Washington v. Davis.
2. Intentional Discrimination. In Washington v. Davis, the
Supreme Court held that the way to determine whether a facially
neutral classification constitutes a race or gender classification is to
ascertain the intent with which the classification was adopted.487 If a
classification results from an intent to discriminate against women or
racial minorities, then it is a race or gender classification despite its
facial neutrality.488 Surprisingly, the lower courts in Coalition for
Economic Equity did not conduct a Washington v. Davis intentional
discrimination analysis of the Proposition 209 preference prohibition.489 Both courts focused instead on the Supreme Court’s political restructuring cases in analyzing the constitutionality of
Proposition 209.490 This focus is unfortunate because the Supreme
Court’s political structure jurisprudence has never been doctrinally

486. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1498 n.19, 1499, 1505
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (enumerating types of affirmative action preferences that are permitted by
Proposition 209), rev’d, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
487. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 220, 239-45 (1976).
488. See id.; Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-74 (1979) (applying Washington
v. Davis intentional discrimination test to gender classifications).
489. Perhaps one reason that the lower courts chose not to conduct a Washington v. Davis
intentional discrimination analysis is that language in the Seattle case suggested that the Washington v. Davis intent test was not applicable to measures that explicitly mention race, as does
Proposition 209. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 484-87 (1982)
(suggesting that intent analysis is inapplicable when facially race-conscious legislation is involved). But cf. id. at 471-74 (conducting apparent intent analysis). This, however, does not
fully explain why the lower courts chose to characterize Proposition 209 as a political restructuring case. Cf. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 701-02 (9th Cir.)
(conducting “conventional” equal protection analysis of Proposition 209), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 397 (1997).
490. See supra Part II.
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intelligible or viscerally satisfying.491 Moreover, the political restructuring cases may not be followed by the members of the present
Supreme Court.492
The Washington v. Davis intentional discrimination standard
cannot itself eliminate the doctrinal indeterminacy that permeated
the political structure analyses of the lower courts in Coalition for
Economic Equity, but it can provide an intuitively accessible analysis
that is viscerally more satisfying than the analyses offered by the
lower courts. One reason that Washington v. Davis cannot eliminate
doctrinal indeterminacy is that a subsequent Supreme Court gloss on
that case’s intentional discrimination standard makes the concept of
discriminatory intent highly elusive. In Personnel Administrator v.
493
Feeney, the Court distinguished between prohibited discriminatory
intent, and mere awareness of non-motivating discriminatory effects,
which the Court did not view as constitutionally impermissible.494 Accordingly, the Court held that the enactment of a Massachusetts veterans preference law did not constitute intentional discrimination
within the meaning of Washington v. Davis.495 The Massachusetts
Legislature, while aware of the gender discriminatory impact of the
law, did not enact the law “because of” its discriminatory impact;
rather, the Legislature enacted the law for the purpose of benefiting
veterans, “in spite of” its gender discriminatory impact.496

491. See supra Parts II.A.2 and II.B.2 (discussing doctrinal difficulties inherent in political
restructuring cases); see also Louis Michael Seidman, Romer’s Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of Warren Court Activism, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 76 (noting that “the political process
decisions struck many commentators as anomalous”).
492. In the district court, proponents of Proposition 209 argued that the Supreme Court’s
political restructuring precedents should not be followed because they were likely to be overruled by the present Court. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1504
n.25 (N.D. Cal. 1996), rev’d, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
493. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
494. See id. at 278-79 (holding that legislation passed “because of” adverse effects on an
identifiable group has a “discriminatory purpose,” while legislation passed “in spite of” such
effects does not).
495. See id. at 281.
496. See id. The continuing importance of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), should
be considered in light of M.L.B. v. S.L.J, 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996). In M.L.B., the Court held that
the application to an indigent mother of a state rule requiring the payment of a transcript fee in
order to appeal a judicial decision terminating the mother’s parental rights was unconstitutional. See id. at 568-69. The dissent hastened to point out that the transcript fee may have had
a disparate impact on indigents, but it did not constitute intentional discrimination under
Washington v. Davis. See id. at 573-75 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Intuitively, the transcript fee
requirement would not seem to satisfy the Washington v. Davis intentional discrimination standard because the requirement was almost certainly intended to be a revenue-generating meas-
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The Feeney construct suffers from the same analytical baseline
difficulties that destabilized the political structure analyses of the
lower courts in Coalition for Economic Equity.497 If one assumes that
the Massachusetts Legislature in Feeney was not responsible for the
fact that the beneficiaries of its law were overwhelmingly male, the
veterans preference law looks like a mere gender-neutral effort to
express gratitude to veterans for their national defense efforts. However, if one focuses on the fact that the Massachusetts Legislature
elected to give a preference to veterans (who are overwhelmingly
male because of the express discriminatory practices of the United
States military in excluding women from conscription and combat),
rather than to equally indispensable nurses or elementary school
teachers (who are overwhelmingly female because of cultural genderrole stereotypes), then the veterans preference law begins to look a
lot more like intentional discrimination that endorses the sexist inclinations of the military.498 Ultimately, any known (or even unknown)
ure that was adopted “in spite of” rather than “because of” its adverse impact on indigents.
However, because neither opinion devoted much attention to the Feeney decision, it seems unlikely that the Court intended a major revision of the Washington v. Davis standard. The case,
however, does seem to illustrate that there is sufficient play in the Washington v. Davis intentional discrimination test to permit the test to be sidestepped when it stands in the way of the
outcome that the Court desires.
An additional difficulty presented by the Washington v. Davis intentional discrimination standard relates to its application in nonfeasance cases. Although language in Crawford
suggests that a race-neutral repeal of measures that benefit racial minorities is not unconstitutional, see Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 535-42 (1982), the Washington v. Davis
test seems to indicate that if a repeal is not race-neutral, but rather is motivated by discriminatory intent, it will be subject to heightened scrutiny notwithstanding the fact that it is a repeal.
Assuming that this is true, it remains unclear how the Washington v. Davis intent test should
apply to nonfeasance situations in which the legislature does not repeal anything but simply
fails to adopt a measure that would benefit a protected minority group. This is something that
all legislatures do almost everyday. In principle, such nonfeasance does not pose a difficult
problem. If the failure to enact a measure that would benefit a protected minority group results from discriminatory intent, the measure is subject to heightened scrutiny under Washington v. Davis. As a practical matter, however, such a showing will be very difficult to make.
The many other legislative priorities and considerations that compete with the unadopted minority measure will almost always protect mere legislative inaction from heightened scrutiny
under Feeney. However, in those rare cases in which there is adequate evidence of discriminatory intent, Washington v. Davis would seem to require strict scrutiny of even legislative nonfeasance—although fashioning an appropriate remedy could be problematic. This conclusion
seems to be reinforced by the Court’s recent decision in Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996),
which can be read to require a legislature to adopt measures that benefit protected minorities
whenever it has adopted similar measures to benefit other groups. See infra Part III.B.3
(discussing Romer).
497. See supra Part II (discussing baseline problems in lower court analyses).
498. Note that Congress may be more responsible for some of these discriminatory inclinations than the military. It was Congress that insisted on excluding women from the present

SPANNPP WITH WIDOW PROTECT

1997]

05/26/98 9:03 AM

PROPOSITION 209

303

disparate effects of a government action can be deemed to constitute
intentional discrimination by selecting the appropriate analytical
baseline. And there is no way to prefer one baseline to another
without invoking some pre-analytical normative preference.499
Although a Washington v. Davis intentional discrimination
analysis cannot eliminate the doctrinal indeterminacy inherent in a
constitutional evaluation of Proposition 209, it can provide an analysis that is viscerally more appealing than the political structure analyses undertaken by the lower courts. A Washington v. Davis analysis
is more appealing because the concept of intentional discrimination is
intuitively more accessible than the concept of an improperly structured political process. Most people have no idea what constitutes
improper political structuring, and the Supreme Court politicalstructuring precedents are difficult to reconcile. But everyone has
some idea of what intentional discrimination is. In fact, to the extent
that the political restructuring cases have any intuitive appeal at all, it
is because they recognize that some restructurings of the political
process are invidiously motivated within the meaning of the Wash500
ington v. Davis intentional discrimination standard. Although it is
draft registration requirement, even though the Department of Defense did not oppose the
registration of women. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 97-102 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
499. When a government adopts a preference “in spite of” its known discriminatory effects,
the government is determining that the benefits of the preference outweigh the costs of the attendant discrimination. When the government adopts a preference with unknown discriminatory effects, the government is simply deciding not to incur the costs necessary to determine
whether its preference will be discriminatory. Both government actions can, therefore, be
characterized as “intentional.” The abstract distinction between intentional discrimination and
mere discriminatory effects is deconstructed in SPANN, supra note 127, at 60-66.
500. Note that this analysis permits one to make sense of the elusive distinction that the
Supreme Court has drawn between an impermissible restructuring of the political process and a
permissible repeal of a program that benefits a minority group. See supra notes 264-75 and accompanying text (discussing political restructuring cases). If the government action—whether
a formal restructuring or a mere repeal—is motivated by discriminatory intent, then that action
constitutes an impermissible race or gender classification under Washington v. Davis. It is motive, rather than the untenable distinction between restructuring and repeal, that is dispositive.
But see Amar & Caminker, supra note 24, at 1023-24, 1034-35 (arguing that Proposition 209 is
unconstitutional under Supreme Court’s political restructuring precedents, but not under
Washington v. Davis intentional discrimination analysis). This intent analysis also permits one
to make sense of Loving. The Virginia antimiscegenation statute that the Court invalidated in
Loving accorded identical treatment to all racial groups. See supra notes 328-32 and accompanying text (discussing Loving). However, the statute was nevertheless unconstitutional under
the Washington v. Davis standard because it was motivated by racial animus toward blacks, in
that it was “obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy.” Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (characterizing justification for miscegenation statute offered by Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955)); see also id. at 11
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true that the concept of intent can be manipulated, and the distinction between intent and effects can be deconstructed,501 most people
will share a conception of intentional discrimination that is stable
enough to resist efforts at result-oriented manipulation or esoteric
deconstruction. When this intuitively accessible conception of intentional discrimination is applied to Proposition 209 under Washington
v. Davis, the Proposition 209 preference prohibition looks like a race
and gender classification.
The stated goal of Proposition 209 is to promote race and gender
neutrality, but there are many reasons to conclude that the voters of
California were engaged in intentional discrimination when they
adopted it. First, the claim that Proposition 209 was adopted in order
to advance egalitarian social goals has little inherent credibility. Second, the political climate out of which Proposition 209 emerged calls
into question the sincerity of the claim that Proposition 209 was motivated by the desire to achieve race and gender neutrality. Third,
political support for Proposition 209 is demographically so polarized
that it suggests that the white male supporters of Proposition 209 are
primarily concerned with protecting their own interests. Fourth,
Proposition 209 is only one of several recent California efforts that
seem suspiciously elitist or xenophobic in nature, thereby further undermining the purported egalitarian nature of Proposition 209. Finally, Proposition 209 is an example of the phenomenon, recently
witnessed in South Africa, in which the holders of dominant cultural
power become interested in equality only when they begin to fear
502
that they are on the verge of losing their cultural dominance.
The egalitarian depiction of Proposition 209 as a measure designed to advance the goal of equality has little inherent credibility.
As has been discussed, proponents of Proposition 209 argue that their
ballot initiative was designed not to discriminate on the basis of race
or gender, but to promote prospective race and gender neutrality.503
Given this claim, it is more than a little ironic that Proposition 209
(“[T]he racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to
maintain White Supremacy.”).
501. See SPANN, supra note 127, at 60-66.
502. Some commentators have argued that Proposition 209 exemplifies the very type of
abuse resulting from untamed majoritarian passions that the Framers intended to avoid by providing for a republican form of government rather than a direct democracy. As a result, they
argue that ballot initiatives such as Proposition 209 are unconstitutional as a violation of the
Guarantee Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. See Rogers & Faigman, supra note 24, at 1066-72.
503. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing moral high ground claimed by proponents of Proposition 209).
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campaign organizers made conscious, politically-motivated efforts to
place women and minorities in top positions in the Proposition 209
campaign. As the Proposition 209 campaign manager remarked, “It
was like using affirmative action to defeat affirmative action . . . . We
were being pretty cynical, I have to admit.”504 It is also noteworthy
that Proposition 209 recognizes convenient financial limits on its
commitment to equality. By its terms, Section 31(e) of Proposition
209 terminates its insistence on race and gender neutrality whenever
adherence to the neutrality principle would result in a loss of federal
funds to the State.505
Although the Proposition 209 prohibition on affirmative action
preferences will have a disproportionately adverse impact on the interests of women and racial minorities,506 proponents of Proposition
209 would presumably argue that Proposition 209 is governed by
Feeney and not by Washington v. Davis, because the primary purpose
of California voters in adopting Proposition 209 was to promote race
and gender neutrality “in spite of” rather than “because of” the disparate impact that Proposition 209 will have. That argument, however, is difficult to take seriously. Throughout the history of the Nation, white males have controlled the bulk of the social, economic and
political power exercised in the United States, typically by using formal legal rules to secure and retain their control over that power.
Initially, the rules were crass and blatantly discriminatory, as when
the government claimed title to lands forcibly taken from Native
Americans,507 or pronounced that black slaves were the property of
white slave owners,508 or denied women the right to own property509 or

504. Barry Bearak, Questions of Race Run Deep for Foe of Preferences, N.Y. TIMES, July
27, 1997, at A1.
505. See Proposition 209, § 31(c). For the full text of Proposition 209, see supra note 49.
506. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text (discussing district court findings of adverse impact Proposition 209 will have on women and racial minorities).
507. See, e.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587-92 (1823) (holding that
United States title to Native American lands was acquired through discovery and conquest); see
also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (holding that United States possesses title to Native American lands).
508. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 611, 613, 625-26 (1842) (invalidating
state statute as conflicting with property rights of white slave owners protected by federal law
under Rendition Clause of United States Constitution and under congressionally enacted Fugitive Slave Act of 1793).
509. Cf. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights
Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 162-63 (discussing Fourteenth Amendment’s one-time
impotence in the face of state laws restricting married women’s ability to “contract, hold property, litigate on their own behalf, or even control their own earnings”).
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to vote.510 Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, legal
techniques for the retention of power and resources by white males
have been more subtle and facially more neutral. But the effects
have remained discriminatory. Thus, the government now takes
lands from Native Americans by invoking the doctrine of sovereign
immunity,511 keeps black children out of white schools through legal
authorization of de facto rather than de jure segregation,512 and denies women the same level of health benefits that men receive by
basing its denials on pregnancy rather than on gender.513 Any neutrality in the way that the government allocates power and resources
is more rhetorical than real.
Since the days of Plessy, government insistence on equality has
been the preferred method for denying power to minorities who
would share resources with the majority.514 Revealingly, proponents
of Proposition 209 supported their political cause by invoking the
concept of colorblindness articulated in Justice Harlan’s Plessy dissent,515 even though Justice Harlan’s views rested on explicit claims of
white supremacy.516 This “equality” technique for refusing to share
resources has outlived even the Supreme Court’s 1954 overruling of
517
Plessy in Brown v. Board of Education. Now, equality has come to
mean that existing levels of general societal discrimination against
women and minorities must simply be disregarded in order to pursue
510. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874) (upholding state’s right to
refuse to allow women to vote).
511. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2033-35 (1997) (using
Eleventh Amendment’s embodiment of sovereign immunity doctrine to dismiss suit alleging
state interference with Native American ownership of tribal lands); cf. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1122-31 (1996) (using doctrine of sovereign immunity as embodied in the
Eleventh Amendment to dismiss suit alleging unlawful state interference with federally protected use of tribal lands for gaming activities).
512. See supra notes 396-402 and accompanying text.
513. See supra notes 428, 435 and accompanying text.
514. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548, 551-52 (1896) (upholding separate-but-equal
public facilities); cf. supra note 13 and accompanying text (citing cases in which “equality” has
been used to deny resources to minorities).
515. See H. Pashler, Yes on 209 Campaign Bulletin (visited Sept. 23, 1996) <http://192.41.11.
185/ccri/bb/843461540.html> (quoting statement in Justice Harlan’s Plessy dissent asserting that
“[o]ur Constitution is color-blind” to support adoption of Proposition 209).
516. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Gotanda’s interpretation of Justice Harlan’s vision of colorblindness).
517. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (overruling Plessy and declaring unconstitutional
separate-but-equal public facilities); see also supra notes 395-402 and accompanying text
(describing how Brown principle of equality has resulted in perpetuation of single race
schools).
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the abstract principle of prospective neutrality.518 Although this argument is nothing more than an artifact of a normative baseline preference,519 it is a difficult argument to rebut in a culture whose attention span often extends only as far as the next political sound bite or
recollection of the last economic recession. The equality technique
of contemporary oppression, therefore, possesses enhanced utility
precisely because it is too slippery for its victims to get a firm handle
on in a legal regime that refuses to accord legal significance to mere
discriminatory effects. Moreover, the equality technique of oppression permits the beneficiaries of the present resource allocation
scheme to congratulate themselves for their own commitment to
egalitarian principles—principles that, in Feeney terms, merely happen to give a disproportionate share of societal wealth to the present
beneficiaries “in spite of” their egalitarian intent. When proponents
of Proposition 209 insist that they are committed to the egalitarian
principle of race and gender neutrality, it is this brand of oppressive
equality that immediately comes to mind. This neutrality claim
sounds frighteningly similar to the neutrality claims that have repeatedly been advanced since the separate-but-equal neutrality of Plessy.
And although proponents of Proposition 209 insist that this time
things are different—that this time the neutrality claim is really
meant to be sincere—it is unlikely that anyone without a direct stake
in preserving the existing allocation of resources is inclined to be
fooled.
The political climate from which Proposition 209 has emanated
reinforces the belief that its claim of egalitarian purpose is more political than principled. Proposition 209 is part of the general antiaffirmative action backlash that emerged when white males began to
resent their loss of jobs and educational opportunities to women and
520
minorities in times of economic decline. While Proposition 209 was

518. See supra note 254 and accompanying text (discussing contemporary Supreme Court
view that general societal discrimination is not legally cognizable).
519. See supra notes 252-54 and accompanying text (discussing baseline assumptions in
equal protection analysis).
520. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v. Fordice: Why
Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1410 (1993) (noting
changing white attitudes during economic decline); Jennifer M. Russell, The Race/Class Conundrum and the Pursuit of Individualism in the Making of Social Policy, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1353,
1432-34 (1995) (discussing effect of economic decline on perception of affirmative action); Sean
M. Scott, Justice Redefined: Minority-Targeted Scholarships and the Struggle Against Racial
Oppression, 62 UMKC L. REV. 651, 663-67 (1994) (discussing lower-class white opposition to
affirmative action that develops in times of economic decline).
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a ballot initiative, Republican presidential candidates—including the
Governor of California—were running on anti-affirmative action
platforms in the 1996 Republican primaries; bills were being introduced in Congress to ban affirmative action; the Governor of California was banning affirmative action efforts by executive order; and
the Regents of the University of California were banning affirmative
action in University hiring and admissions.521 Although proponents
of Proposition 209 claimed to be committed to the allocation of resources on the basis of merit rather than on the basis of race or gender, they chose not to challenge affirmative action preferences such
as the preference for athletes or children of alumni, even though such
preferences appear to be responsible for more non-merit-based allocations of educational resources than race- or gender-based preferences.522
A simple thought experiment is sufficient to reveal just how little
credibility there is in the claim that Proposition 209 was motivated by
the desire to promote race and gender neutrality in the allocation of
resources.523 Demographically, white males are the only group that
favored the adoption of Proposition 209. Women, blacks, Latinos
and Asians all opposed adoption of the ballot initiative.524 The structure of contemporary society is such that white males possess a disproportionately large share of society’s power and resources, while
women and minorities possess a share that is disproportionately
small.525 Proposition 209 preserves this allocation of power and resources, in the name of equality, by prohibiting redistributive affirmative action programs that would alter the status quo. Now
imagine that the society is arranged so that white males possess a disproportionately small share of society’s power and resources. Imagine that height, strength, seniority, grades, standardized test scores
and country club connections all favor women and minorities, and
disfavor white males. Would the equality principle to which white
male supporters of Proposition 209 purport to adhere still cause those

521. See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text (discussing anti-affirmative action political climate).
522. See supra note 230 and accompanying text (discussing Harvard alumni preference).
523. Cf. STONE ET AL., supra note 128, at 628-30 (proposing similar thought experiment to
analyze racially-disparate impact of capital punishment).
524. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text (discussing demographic breakdown of
Proposition 209 voting).
525. See supra Part I.C.5 (discussing statistical advantages that white males have over
women and minorities).
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white males to favor Proposition 209, even though it would perpetuate their own social, economic and political disadvantage? Only if the
answer to this question is “yes” can we take seriously the claim that
Proposition 209 was adopted in order to promote race and gender
neutrality, rather than to preserve the existing allocation of societal
benefits. But it is hard to imagine that the answer to this question
could possibly be “yes.” The demographic correlation between supporters and beneficiaries of Proposition 209—as well as between opponents of Proposition 209 and those who will be adversely affected
by its adoption—suggests that much more is going on in the Proposition 209 debate than a disinterested dispute about abstract conceptions of equality. The issue of intentional resource allocation is what
is really at the core of Proposition 209.
Proponents of Proposition 209 might argue that Feeney permits
the voters of California to favor a diversion of societal resources from
women and minorities to white males as long as the intent of the voters is to benefit white males and not to harm women and minorities.526
Doctrinally, this reading of Feeney cannot be dismissed out of hand,
because the content of the Washington v. Davis intentional discrimination standard is too amorphous to have any definitive meaning.527
Intuitively, however, that reading seems hopelessly artificial. The
current affirmative action controversy has arisen because race and
gender groups are competing for the same limited supply of societal
resources. The zero-sum nature of resource allocation in such circumstances means that white males cannot be benefited without
harming the women and minorities who will be denied access to the
resources that are reserved for white males. Everyone knows that
this is so, and everyone knows it at a very conscious level. Accordingly, the choice between characterizing Proposition 209 as a measure
designed to benefit white males or as a measure designed to harm
women and minorities is simply an act of post hoc, result-oriented labeling.
The fact that the Supreme Court favored a “benefit” characterization over a “harm” characterization of legislative intent in Feeney
does not undermine the strength of this insight, but rather illustrates
526. See, e.g., Amar & Caminker, supra note 24, at 1023-24, 1034-35 (suggesting that
Proposition 209 would not constitute intentional discrimination under Feeney); cf. Sunstein,
supra note 466, at 157-64 (offering similar intentional discrimination argument to explain divergent outcomes in Seattle and Crawford cases).
527. See supra notes 497-99 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties with concept of
intentional discrimination).
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it. The Supreme Court could easily have come out the other way in
Feeney, just as it has in the Voting Rights cases it has considered in
the past several years.528 In invalidating the redistricting plans at issue
in those cases, the Court chose to characterize the plans as intentional efforts to harm white voters, although it could easily have
characterized the plans as efforts to benefit minority voters—just as it
characterized Feeney as an effort to benefit veterans. Moreover, under the permissive reading of Feeney, any law could be deemed valid
no matter how blatantly discriminatory it appeared to be. Even laws
prohibiting women from voting, or laws consigning blacks to slavery,
would be permissible as long as one focused on the substantial benefits that such laws conferred on white males and treated as merely incidental the burdens that the laws imposed on women and minorities.
The proposition that Feeney actually seems to stand for is the proposition that the relevant intent must be ascertained on an intuitive
level, because the concept of intentional discrimination is simply not
serviceable on a doctrinal level. And on an intuitive level, it seems
clear that the white males who voted for Proposition 209 continue to
believe that they are more entitled than women and minorities to win
the ongoing competition for societal resources, just as they have always won that competition in the past.
Also significant to a determination of voter intent is the fact that
Proposition 209 is but one of several recent measures adopted
through the California political system that evidence xenophobic disregard for the interests of those who compete with the majority for a
share of societal resources. Proposition 209, which prohibits redistribution of resources through affirmative action programs, was
529
adopted in 1996. Two years before the adoption of Proposition 209,
in the November 8, 1994 general election, the California electorate
adopted Proposition 187.530 Proposition 187—which was also a response to budget shortfalls, reductions in essential services and record-high unemployment—denies public education, non-emergency
medical services and public social services to aliens who are not legally in the United States.531 Moreover, the preamble to Proposition
187 candidly conceded that its purpose was to prevent “economic
528. See supra note 412 and accompanying text.
529. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
530. See Lolita K. Buckner Inniss, California’s Proposition 187—Does it Mean What it
Says? Does it Say What it Means? A Textual and Constitutional Analysis, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
577, 578 (1996).
531. See id. at 578-81.
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hardship caused by the presence of illegal aliens in this state.”532 Even
if one believes that it is appropriate to deny resources to aliens who
are not legally residing in the United States, Proposition 187 still supports the conclusion that California voters are more concerned with
the self-interested allocation of societal resources than with the abstract concept of equality. Although the common law imposes no
obligation to throw a rope to a person who is in danger of drowning,
we are nevertheless justified in drawing an inference about the character of someone who refuses to provide any assistance in such a
situation—even to a drowning trespasser.533
In 1986, the California voters also used the ballot initiative process to adopt Proposition 63, which amended the State Constitution to
declare that English was the official language of California.534 The
adoption of this official-English amendment, and of Proposition 187,
have been attributed to anti-immigrant sentiment in California.535 As
has been noted, the Board of Regents of the University of California
has voted to end all race and gender affirmative action in the University of California educational system.536 As a result, black and Latino
enrollments have dropped in law and medical schools, and no black
students were admitted to the 1997 entering law school class at Berkeley.537 In 1982, it was again the voters of California who used the
532. See id. at 617 (quoting section 1 of Proposition 187).
533. Implementation of Proposition 187 has been delayed by a preliminary injunction issued in the course of ongoing litigation concerning the constitutionality of the ballot initiative.
See id. at 578 (describing Proposition 187 litigation).
534. See CAL. CONST. art. III, § 6.
535. See, e.g., Steven W. Bender, Consumer Protection for Latinos: Overcoming Language
Fraud and English-Only in the Marketplace, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1027, 1058 (1996) (attributing
anti-immigrant sentiment to adoption of California official-English amendment and Proposition 187); Michael G. Colantuono, Comment, The Revision of American State Constitutions:
Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1473, 1511
(1987) (characterizing California official-English amendment as hostile to minorities); Note,
“Official English”: Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Services in the States, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1345, 1358-59 (describing xenophobic origins of California official-English
amendment).
536. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
537. See, e.g., Bearak, supra note 504, at A1 (reporting no blacks admitted to Berkeley law
school 1997 entering class); Louis Freedberg, UC’s Law Admissions Investigated; U.S. Checking
At 3 Schools For Violations Of Civil Rights, S.F. CHRON., July 15, 1997, at A1 (same); Amy
Wallace, UC Law Schools Face Discrimination Investigation; Education: Federal Civil Rights
Office Probes Allegation that under the Ban on Affirmative Action, Admissions Policies Favor
Whites, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 1997, at A3 (same); Education in California: After Preferences,
ECONOMIST, July 19, 1997, at 27-28 (same); cf. Peter Applebome, Affirmative Action Ban
Changes a Law School, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1997, at A14 (reporting that one black will be in
Berkeley law school 1997 entering class).
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ballot initiative process to amend the State Constitution to prohibit
State courts from ordering busing or mandatory pupil assignment as a
remedy for de facto public school segregation in the now-famous
538
Crawford case. In so doing, the California voters overruled the
California Supreme Court, which had interpreted the State Constitution to require the remedies that the Crawford amendment prohibited.539 The California voters also attempted unsuccessfully to repeal
the state’s fair housing statutes,540 and successfully adopted a statewide exclusionary zoning measure.541 Considered in the aggregate,
these measures demonstrate that the California political system has a
history of hostility to racial minorities so pronounced that it further
undermines the claim that Proposition 209 was motivated by a desire
for neutrality.
All of these factors suggest that Proposition 209 was motivated
by an intent to discriminate against women and minorities in the allocation of societal power and resources, rather than by a benign intent
to promote equality in the allocation of societal benefits. This inference is further strengthened by the fact that whites will soon cease to
be a majority in the state of California. Demographers predict that
early in the next century, whites will constitute a minority in California, with a majority of the State’s residents having roots that are
traceable to Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East or the Pacific Islands.542 A time-honored political maneuver is the use of struc-

538. See Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 531-32 (1982); see also supra notes 27175 and accompanying text (discussing Crawford).
539. See id. (upholding anti-busing amendment to California Constitution).
540. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380-81 (1967) (invalidating Proposition 14,
which amended California Constitution to prohibit enactment of fair housing legislation).
541. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 143 (1971) (upholding California statute requiring local referendum approval to fund public housing projects).
542. See Ruben J. Garcia, Comment, Critical Race Theory and Proposition 187: The Racial
Politics of Immigration Law, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 118, 138 (1995); see also, e.g., Rachel F. Moran, Foreword—Demography and Distrust: The Latino Challenge to Civil Rights and
Immigration Policy in the 1990’s and Beyond, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 2 (1995) (“Census projections
indicate that by 2020, Whites will constitute 34% of the state’s population; Latinos, 36%; Asian
Americans, 20%; African Americans, 8%; and Native Americans, 1%.”); Alex M. Johnson, Jr.,
The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007, 2060 n.220 (1991) (noting that whites will soon
cease to constitute majority in California); Deborah Ramirez, Empowerment: It’s Not Just
Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957, 961 (1995) (recognizing that whites could be
minority in California by year 2000); Alexandra Natapoff, Note, Trouble in Paradise: Equal
Protection and the Dilemma of Interminority Group Conflict, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1060
(1995) (“By the year 2050, people of color will make up approximately one-half of the United
States’ population . . . .” (citing William P. O’Hare, America’s Minorities—The Demographics
of Diversity, POPULATION BULL., Dec. 1992, at 2)).
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tural changes to stave off an impending loss of direct political power.
The facts surrounding Marbury v. Madison543 indicate that after the
election of 1800, the lame-duck Federalists tried to retain political
power through the “midnight” appointment of life-tenured federal
judges in the wake of their defeat at the polls by the new Republican
majority.544 It is reasonable to assume that the political majority in
California is similarly apprehensive about its impending loss of political power to racial minorities, now that minorities threaten to supplant whites as the political majority in the state. Proposition 209 and
the other xenophobic political measures that have been adopted in
California can be best understood as efforts to entrench existing political power through the addition of constitutional amendments and
other structural reforms that will make redistributive efforts difficult
after whites lose their majority status to racial minorities.
The history of South Africa reveals that a white minority can use
the legal system to control social, economic and political power even
in the face of a large non-white racial majority, as long as the racial
majority is given only truncated political rights.545 South Africa has
now ended its regime of formal apartheid, and has drafted interim
and permanent Constitutions that guarantee equality and insist on
the protection of minority rights.546 At least as a nominal matter, the
South African Constitutions explicitly permit the very type of affirmative action that Proposition 209 prohibits.547 It is more than a little ironic that the dominant political powers in South Africa, who
flourished under a regime of legally protected inequality, have now

543. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
544. See STONE ET AL., supra note 128, at 31-32 (discussing factual background of Marbury
decision).
545. See generally STEVEN DEBROEY, SOUTH AFRICA UNDER THE CURSE OF APARTHEID
187-220 (1990) (discussing state-sponsored racial oppression in South Africa during apartheid);
MICHAEL LOBBAN, WHITE MAN’S JUSTICE: SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL TRIALS IN THE
BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS ERA (1996) (same); LEONARD MONTEATH THOMPSON, A HISTORY
OF SOUTH AFRICA (1990) (same).
546. See Christopher A. Ford, Symposium on Affirmative Action: Challenges and Dilemmas
of Racial and Ethnic Identity in American and Post-Apartheid South African Affirmative Action, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1953, 1961-63 (1996); Adrien Katherine Wing & Eunice P. De Carvalho, Black South African Women: Toward Equal Rights, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 75 (1995);
cf. Sidney Kentridge, Civil Rights in Southern Africa: The Prospect for the Future, 47 MD. L.
REV. 271, 279 (1987) (discussing prospects for bill of rights in proposed South African Constitution).
547. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 546, at 1966-69 (discussing affirmative action provision of
permanent South African Constitution); Wing & De Carvalho, supra note 546, at 78-79 (same).
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embraced constitutional guarantees of equality and neutrality.548 But
it is also understandable. As the white South African power structure was threatened with a loss of political dominance, it realized that
it could rely on the constitutional safeguard of “equality” to perpetuate its economic and social advantage. Similarly, the existing power
structure in California, now likewise threatened with an impending
loss of political dominance, has realized that it too can rely on the
constitutional safeguard of “equality” to perpetuate its economic and
social advantages. Such a motive may be cunning, but it is far from
neutral. It entails the precise type of intentional discrimination that
triggers heightened scrutiny under Washington v. Davis.
3. Heightened Scrutiny. Once the Proposition 209 prohibition on
affirmative action preferences is subjected to heightened scrutiny
under Washington v. Davis, its unconstitutionality becomes
apparent.549 To the extent that Proposition 209 prohibits race-based
affirmative action, it constitutes a racial classification that is subject
to strict scrutiny under Korematsu and Adarand.550 A racial classification can be upheld under strict scrutiny only if it advances a
compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to the
advancement of that interest.551 To the extent that Proposition 209
prohibits gender-based affirmative action, it is a gender classification
that is subject to rigorous intermediate scrutiny under the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in The VMI Case.552 A gender classification
can be upheld under intermediate scrutiny only if it serves an
important government interest and is substantially related to the
advancement of that interest.553 Gender classifications rarely survive

548. See Kentridge, supra note 546, at 281 (pointing out irony, and black suspicion, of white
minority support for bill of rights in South African Constitution).
549. Cf. Amar & Caminker, supra note 24, at 1023-24, 1034-35 (arguing that Proposition
209 would likely survive constitutional scrutiny under Washington v. Davis because it would not
be viewed as intentionally discriminatory, but is nevertheless unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s political restructuring precedents).
550. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (prescribing strict scrutiny
for racial classifications); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227, 235 (1995)
(extending strict scrutiny to racial affirmative action programs).
551. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
552. See 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996) (requiring “exceedingly persuasive” justification for
gender classifications).
553. See id.
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intermediate scrutiny,554 and no racial classification has survived strict
scrutiny since Korematsu.555
It is difficult to see how the Proposition 209 preference prohibition could survive either strict or intermediate equal protection scrutiny. The only legitimate government interest that proponents of
Proposition 209 claim it advances is the promotion of equality
through race and gender neutrality.556 But, as the previous discussion
has demonstrated,557 Proposition 209 does more to advance intentional race and gender discrimination than it does to advance neutrality. In Coalition for Economic Equity, the district court easily
found that Proposition 209 failed to satisfy even the less-demanding
test of intermediate scrutiny that is applied to gender classifications,
precisely because it promoted discrimination rather than ameliorated
it.558 With respect to the State’s interest in promoting neutrality, the
district court termed Proposition 209 a “nonsequitur.”559 The court of
appeals never subjected Proposition 209 to heightened scrutiny, because it deemed Proposition 209 to be neutral and therefore not subject to heightened scrutiny.560

554. See id. (discussing difficult burden that state must meet to satisfy intermediate scrutiny).
555. See STONE ET AL., supra note 128, at 601 (noting that since Korematsu the Supreme
Court has not upheld a “race-specific statute disadvantaging a racial minority”). But cf. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (“[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but
fatal in fact.’” (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring))); Lawyer v. Department of Justice, 117 S. Ct. 2186, 2194-95 (1997) (upholding voter redistricting plan that considered race as factor, although plan omitted majority-minority district
at issue and seems to have been subject to only rational-basis scrutiny because race was not
“predominant” factor under Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995)). Although the government often uses explicit racial classifications, for one reason or another, the use of such classifications is often not subjected to explicit strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
See supra notes 403-12 and accompanying text (discussing government use of racial classifications).
556. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing claimed moral justifications for Proposition 209). In
the district court, Proposition 209 proponents also made the derivative argument that the state
had an interest in avoiding liability for race and gender discrimination under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1509 (N.D. Cal.
1996), rev’d, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
557. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing why Proposition 209 constitutes a race and gender
classification).
558. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1508-09.
559. Id. at 1509.
560. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 701 (9th Cir.) (deeming Proposition 209 neutral for “conventional” equal protection purposes), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397
(1997); id. at 707 (deeming Proposition 209 neutral for “political structure” equal protection
purposes).
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Once the discriminatory nature of Proposition 209 is understood,
it is unlikely that Proposition 209 could withstand even the normally
deferential, rational-basis standard of judicial review that the Court
applies to non-suspect governmental classifications.561 Proposition 209
prohibits women and racial minorities from protecting their interests
through the adoption of political measures that are designed to advance those interests. In so doing, Proposition 209 preserves the social, economic and political advantages that white males initially secured through the enactment of discriminatory laws and standards,
and now retain through the enactment of facially neutral laws and
standards that prevent redistribution by their correlation with white
male-ness.562 This historic and present preference for the interests of
white males over the interests of women and minorities is invidious.
It subsists on the belief that there is something about white males
that makes them more worthy than women or minorities, thereby
making it appropriate to benefit white males by sacrificing the interests of women and minorities. This privileging of the interests of one
group, and concomitant discounting of the interests of another, is
squarely prohibited by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Romer
563
v. Evans.
In Romer, the Court invalidated “Amendment 2” to the Colorado Constitution on equal protection grounds.564 Amendment 2 did
two things. First, it repealed several local human rights ordinances
that prohibited discrimination against individuals based on their sexual orientation.565 Second, it prohibited future legislative, executive
or judicial actions at any level of state or local government that were
designed to protect gay men, lesbians or bisexuals from discrimination based upon their sexual preferences.566 Like Proposition 209,
Amendment 2 prohibited “quota preferences” in favor of the subject
classes.567 In fact, the Amendment was entitled “No Protected Status
561. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 594 (1979) (applying rational-basis scrutiny to non-suspect classifications in order to defer to policy decisions made by
representative branches); see also STONE ET AL., supra note 128, at 567-77 (discussing and
questioning judicial competence to override means/ends determinations made by representative branches).
562. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing ways in which Proposition 209 preserves advantages
that white males have over women and racial minorities).
563. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
564. See id. at 1622.
565. See id. at 1623.
566. See id.
567. Id.
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Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation.”568 The
Colorado Supreme Court invalidated Amendment 2 under strict
equal protection scrutiny, holding that invalidation was required by
the Supreme Court’s political restructuring precedents.569 However,
in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, the United States Supreme
Court emphasized that it was affirming the Colorado Supreme Court
judgment “on a rationale different from that adopted by the State
Supreme Court.”570
Ascertaining the Supreme Court’s different rationale for invalidating Amendment 2 is a challenging task.571 The difficulty is created
by the fact that the United States Supreme Court was unwilling to
treat sexual preference as a suspect classification entitled to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.572 If classifications
based on sexual preferences were held to be suspect, the Supreme
Court could easily have subjected Amendment 2 to heightened scrutiny and invalidated it as the Court almost always invalidates governmental classifications under heightened scrutiny. However, by
holding that sexual preference was a suspect classification, the Court
would have jeopardized the constitutionality of recent measures that
the Court was apparently unwilling to invalidate. For example, if
sexual preference were treated as a suspect classification, it would be
difficult for the Court to uphold the Federal Defense of Marriage
Act573 effort to deny spousal benefits to members of gay and lesbian
married couples,574 or to uphold the “Don’t Ask/Don’t Tell” policy
568. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b. Unlike Proposition 209, Amendment 2 did not include
a discrimination prohibition. However, Justice Scalia’s dissent argued that Amendment 2 did
nothing more than prohibit governmental preferences for individuals with nontraditional sexual preferences, because special protections against discrimination based on sexual preference
would in fact constitute a governmental preference. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629-31 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
569. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1286 (Colo. 1993). For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s political restructuring precedents see supra notes 264-75 and accompanying text.
570. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1624.
571. Commentators have pointed out the difficulties entailed in ascertaining the meaning of
the Court’s opinion in Romer. See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49
STAN. L. REV. 45, 84-87 (1996) (noting doctrinal difficulties in Romer opinion); Seidman, supra
note 491, at 73 (same); Cass R. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6, 9
(1996) (same).
572. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627 (applying rational basis scrutiny to Amendment 2).
573. Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419.
574. See generally Mark Strasser, Loving the Romer Out for Baehr: On Acts in Defense of
Marriage and the Constitution, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 279, 301-04 (1997) (arguing that the Federal
Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional on several grounds); Leonard G. Brown III,
Comment, Constitutionally Defending Marriage: The Defense of Marriage Act, Romer v. Evans
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designed to deal with the controversy over excluding gay men, lesbians and bisexuals from service in the military.575
The Supreme Court’s unwillingness to treat sexual preference as
a suspect classification left the Court struggling for a way to invalidate Amendment 2, which six justices found too objectionable to uphold. It was not easy for the Court to invalidate Amendment 2 under
the deferential, rational-basis scrutiny that the Court applies to nonsuspect classifications, because rational-basis scrutiny rarely results in
the invalidation of governmental classifications.576 As a result, the
Court had to come up with a way of explaining why Amendment 2
was so unusual that it could not withstand even minimal equal protection scrutiny. What the Court said was that Amendment 2 “seems
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it
lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”577 The
Court added that “if the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a
bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”578
The Romer Court explicitly rejected the State’s argument that
Amendment 2 was constitutionally justified because it did no more
than place people with nontraditional sexual preferences in the same
position as all other people by denying them special rights.579 The
Court also rejected the claim that Amendment 2 was justified by the
State’s interest in deferring to the associational preferences of private
individuals such as employers and landlords who had personal or religious objections to nontraditional sexual behavior.580 The Court
and the Cultural Battle They Represent, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 159, 173-86 (1996) (arguing for
the constitutionality of the Act); Diane M. Guillerman, Comment, The Defense of Marriage
Act: The Latest Maneuver in the Continuing Battle to Legalize Same-Sex Marriage, 34 HOUS. L.
REV. 425, 464-71 (1997) (questioning constitutionality of the Act).
575. See generally Kay Kavanagh, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Deception Required, Disclosure
Denied, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 142 (1995) (discussing “Don’t Ask/Don’t Tell” policy);
Mark Strasser, Unconstitutional? Don’t Ask; If It Is, Don’t Tell: On Deference, Rationality, and
the Constitution, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 375 (1995) (same).
576. See STONE ET AL., supra note 128, at 561-70 (discussing deference accorded under rational-basis review due to lack of judicial competence to override means/ends determinations
made by representative branches).
577. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
578. Id. at 1628 (ellipsis in original) (alteration omitted) (quoting Department of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
579. See id. at 1624.
580. See id. at 1629. Although the Court stated that Amendment 2 was “far removed from”
this deference-to-private-preference justification, see id., Amendment 2, in fact, seems directly
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concluded that the State had departed from a constitutionally mandated level of neutrality because it left an array of antidiscrimination
measures in place, and invalidated only those antidiscrimination
measures that protected individuals with nontraditional sexual preferences.581 The Court viewed the Amendment 2 departure from this
baseline of antidiscrimination measures as further evidence of discriminatory animus.582
Romer is not a doctrinally satisfying decision. As Justice Scalia’s
dissent was quick to point out, states are permitted to disfavor at
least some forms of behavior on the grounds that the behavior is
morally objectionable.583 For example, moral disapproval permits
states to prohibit murder, cruelty to animals and polygamy, and it is
not clear why moral disapproval of nontraditional sexual preferences
should be treated any differently.584 Justice Scalia also emphasized
that the Romer majority had not even mentioned—let alone overruled—Bowers v. Hardwick,585 a case in which the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia statute that the Court read
as prohibiting homosexual sodomy.586 If a state was free to punish
nontraditional sexual behavior with criminal sanctions, the state
should also be free to take the less draconian step of disfavoring such
behavior by repealing the antidiscrimination provisions that protected it.587 Justice Scalia also questioned the majority’s conclusion
that Amendment 2 evidenced voter animus toward individuals with
nontraditional sexual preferences, pointing out that Colorado was
one of the first states to repeal its sodomy laws.588 Although Colorado voters disapproved of nontraditional sexual behavior, that did
not mean that the voters bore animus toward the people who engaged
in such behavior.589

responsive to this justification because it prohibits the government from coercing private parties into relinquishing their discriminatory preferences. The Court must therefore mean that
the government cannot legitimately endorse private discriminatory preferences that are as invidious as the discriminatory preferences it deems to be protected by Amendment 2.
581. See id. at 1624-26.
582. See id. at 1628-29.
583. See id. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
584. See id. at 1635-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
585. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
586. See id. at 196.
587. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
588. See id. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
589. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Romer seems to stand for the proposition that a governmental
entity cannot invidiously impose burdens on an identifiable group
simply because it dislikes the members of that group due to some
immutable group characteristic.590 Ironically, the arguments made by
Justice Scalia in dissent tend to support this reading of the case. By
illustrating the difficulty in finding any other doctrinal distinction between Amendment 2 and other moral prohibitions that the majority
is willing to uphold, Justice Scalia’s reasoning suggests that only invidious dislike can account for the majority’s result. Although Justice
Scalia questions the animus of Colorado voters, it is noteworthy that
he does not dispute the general proposition that governmental animus is impermissible. He concedes that, “[o]f course it is our moral
heritage that one should not hate any human being or class of human
beings.”591 However, Justice Scalia distinguishes between disapproval
of human beings and disapproval of the conduct in which human beings may sometimes engage.592 Romer can therefore be read to permit
governmental imposition of burdens designed to deter conduct that
the state finds to be morally objectionable—including murder, cruelty to animals and nontraditional sexual conduct—but not to permit
governmental imposition of burdens based on an immutable status of
which the government disapproves. Romer permits the government
to burden conduct that is susceptible to being deterred, but does not
permit the government to burden an immutable status that is not susceptible to deterrence. Indeed, commentators have argued that
Romer stands for the proposition that the government is not permitted to treat any group as a pariah,593 or as the target of a bill of attainder,594 and even that the implications of the Romer holding are vast
590. This reading of Romer rests on the view that nontraditional sexual preferences are innate rather than voluntarily adopted—a view that is controversial. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills,
Jr., Is Amendment 2 Really A Bill of Attainder? Some Questions About Professor Amar’s
Analysis of Romer, 95 MICH. L. REV. 236, 242-46 (1996) (discussing debate concerning innate
nature of sexual preference).
591. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
592. See id. at 1632-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Note, however, that Justice Scalia also states
that the government can treat nontraditional sexual preference as a surrogate for nontraditional sexual conduct. See id. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The distinction between status
and conduct has been the subject of much legal scholarship. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer,
Reading Entrails: Romer, VMI and the Art of Divining Equal Protection, 32 TULSA L.J. 361,
385 n.181 (1997) (citing sources discussing the “status/conduct divide”).
593. See Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY
257, 258 (1996).
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enough to revive a Warren Court tradition of redistributive judicial
activism designed to advance egalitarian moral objectives.595
Romer seems to preclude a finding that Proposition 209 can satisfy even rational-basis scrutiny, because Proposition 209 entails the
same type of invidious discounting of group interests based on immutable characteristics that Amendment 2 entailed. As in Romer,
Proposition 209 “seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward
the class that it affects,”596 and as in Romer, the Equal Protection
Clause “must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”597 Like Romer, Proposition 209 cannot be justified as an
effort to place women and minorities in the same position as all other
people by denying them special rights,598 and it cannot be justified by
the state’s interest in deferring to the associational preferences of
that portion of the electorate that had personal objections to affirmative action.599 Just as in Romer, Proposition 209 departed from a constitutionally mandated level of neutrality by leaving an array of other
affirmative action preferences in place.600 And, as in Romer, the
Proposition 209 departure from this baseline of preferences constituted further evidence of discriminatory animus.601
The only reason that the California electorate could have had for
favoring the interests of white males over the interests of women and
minorities is that the electorate invidiously discounted the interests of
women and minorities. An abstract interest in race and gender
equality cannot adequately account for the adoption of Proposition
209, because the Proposition 209 preference prohibition preserves
race and gender inequality rather than promoting equality in the allo594. See Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 203, 203-04, 221-28 (1996). But see Hills, supra note 590, at 236 (arguing that Amendment 2 is not a bill of attainder, but is nevertheless invalid because of its breadth).
595. See Seidman, supra note 491, at 67-73, 96-98.
596. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
597. Id. at 1628 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973)).
598. Cf. id. at 1624 (rejecting as “implausible” Colorado’s argument that Amendment 2
merely puts gays and lesbians in the same position as other persons).
599. Cf. id. at 1629 (refusing to credit Colorado’s alleged interest in respecting the associational rights of those people who have personal objections to homosexuality).
600. Cf. id. at 1624-28 (concluding that Amendment 2, as a law which subjects only homosexuals and no others to a detrimental change in legal status, is a denial of equal protection).
601. Cf. id. at 1628 (observing that the disadvantage Amendment 2 imposes upon homosexuals raises “the inevitable inference” that the disadvantage is rooted in animosity towards
homosexuals).
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cation of societal resources. And Proposition 209 cannot be explained by an interest in ensuring that resources are allocated on the
basis of merit, because Proposition 209 leaves in place all other affirmative action preferences that can supplant traditional measures of
merit, including veterans preferences, athletic preferences, preferences for disabled individuals, geographic preferences, age preferences, preferences for individuals with learning disabilities, artist
preferences, low-income preferences, preferences for alumni children, and the like.602 Moreover, the very suggestion that women and
minorities possess less merit than the white males who currently control the bulk of societal resources smacks of invidious prejudice. If it
were true that women and minorities possessed less merit than white
males, that would be an indication that the society was structured in a
way that discriminated either in the manner in which merit was assessed, or in the manner in which training and educational opportunities for acquiring merit were allocated. The only other explanation
for discrepancies in the allocation of merit—the explanation that the
California electorate apparently accepted—is that women and minorities are inherently less “meritorious” than white males.603 And
that is a view that certainly entails the type of discriminatory animus
that Romer declares to be constitutionally impermissible.
CONCLUSION
Like most propositions, California’s Proposition 209 attempts to
be seductive. It promises that by eliminating our race and gender affirmative action programs we can solve the problems of race and
gender discrimination that have tainted our culture since the Nation
was founded. Although women and minorities have traditionally
been viewed as the victims of discrimination, Proposition 209 asserts
that under a liberated understanding of contemporary culture,
women and minorities are actually the perpetrators of discrimination.
White males have become the forgotten victims. For proponents of
Proposition 209, the antidiscrimination requirements that Brown and
the Civil Rights laws of the 1960s instituted are adequate to eliminate
any lingering problems of discrimination against women and minori-

602. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1498 n.19, 1499, 1505
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (enumerating types of affirmative action preferences that are untouched by
Proposition 209), rev’d, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
603. Cf. Spann, supra note 194, at 90-94 (suggesting that opposition to affirmative action
rests on belief that minorities are inherently inferior).
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ties that persist in our present culture. But the reverse discrimination
caused by affirmative action has slipped through the cracks of our antidiscrimination laws. As a result, we now need a distinct prohibition
on race and gender preferences to preserve the type of equality that
the framers envisioned. Because the United States Constitution can
no longer be trusted to preserve that conception of equality, we must
rely on Proposition 209 to prohibit the affirmative action preferences
that the Constitution allows.
That is quite a Proposition. And although it seems transparently
self-interested to me, the question of whether the culture at large
should be seduced by this Proposition is a question that is inherently
political. In a democracy, social policy should be made through the
political process. However, the history of the Supreme Court in
dealing with the formulation of race and gender policy suggests that
the Supreme Court will be reluctant to relinquish control over the social policy issues raised by Proposition 209. That reluctance is unfortunate, because the social desirability of Proposition 209 seems to
constitute a quintessentially “political question.” The Equal Protection Clause is doctrinally too indeterminate to permit the Court to
ascertain the validity of Proposition 209 without ultimately substituting its own policymaking preferences for the preferences of the
electorate that adopted it. The magnitude of this doctrinal indeterminacy is illustrated by the striking divergence that exists between
the rulings of the district court and the court of appeals on the constitutionality of Proposition 209. It is also illustrated by the difficulties
that one encounters in attempting to conduct one’s own analysis of
how the Supreme Court’s “conventional” and “political structure”
precedents should apply to the constitutional questions raised by
Proposition 209.
Notwithstanding the absence of doctrinal constraint to guide the
exercise of judicial discretion, the Supreme Court has already intervened in the formulation of affirmative action policy. It has applied
heightened equal protection scrutiny to invalidate affirmative action
programs adopted through the political process that fail to comply
with norms that the Court has found in the Constitution. Therefore,
unless the Court is willing to overrule those decisions and to withdraw from the political debate about affirmative action, consistency
requires the Court to apply that same heightened scrutiny to the
Proposition 209 prohibition on affirmative action, and to invalidate
Proposition 209 under the same constitutional norms that it has used
to invalidate affirmative action programs.
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Although the lower courts focused on a political structure analysis of Proposition 209, intuitively more satisfying analyses of Proposition 209 are available. The Court can subject Proposition 209 to
heightened scrutiny as an affirmative action program for white males
that redistributes resources on the basis of race and gender, just as it
subjects other affirmative action programs to heightened scrutiny on
that ground. Or it can subject Proposition 209 to heightened scrutiny
under the intentional discrimination standard of Washington v.
Davis. A number of factors strongly suggest that the voters of California utilized the purported facial neutrality of Proposition 209 in a
surreptitious manner to take resources away from women and minorities and redistribute them to the white males on whose political
support Proposition 209 was based. The race and gender animus inherent in Proposition 209’s discriminatory reallocation of resources
not only precludes Proposition 209 from surviving heightened scrutiny, but under Romer v. Evans, it precludes Proposition 209 from
surviving the more deferential standard of rational-basis scrutiny as
well.
A major premise of this Article has been that the Supreme Court
should be consistent in the way that it treats affirmative action and
prohibitions on affirmative action. If the Court were to read the
Equal Protection Clause selectively to prohibit women and minorities
from redistributing resources through the adoption of affirmative action programs, while permitting whites and males to redistribute resources through the adoption of Proposition 209, the Court would be
engaged in a form of race and gender discrimination that is antithetical to the countermajoritarian function that the Supreme Court is
typically said to serve. Nevertheless, the suggestion that the Supreme
Court can operate in a countermajoritarian manner that is immune
from the discriminatory inclinations of the overall political culture is
a claim that is difficult to maintain. The Supreme Court itself is part
of the political culture, and as such can stray only so far from popular
political preferences. Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s resolution of
the Proposition 209 issue will be important not so much for its immediate disposition of that issue, but for its less-immediate revelation
about how far our culture has progressed.
In the past, race and gender discrimination in the allocation of
resources was unabashedly rampant. In the future, such discrimination will hopefully become an embarrassing relic of the past. What
Proposition 209 does is present the Supreme Court with one of its periodic opportunities to give us cultural feedback about how far we
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have traveled along our developmental continuum. Proposition 209
seeks to do to women and minorities what those who use propositions always seek to do to those at whom their propositions are directed. It would be nice to think that principled argument could
prompt the Supreme Court to respond to this effort in a way that
would move us further along the continuum of social progress. But
the most that we can realistically expect the Court to do is give us
feedback about how far we have progressed to date. The Supreme
Court is inescapably a part of our culture. And we can never successfully prevent ourselves from being who we are.
We are a culture in which the influence of race and gender is so
relentless that the possibility of race and gender neutrality remains
realistically out of reach. In such a culture, Proposition 209 is perhaps most significant for its demonstration of the contradiction inherent in trying to get beyond the problems of race and gender by
pretending that race and gender no longer matter. If the Proposition
209 prohibition on race and gender preferences is genuinely desirable, the first thing that Proposition 209 should be used to invalidate
is Proposition 209 itself.

